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Solton on U.S. Freezing Nuclear Test Talks

LD2401142990 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Washington has decided to postpone for an indefinite period talks with the Soviet Union on limiting and banning nuclear testing after the control protocols for what are known as the threshold agreements are ready. These agreements include the 1974 treaty on limiting the capacity of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotonnes and the 1976 treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Yuriy Solton looks at the reasons that have caused the White House's decision:

When the Soviet and the American sides resumed talks on nuclear testing last week many, including myself, felt very optimistic about them. They were sure that the delegations would manage to prepare the control protocols for the threshold agreements, and those would be signed during the Bush-Gorbachev meeting in June. (?This certainly still exists but as it is was believed) the completion of the work on to the protocols was to mark the beginning of a new stage in the talks. I would like to recall at this point that back in September 1987 a joint statement issued by the Soviet and American sides pointed out that after the control protocols had been prepared, the sides would get down to the work of discussing further intermediate limitations of nuclear testing on the way to the final goal, their total halting as part of the disarmament process.

And now we have, as the Americans themselves say, this dramatic departure from the coordinated stand made by the Bush administration. It is believed here in Moscow that a new situation is developing, pertaining on the question of Soviet-American talks on nuclear testing. As the official spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry has declared, the change in the American stand may have the most negative effect on the talks, whose successful completion the two sides were so much interested in.

In my opinion, as the Soviet-American summit meeting approaches, where most important disarmament agreements are to be signed, the opponents of disarmament began raising their heads. Despite the obvious easing of the military danger in the world, they are trying to (?revive) the thesis about the so-called Soviet military threat. This can be illustrated by the statement made recently by the chairman of the American Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Colin Powell. After admitting that positive changes were taking place in the world, the general declared that the Soviet Union was and remains the communist military superpower. According to the general it would remain the only country in the world having the military potential capable of destroying the United States, or its positions, capable of hampering national interests all over the world. General Powell called on the administration to continue pursuing the policy from a position of strength.

The White House, it seems, is yielding to the pressure of the rightwingers. Otherwise it would be difficult for me to explain the decision to actually freeze the talks on halting nuclear testing.

Vienna Meeting Discusses Military Doctrine

LD2401215990 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna January 24 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov:

Structure of armed forces is discussed at the second stage of the seminar on military doctrines under way in the Austrian capital. Having discussed generalized questions related to military-political and military-technology aspects of national doctrines, the seminar started discussing specifics. The seminar is attended by military commanders, diplomats and scientists from European countries, as well as from the United States and Canada.

U.S. representative, Major General J. Robinson described the structure of U.S. forces in Europe and declared in support of the concept of collective defence with the use of the strategy of forward-based defenses.

He declared NATO's adherence to the concept of flexible reacting which allows for the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

He welcomed radical political, economic and social changes in Europe, as well as positive military steps taken by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

At the same time the U.S. representative said that the U.S. experts favour a cautious approach and wait till their understanding of the strategic situation becomes profound enough and nothing remains unclear.

In this connection he emphasized profound interest in the thorough study of the Soviet notion of reasonable sufficiency of armaments.

The essence of this notion was explained by member of the Soviet delegation, Lieutenant General Franz Markovskiy, first deputy chief of the Board of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

He said that the term "defence sufficiency" means the minimal level of military potentials of a country or a coalition, ensuring reliable defence of a state and its allies.

The principle of defence sufficiency envisages complete elimination of nuclear arms, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

He said that these purposes apparently cannot be achieved at once. There will be a need of stage-by-stage reductions, preserving balance, strategic stability and mutual security at every stage.

As regards strategic offensive arms, the principle of defence sufficiency means approximate balance of these armaments between the Soviet Union and the United States, Markovskiy said.

The structure of these armaments might be different, but potentials at every level should be equal.

"It is from this viewpoint that we negotiate with the United States 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms," he said.

As regards conventional arms, defence sufficiency envisages the ability of the sides to rebuff a possible aggression but at the same time they are unable to launch a surprise attack or to conduct large-scale offensive operations. In view of this the armed forces should have a non-offensive structure. The composition of strike systems should be limited. Groups of armed forces should be deployed with taking into consideration defensive tasks. The scales of military production should be decreased.

The Soviet Union is unilaterally embarking on the issue of the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The numerical strength of its troops is being reduced, its military budget is being decreased.

But full implementation of the principle of defence sufficiency is possible only on a basis of reciprocity, Markovskiy said.

Noting that the chief political purpose of West Germany is the preservation of peace and prevention of any war, conventional or nuclear, West German representative, Read-Admiral Frank asserted that the deployment of troops of NATO partners of West Germany in the country's territory in peacetime is necessary.

He said that in the present situation West Germany, because of economic and political reasons, should have a much greater number of military units that it has at present.

At the same time he noted that the West German Government recently decided to reduce the Bundeswehr personnel from 495,000 to 470,000 by 1995.

Chervov Remarks on Seminar

LD2401232190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast; video report from Vienna by V. Mikhayev, including remarks by Colonel Nikolay Chervov—recorded; first paragraph read by announcer]

[Text] A seminar on military doctrine is taking place in Vienna. It is being attended by the chiefs of general staff of the European states, the United States, and Canada.

[V. Mikheyev, captioned, shown outside building] The Soviet Union has presented its military doctrine, the gist of which is the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. NATO representatives have stated that an end should be sought to the era of confrontation. But their military doctrine consists of the principles of forward-based defense, flexible response, and sufficient deterrence by means of conventional and nuclear armaments, and the use of mighty naval forces.

[Video shows Mikheyev seated with Chervov] An animated and robust discussion has been under way at the Vienna seminar over the last few days about which military doctrine meets in a more precise and better way the interests and aspirations of the European peoples.

[Chervov] The NATO representatives would like to persuade us that the structure, formation, disposition, and grouping of their armed forces need no reduction, and that their doctrines should remain as they are. Naturally, we are attempting to use specific and factual material to persuade our partners that the reliance on a first strike, the reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons, and altogether doctrines based on nuclear weapons are offensive doctrines. It is not only we who should change and restructure ourselves, but also our opponents and the NATO countries. In particular, they should change their doctrine of nuclear deterrence and change the structure of their armed forces. Representatives of the NATO countries find it difficult to answer our questions. In general, I should like to stress once again that despite the general nature of the discussions, they are nevertheless proceeding in a constructive spirit, and I am convinced that the seminar as a whole will proceed in the same direction and will yield much benefit for the Vienna talks, above all.

Editor Sees Changes in Military Thinking

PM2301145390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Gennadiy Zafesov, deputy editor of PRAVDA for international information, under "Viewpoint" rubric: "When Aphorisms Become Decrepit"]

[Text] We all resort to aphorisms from time to time. Indeed, why not use an idea sometimes checked out over centuries? But it looks as though many aphorisms in our rapidly changing age are becoming decrepit and are on their deathbed. Indeed, who today would venture to assert an old truism like: "If you want peace, prepare for war" or "war is the continuation of politics by different means?"

I would say that the lethal power of the nuclear weapons now accumulated on our planet has itself killed off these postulates. Because building policy on the basis of the arms race is shortsighted, while implementing it by the means of warfare is simply fatal: In that event there would be no spot on earth where life and civilization would be preserved.

Perestroyka, and primarily its international aspect, has become an important factor in the normalization of the international climate. The change in our approaches toward the solution of problems which seemed hopeless has improved matters. In noting this I think there is no

point in wondering whose initiatives served as impetus to the adoption of specific steps and whose pragmatic response allowed them to be implemented: first attaining treaties and agreements and then destroying Soviet and U.S. medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles.

By the end of the year nearly 1,500 Soviet missiles and about 500 U.S. missiles had been eliminated. What recently might have seemed a bold fantasy had become fact. The importance of what has been achieved is enormous, but after all it is only the first step. They say that making a start is half the work. With all respect to the optimism included in this beginning we realize that an enormous amount of work lies ahead to clear the earth of the barriers of weapons.

Let us note one undisputed fact: The achievements which have softened the political climate on the planet and made it safer and more resistant to the virus of confrontation could be implemented only as a result of the East-West dialogue which has become a universal means for the normalization of the entire international sphere. It looks as though the new thinking is now encompassing not only the offices of politicians and diplomats but also the military men's headquarters.

People may object that the military fulfill decisions taken at the political level. That is true, but only in part. I think that there is some feedback here: The position of the military cannot be overlooked in elaborating a foreign policy line. It is perfectly obvious, however, that the new trends are permeating both our own army milieu and the Western army milieu. A complex breakdown of existing stereotypes is under way. Man in general cannot change his views, mode of thinking, and working skills in an instant. Let's not overlook the fact that the professional military man is all his life psychologically in a state of combat readiness. After all, his very profession presupposes that at any moment an order may transport him from the maps at headquarters to the battlefield. Indeed, the military man prepares himself for the possibility of such a turn of events.

Let us add that the existence of a real or potential enemy is an essential condition of his activity. If there is no enemy the question naturally arises: What are the military for at all. It is difficult and sometimes even dramatic to suddenly find yourself faced with the fact that the profession to which you have given your life is no longer needed. Actually, I have gone a long way in my hypotheses. But I should very much like that in the foreseeable future there should be fewer people both in our country and in the West whose profession is linked with war and armaments. Perhaps that is why the shoots of the new thinking are so promising both among the military themselves and in mutual relations between them, so to speak, at international level. It is as though a new aspect has arisen which I would call the military-diplomatic aspect. With hand on heart, scarcely any of us could have imagined 3 years ago the exchange of visits by top military men representing opposing blocs. To me at least this seemed utterly implausible. Now this is part of international practice. And matters are not restricted to strictly protocol meetings. In some areas the military are even setting examples worthy of emulation. A small detail.

Last year, as a member of the delegation from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, I visited the U.S. city of San Diego. My colleagues who work permanently in the United States envied me with a pure envy. That city is closed to them because there is a large naval base there. But for our defense minister San Diego hospitably opened its doors. In what is that not an example for emulation? You think it is a solitary example? Nothing of the kind. The Soviet foreign minister has visited the Brussels NATO Headquarters. Without succumbing to euphoria let us nonetheless note that this incident is as yet absolutely unique but easily falls within the new approaches toward which the Warsaw Pact and NATO are feeling their way in mutual relations between the two blocs.

Of course, the ideal would be to dissolve both blocs, which the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies consistently advocate. Let us be frank, this idea has so far failed to acquire even the remote contours of reality. Above all because the Western participants in the dialogue in my opinion are not ready for such a radical step. Moreover, many people oppose it. Probably, to think realistically, we must proceed from the premise that in the foreseeable future both NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be retained but their role and at the same time their contribution to the development of the process of international security can and must change. And the symptoms of this are already appearing obviously enough.

A seminar is under way in Vienna on military doctrines in which the chiefs of general staff of the European states and also the United States and Canada have taken part. In brief, we are witnessing military men from opposing blocs not looking at each other through the narrow sights of a gun but are exchanging opinions at a "roundtable." Perhaps only the historians of the future will assess in full this fact as just one step toward aphorisms about war completely losing their meaning.

Glazunov on Withdrawing Troops From Europe

LD2401201190 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth of Hungary has told Parliament that an agreement was reached with the USSR on withdrawing Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. Viktor Glazunov comments:

[Glazunov] The deployment of troops in foreign countries is undoubtedly something abnormal, even if based on committments between allies. Now that the cold war is over its instruments should die out. This involves military alliances and the presence of foreign troops connected with them. This isn't a simple process. It requires a balance of interests. Moreover, it requires reciprocity, but it has to begin. In late 1988 the Soviet

Union declared at the United Nations that it would unilaterally withdraw a considerable part of its troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia. Dozens of thousands of servicemen, thousands of tanks, hundreds of planes, and other weapons, have already been pulled out. A week ago, the first round of talks between the USSR and Czechoslovakia took place. The talks are aimed at removing all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. They will be resumed in Moscow in February. In the near future a delegation of Soviet experts will go to Budapest to work out a schedule for withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary.

These facts are particularly important today when East European countries are swept by serious political changes. In the light of the Soviet Union's willingness to withdraw all its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the old notions that the presence of Soviet troops is a guarantee for maintaining Moscow-oriented regimes in Eastern Europe loses its substance, even though there used to be grounds for it. It's enough to recall the 1956 developments in Budapest and the 1968 events in Prague, when Soviet troops were used to consolidate the regimes favored by the then Soviet leaders.

Today the Soviet Union confirms not only with words, but also deeds, its respect for the freedom of choice of every nation. Witness its readiness to remove all its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, this issue has a more general aspect. It involves the political and military situation in Europe and the line-up of forces belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. As a matter of fact, while Soviet troops are stationed in East European countries, American troops are deployed in West European states. In my view the question of the presence of foreign troops in Europe—in its East or in its West—must be settled in the context of the need to lower military confrontation on the continent. Military tensions in Europe would further decrease if, as the USSR suggests, both Soviet and American troops leave European countries by 1995. And for the future the rule must be: No foreign troops anywhere.

PRAVDA Comparison of Moiseyev Interview

PM2301114590

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 22 January 1990 carries in its First Edition on page 5 an interview with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. The 22 January PRAVDA item, entitled "Removing Suspicion," has been compared with the translation of the 21 January Moscow PRAVDA Russian Second Edition version published in 22 January Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 1, revealing the following variation:

Page 2, column two, paragraph five, sentence four reads: ...was unfeigned interest.

[Melnikov] What can... (deleting passage, picking up paragraph six)

Gerasimov Cites Bush on Transcaucasus Events

LD2401182990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] A briefing on current issues in international politics took place today in the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaking to Soviet and foreign journalists Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, said in particular:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] We establish with satisfaction that the actions of the Soviet leadership in settling the interethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus have been received with understanding by the overwhelming majority of countries, if not everywhere, by governments, and by the public. A great many examples may be cited. For example, George Bush, President of the United States, said in an interview with the magazine NEWSWEEK that before us is a situation where the Soviet Union is attempting to clear up an ethnic and internal conflict. Waldegrave, minister of state for foreign affairs of Great Britain, has declared that the British Government regards as reasonable and necessary those measures taken to restore law and order in the Transcaucasus and to settle the conflict which has arisen exclusively on the basis of internecine contradictions.

Kaifu, the prime minister of Japan, may be quoted. He noted that the measures of the Soviet leadership were necessary for the restoration of order which was infringed as a result of ethnic clashes. We could even go back into the past.

Our southern neighbors are also demonstrating understanding. Here, for example, Yilmaz, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, in a report for the press expressed such advice—I quote: It is to be hoped that the Azerbaijanis will not give in to incitement and provocations and will give support to the justified and well- grounded actions which, we are convinced, will be undertaken by the Soviet Government in order to ensure stability in the region.

The view of events from official Tehran is distinctive. Here there is a tendency to lay the blame for what has happened on the West which undertook, in Tehran's opinion, I quote: Provocative steps for the purpose of pushing the Soviet Union into discrimination against various Soviet republics.

Some of the Islamic countries' mass media consider that the events in the Transcaucasus are connected not so much with nationalist manifestations as with Islamic moods. In connection with this I would like once more to recall our evaluation of the events. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has, in our appraisal, an intranationality, economic, and social basis, and is of an ethnic nature. [end recording]

'Domino Effect' in Communist World Denied

PM2401215190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Korionov "Observer's Opinion": "After 'Cyclone From East.' Domino Effect Is Not Operating"]

[Text] Reactionary forces throughout the world are sparing no efforts these days to bring anticommunist passions to the boiling point. Millions of people are told in all ways: "Communist ideology has become bankrupt"; "the time has come to erase communist parties from political life."

The enemies of socialism are making downright herculean efforts to derive the maximum possible advantage for themselves from the dramatic events in the countries of Eastern Europe, described in some publications as the "cyclone from the East." At first glance it may indeed seem that the socialist edifice is tumbling down and that the overwhelming majority of working people are turning away from communist parties. And a report arrived from Bucharest in the nick of time regarding the intention, under pressure from unruly street forces, to "outlaw" the Romanian Communist Party. The followers of anticommunism acquired another "trump"...

Confessions to schemes linking influential U.S. and West European circles with the changes in the East European countries are multiplying in the press there. Here, for instance, is a report recently carried by UPI: "U.S. corporations and banks are attentively studying business opportunities and considering the possibility of investments in this region, which has just embarked on the road away from Marxism toward capitalism."

But there are also other forces in the United States which do not like the "roundabout" policy. They crave the immediate downfall of socialism. Now! An example of this is the way THE NEW YORK TIMES has pushed extracts from an article in the journal DAEDALUS. Hiding behind the pseudonym "Zet," its author, who is by all indications an extremely influential person, predicts the "rapid collapse of communism throughout the world" and urges Western countries not to aid "communist states" so as not to prolong the "destruction of the communist system." Americans are now trying to guess the whereabouts of this "influential" writer—in White House circles, in the Pentagon, or elsewhere...

At the same time, the reactionary press has mounted a massed attack on communist parties in Western countries. Attacks on communist parties in France, Italy, the FRG, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and other countries have sharply increased. In some places people are calling for "blacklists" of communists and representatives of other leftwing forces to be drawn up.

Our enemies are, of course, focusing their attention above all on the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Antisocialist, anticommunist circles realize that the implementation of the CPSU course of renewing Soviet society and restoring the full humanist, democratic essence of the

new system will raise socialism to new heights, and this threatens to nullify its enemies' plans and desires.

A curious statement regarding our perestroyka may be found, inter alia, in the book "Facing the World," which was published recently in France—the work of prominent French statesman Couve de Murville. Mediocrities incapable of decisionmaking held leading posts in both the USSR and the United States, he said, until the mid-1980's. A major turnaround occurred with M.S. Gorbachev's rise to power in the USSR, which resulted in the end of the period where "sclerosis among the upper echelons was in command."

This "sclerosis among the upper echelons" which the Frenchman writes about is not merely an ailment, although, of course, 80-85 year-old men probably had the usual sclerosis. This is also an ailment common to leadership. It was not only a Soviet phenomenon, but also affected the upper echelons in a number of other socialist countries.

Following the publication of my article in PRAVDA 5 January "What Comes After the Storm?" the editorial office received a letter from reader A. Belokon from Moscow who wrote, arguing with the article, that the "system of personal authority" which existed in a number of socialist countries allegedly results from the fact that the leaders of these parties and states were guided by... the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Certainly, there are now many people both in the USSR and other socialist countries, leaving aside Western countries, for whom it has become fashionable to engage in contention and who have raised a great hail of abuse over our revolutionary teaching.

Therefore, I deem it necessary to repeat once again my conviction that the source of the calamities which befell a number of communist parties and socialist countries, including us, lies by no means in Marxist-Leninist principles but in the departure from and violation of these principles. There is no need now to recall the warnings which both Marx, and particularly Lenin in the latter years of his life, gave on this subject. These warnings were rejected by those people who strove to establish a regime of personal power. Stalin began it, Brezhnev continued it, but "true disciples" were to be found in other socialist states too. That is why it is so important to understand what large population groups in Romania, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and other countries are rejecting today. However contradictory the situation in these countries may be, however antisocialist forces may try to entice muddled people in their wake, considerable strata of the working class and working people nonetheless have no intention of losing what they have acquired over the decades of socialist transformations.

It goes without saying that many people now associate distortions of socialism with the communist movement. That is understandable, since it was the leaders of ruling communist parties who flouted Marxist-Leninist principles. For instance, it is obvious that Ceausescu's tyrannical regime had nothing in common with socialism. I foresee objections from some readers: Why did you not see this coming in Moscow? Admittedly we did not see everything, but we saw a great deal of it. Nor was that all we did. During meetings with N. Ceausescu both in Moscow and in Bucharest the CPSU leadership told him most bluntly on several occasions of our critical negative attitude to many aspects of his policy. This opinion, however, was arrogantly disregarded. The complexity of the situation, in my view, also lay in the fact that the practice of "party diplomacy" existed in our country for a long time, and there were certain unwritten rules for relations between socialist countries whereby public criticism of one another was considered inadmissible. Is not the fact that we must do away with this practice in the interests of our common cause one of the lessons we have learned?

Life attests to the following: No party is guaranteed that it will not have grave crises. But historical experience teaches us that some parties do not withstand crises and disappear from the political scene while others emerge from them enriched by the experience and even stronger. The main thing is to preserve the prospect of social development and retain the belief in the rightness of our cause and its future. The following lines written by Achille Occhetto, secretary general of the Italian Communist Party, in L'UNITA at the beginning of the new year are typical: "New states, new parties, renewal, perestroyka, democracy, and participation by the people in government can be glimpsed through the holes in the 'Berlin Wall.'" Touching on the dramatic events in the countries of East Europe, A. Occhetto wrote the following: "Owing to this tragedy the very hope of socialism has grown dim in the hearts of millions of people in these countries. We Italian Communists have preserved and strengthened this hope, linked increasingly closely with the idea of freedom and democracy. That is why we must not only say but also demonstrate with supremely confident simplicity and clarity that this tragedy has not made socialist ideals null and void. On the contrary, these ideals are even more necessary..."

At the same time, Britain's THE GUARDIAN carried an article by Professor of Economics L. Harris of the Open University. "The changes in East and West," he wrote, "mean that the idea of socialism is by no means dead and buried but is, on the contrary, acquiring new life." The fact that it has now become obvious in 1989, the English professor continued, that the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can openly study their history—both its crimes and its achievements—and that they have actively embarked on elaborating a new socialist policy is important. The fact that political life in socialist countries has acquired an open character is a most convincing reason for believing that socialism has entered a new and—let us hope—reassuring and more democratic era. That is the British academic's conclusion.

The need for the communist party's existence is determined not by proclamations but by the needs of life and the fundamental interests of the working people. At a recent Spanish Communist Party Central Committee plenum the following words were said: "In today's society only leftwing forces can unite the great ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity put forward by the French Revolution with the ideas of social justice proclaimed by the 1917 October Revolution. Communists' great ideas, which are being constantly renewed, are still effective and necessary for mankind's development."

In this part of the world communist parties are seeking ways to tie up their ideas effectively with present realities. They are striving to resolve questions linked with strengthening the influence of leftwing forces in Europe by means of developing dialogue and cooperation between communists, socialists, social democrats, and all social movements that advocate social progress and democracy.

America's TIME magazine published an article 15 January headlined "The Reds Are Still Alive in the West." The magazine noted with clear dissatisfaction: "After the revolutions that overwhelmed Eastern Europe, one might have expected the domino effect to do away with the communist parties trying to survive in Western democracies. Nevertheless, the West European communist parties are showing themselves to be the traditional channel for political protest, whose roots and peculiar sociopolitical culture have been handed down from generation to generation. Voting Communist or membership in the party has become a family tradition in many areas of Europe."

Such admissions illustrate that the anticommunist, antisocialist "domino effect" is not operating.

Gorbachev's 'Helsinki-2' Initiative Supported

LD2201140290 Moscow TASS in English 1351 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—By TASS political analyst Yevgeniy Babenko:

The idea of holding next year a "Helsinki-2" summit conference, suggested by Mikhail Gorbachev during his state visit to Italy, is meeting growing support.

It was hailed from the very outset in West Germany. Proceeding from the results of his meeting with President Gorbachev in Kiev on December 6, 1989, Francois Mitterrand advanced the idea of setting up a "European confederation" within the next ten years. This shows that the idea of building an all-European home is becoming more concrete. It is now shared by many people on our continent. The Helsinki-2 conference is bound to discuss this problem.

The European Community foreign ministers have recently supported the idea of calling such a conference. Meeting in Dublin, the foreign ministers of 12 West European states acknowledged that the Helsinki process, started in 1975, has proved its usefulness. Substantial progress was made in relaxing international tension, reducing armaments and ensuring human rights.

As stressed on Ireland's behalf by Foreign Minister Gerard Collins, who now presides over leading E.C. bodies, it is necessary, due to profound changes in Eastern Europe, to hold a summit European conference to discuss changes on the continent and the future of Europe in general.

The European home concept paves the way to a new type of inter-state relations in Europe based on comprehensive cooperation. The current period of stormy changes on our continent calls for new steps. What steps? Primarily those that, despite their novelty, will not upset the balance of interests on our continent and in the surrounding world.

THE LONDON TIMES pointed out recently that a conference of representatives of 35 states to establish new East-West relations in Europe would mark the end of the post-war era. It noted that by voicing their support for the Soviet president's initiative, the E.C. countries are trying to help the Soviet Union at a time when the country is tackling complicated internal political problems. And this is understandable, since the world is so interconnected today. It needs stability, common sense and responsibility not only for one's own country, but for the entire world community.

Questions, Changes Facing Europe Pondered

PM1201160990 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 1, 1990 pp 26-27

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Igor Malashenko in "What Will New Year Bring?" feature: "Long- Awaited Instability"]

[Text] During the cold war people got used to stability. Though tension was high, they could be sure more or less that the next year will be in the main like the previous one. This certainty disappeared after seeping changes in world politics. The epicentre of these shifts was Europe, primarily its eastern part. The long forgotten note—nostalgia for status quo—is beginning to sound in political debates and in the media. There is no doubt that the year 1990 will not be like 1989.

The point is not that 1990 will see more changes. They will be of a different kind. Hardly anyone will ask seriously whether the "Brezhnev doctrine" has been done away with. The principle of a free choice has been established in relations between socialist countries. The point is what choice East European countries, and the Soviet Union itself, will make.

One important choice has already been made by the majority of these countries. They have discarded the administrative-command model of socialism. We should not think, however, that the problem of choice is limited

to the rejection of this model. The peoples of these countries will have to answer what kind of society they are going to build. Will the Soviet Union retain in new conditions its role of a catalyst of reforms in other socialist states? For a number of East European countries have advanced farther than the Soviet Union along the path of economic and political reforms.

1990 is likely to see how the reforms in allied countries will push forward perestroika in the Soviet Union, which is noticeably dragging out in a number of directions. It will apparently give an answer to the question: to what extent Moscow will be guided in the solution of domestic problems by the same principles which are being consistently and effectively realized in foreign policy—by the desire to find a balance of interests and respect the freedom of choice of all nations and nationalities. The influence of our reforms on the outside world will also depend in large measure on Moscow's policy along these lines.

Foreign economic assistance is acquiring special importance in the present difficult situation in East European countries. In view of the critical situation in its economy, the Soviet Union can unfortunately give only limited aid to its allies. East European countries are pinning great hopes on possible aid from the West, first of all from members of the Common Market, which has considerable economic resources and, by all indications, is prepared to use them on reasonable terms for assistance to East European countries in their economic development.

No sensible politician in Eastern Europe can of course fully rely on assistance from the West. Nevertheless, the European Community is becoming an ever stronger force of attraction for socialist countries. Will the Soviet Union be able to create a sufficiently strong "gravitational field" for its partners, a relationship that will not be confined to their traditional dependence on its raw material, fuel and power resources and to the common interest of socialist countries in the sale of goods not competitive in the world market? This will depend on how the Soviet Union will be able to carry out its economic reform and overcome its economic crisis.

The increasing role of the economic factor in relations between European countries, the erosion of the "enemy image," the diminishing fear of the threat of war on both sides, and a radical change in the European political climate will inevitably call for a profound reassessment of the role of the two military-political alliances. As a matter of fact, this process has already begun. Provoked by events in Eastern Europe, it has perhaps a more spontaneous character in the Warsaw Treaty Organization than in the North Atlantic bloc. It should be admitted that this state of affairs also reflects the magnitude of problems that are facing the two blocs.

In context of sweeping social and political changes in East European countries there has arisen the task of "deideologizing" the Warsaw Treaty Organization, of renouncing the demand for ideological and political orthodoxy as an attribute of membership. The national interests of a country must be the sole factor determining its affiliation with the Warsaw Treaty or any other military-political organization. It is apparently senseless to keep any country in an alliance if it does not regard it as a guarantor of its security.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization in the first place is likely to lose some of its members. However, NATO cannot feel complacent either, because in the final count it is pivoted on the "threat from the East," or at least on the belief in such a threat. So the processes under way in the Warsaw Treaty Organization are bound to affect the North Atlantic bloc too. The two alliances increasingly play the role of instruments of European stability and their members, at least those with a sense of historic responsibility, will hardly want to have their political weight diminished or to rock the "European boat."

Heated debates on the German question will surely be held in both blocs, sometimes crossing the border between them. Will the two German states unite? When, in what form and on what terms? What will this mean from the standpoint of the balance of forces in the continent? It is a far from complete list of questions which it will be more appropriate to answer in the new year.

The social, political and economic distinctions between the two German states will not disappear quickly, and it will take several years to regulate the legal aspects of the German question. Besides, no serious politician in the East or the West is interested in spurring the processes developing in relations between the two German states, in accelerating the course of history, so to speak. We do not know the strength and character of the national aspirations of Germans who have a decisive say on this question. The year 1990 will not possibly be marked by such a dramatic symbol of new inter-German relations as the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, but it will not become less significant for this reason than the year 1989.

The need to ensure stability in the context of changes is again pushing the all-European process into the foreground. This process serves as an important basis of political order in the continent. I don't know whether a European summit which could work out a code of behavior for the nineties will be convened in 1990, as it was proposed by the Soviet Union. But I think that this idea is more preferable than a summit meeting of 23 countries taking part in the Vienna talks on a reduction of conventional armaments, which was proposed by the United States. The point is that Helsinki-2, as the Soviet-sponsored meeting has been called, will be attended also by a large group of neutral and non-aligned countries which play an ever greater part in politics. Anyhow, it can rightly be expected that 1990 will become a year of big European politics.

FRG 'Active Participants' in GDR Election

PM1801132990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Election Campaign With FRG Involvement?"]

[Excerpt] Berlin—[Passage omitted] The election campaign is gathering momentum in the GDR. What are its characteristics? You sometimes get the impression that its most active participants are the FRG political parties. The situation is truly unique. At the recent Berlin conference of the GDR's Social Democratic Party the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], invited from the FRG, declared that their party would spare neither effort nor money to help like-minded people in the GDR to win the 6 May elections. The Social Democrats of both countries agreed to join forces in drawing up an election struggle strategy—Rau, deputy chairman of the West German SPD, was entrusted with heading a joint committee of both parties.

Waigel, chairman of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, appeared on West German television yesterday. His party also intends to use all available means to influence the course of the election campaign in the neighboring country. The same channel showed a program directed openly against the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] and Gregor Gysi, its chairman. A provocative banner which someone had brought to a demonstration in Leipzig was shown several times: "Anyone who votes for the SED-PDS votes for civil war." The producers of the program even found a diploma work by Gysi and showed all over the screen lines in which the author writes about the party's leading role. The chief idea behind what was shown was that the SED-PDS is supposedly continuing in general outline the course of the former party leadership.

Incidentally, an election campaign is now gathering momentum in the Federal Republic too. I do not think that even West German politicians endowed with an unbridled imagination could imagine interference in that campaign on the part of GDR parties, let alone allow it. But in the other direction it is becoming increasingly extensive and unceremonious and is beginning to be perceived as something natural and not contrary to generally accepted norms and political ethics.

GDR Legal Expert Discusses Unification Issues

PM1901112590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with Prof. Bernhard Graefrath, "one of leaders of GDR Academy of Sciences Theory of State and Law Institute and imminent specialist in international law," by own correspondent V. Lapskiy in Berlin under rubric "IZVESTIYA Interview": "German Question: Stumbling Blocks"; date unspecified]

[Text] [Lapskiy] There are several views regarding the future development of relations between the GDR and the FRG. The range of differences is fairly broad. What can you say about this?

[Graefrath] I would like to begin by saying that, in the final analysis, the German question is a question of the future of the GDR. In his 10-point program Federal Chancellor H. Kohl talks about creating a "federal-legal order in Germany." Essentially, this means incorporating the GDR in the FRG as a land. I would like to point out that if we in the GDR do not manage to pass rapidly through the present "negating" phase of the revolutionary process and give our citizens convincing prospects that their lives are going to improve, there will be a real threat of the nationalist movement for unification gaining the upper hand. Its slogans are being heard particularly loudly at mass demonstrations in Leipzig. Instead of emigrating to the FRG, the participants in these demonstrations want to "transfer" the West German political and economic system to the GDR. The decision taken by means of a referendum in the GDR would make it possible to demand equal standards of living in both parts of Germany.

[Lapskiy] All the signs are, however, that the Bonn government has cooled to the idea of an immediate merging of the GDR and the FRG, because it would lead to an excessive burden on the West German budget and have a negative impact on the social security system.

[Graefrath] That is quite correct. External factors must also be taken into account. Whatever development of events the neighbors of the two German states are interested in, they rightly believe that a "fourth reich" would be an economic and political force that would have a harmful impact on European integration processes. Serious problems connected with European security would arise. One really does get the impression that Bonn has at last become aware of the possible dangers of such a development of events internally and externally, so to speak. Consequently, it has put its foot on the brake and come up with the proposal of a confederation.

Under certain conditions, a confederation or, in other words, the creation of joint political bodies belonging to the two states, carries the threat of the GDR being gradually incorporated into the FRG. Why would a confederation be convenient for Bonn? The FRG seems to be absolving itself of all responsibility for the GDR's domestic difficulties and problems and leaving it up to our republic's government to resolve them. But it can still make good at our expense, in view of the present low prices for goods and services in the GDR and the unfair exchange rate for the Eastern and Western mark.

[Lapskiy] And at foreign policy level? How would this option be viewed from the outside, so to speak?

[Graefrath] Bonn is hoping that the specter of a "fourth reich" does not loom too large in Europeans' eyes and that a calmer view will be taken of this process by the four allied powers as they gradually get used to the idea

that in 5 or 10 years' time an economic and political giant will rise up in Europe—a great European power that will superintend continental integration. But the facts show that European countries in both East and West have no vested interest in this development of events. French President F. Mitterrand, for example, made it perfectly clear during his recent visit to the GDR that, before raising the delicate issue of borders between the two German states, one must have a clear head and also be constantly mindful of one's neighbors and consider their vested interest in preserving the existing European balance. It is for this reason, incidentally, that Kohl has backpedaled: At a recent small congress of the Christian Democratic Union in West Berlin he softened his proposal, the 10-point program, saying that he is setting no specific deadline for unification and that he is treating the idea of a contractual association very seriously.

[Lapskiy] We have obviously come to the third question: the contractual association proposed by the H. Modrow government.

[Graefrath] According to this idea, the association must lead to a conscious drawing together of the GDR and the FRG and to stronger positions for democratic forces in both states. The main principles of the contractual association were set out recently in the appeal "For Our Country." This underlined the need to preserve the GDR's sovereignty and independence and claimed that we still have a chance "to develop the socialist alternative in relation to the FRG as equal neighbors with all European states." A very great deal has to be done to achieve this: make the necessary changes to the Constitution, develop different forms of ownership, and actively attract foreign capital.

[Lapskiy] In which areas, in your opinion, will the two German states draw closer together quickest of all?

[Graefrath] Maybe first and foremost in matters concerning disarmament. Both our country and the FRG have a vested interest in this. Extensive cooperation in the ecological sphere has already begun. Collaboration will develop rapidly in the currency sphere and in legal aid (which has hitherto been nonexistent, incidentally). There also will be no problems with the qualitative expansion of cultural exchange and tourism. And economic cooperation will begin to develop unimpeded to all intents and purposes.

[Lapskiy] And at a higher level, government level?

[Graefrath] The contractual association envisages the formation of various commissions and consultative bodies. In this respect, existing bilateral agreements will not be violated and no damage will be done to the security interests of third countries. The GDR must join the process of European integration as an independent country and not as part of a German confederation.

[Lapskiy] The special interest and special responsibility of the four allied powers must also be taken into account. What can you say about this?

[Graefrath] They must certainly be taken into account, and this must be done with all seriousness and responsibility. Under no circumstances,however, must people get the impression that the process of the rapprochement of the two German states can be held in check by the four allied powers. This impression would inevitably give rise to "anti-Versailles-type" attitudes similar to those which swept Germany after World War I. They became a breeding ground for right-wing, nationalist forces—the result of which is well known.

[Lapskiy] Are you also thinking of right-wing forces in the GDR?

[Graefrath] Yes, although they are not registered as any official organization. I am not only referring to neo-Nazis operating underground. The right-wing is "scattered" across various political parties and movements and makes its presence felt all over the place. We must be vigilant. I believe that it is now very important for democratic forces in the GDR and the FRG to take a common stand in the process of the two countries' rapprochement. A united antifascist front is needed in the new conditions.

[Lapskiy] What role, in your opinion, could unification issues play during the election campaign now under way in the GDR?

[Graefrath] The "unification" concept contains a powerful emotional charge. On the one hand it is directly linked to the standard of living and quality of life. Some people see it like this: The sooner we become one with the FRG, the sooner our lives will be more comfortable. On the whole, there is nothing particularly remarkable about formulating the issue in this way: There is a historical precedent. Take the Saarland, for example, after the war: The question of whether it would be part of West Germany or France ultimately decided the real standard of living. But there is also another side to the issue: playing on nationalist feeling. This is a dangerous tactic. It could lead to the strengthening of right-wing forces, growing chaos, and the undermining of the all-European process. And it will hardly serve to benefit the reasonable rapprochement of the two German states.

Mitterrand Visit Results in Hungary-France Deals

PM2301123990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Dispatch by own correspondent F. Lukyanov: "Whole Package of Agreements"]

[Text] Budapest—"To give all-around support to the reforms in Hungary and, in so doing, to the development of cooperation among all European countries"—this was French President F. Mitterrand's brief description of the aim of his visit to Budapest, prior to departure. On the

final day of his stay in Hungary, addessing journalists, Mitterrand noted that the talks in Budapest were a turning point in relations between the two countries.

Indeed, no previous visit by a French leader to Hungary had been accompanied by the conclusion of so many agreements in so many dif'erent areas of the economy. During the talks in Budapest, both sides paid special attention to the so-called "Mitterrand plan," which envisages setting up a European bank of reconstruction and development for East Europe to finance economic reforms. In this connection, Hungarian Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman P. Meggyesi suggested to Mitterrand that the new bank's headquarters be located in Budapest, as a kind of first step toward the implementation of the "Mitterrand plan." Judging by the accord reached at the talks, France, irrespective of the

As well as economic questions, prominence was given at the talks to President Mitterrand's recent proposal on a European confederation. Acting head of state M. Szuros and the leaders of Hungarian political parties Mitterrand met with expressed full support for the European confederation plan and a willingness to become involved in its implementation. For his part, the French visitor rated highly the contribution Hungary has already made to creating prerequisites for such a confederation. According to what Mitterrand said at a news conference, both sides have an identical view of European problems today.

JANA Report on Plane Search by FRG Cited

LD2401064690 Moscow TASS in English 0637 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Tripoli January 24 TASS—The West German authorities on Tuesday [23 January] detained a Libyan passenger plane in Frankfurt am Main, the JANA news agency said in its urgent report.

A spokesman for the General People's Committee for Communications and Transport of the Libyan Jamahiriyah said that the airport authorities detained the Libyan Boeing-727 passenger plane on the routine Tripoli-Frankfurt flight 172. He said the West German police surrounded the airliner and did not allow an official of the Libyan airlines to approach it.

The crew was arrested and passengers, among them sick people, women and children, were put down from the plane and searched. The plane was also thoroughly inspected. Some passengers were beaten and insulted.

The unlawful actions against the Libyan plane and its passengers are continuing, the spokesman said. "The airport authorities have not divulged the reason for this inhuman act which contradicts the code of civil aviation", said the JANA report.

The People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya summoned the West German ambassador in Tripoli to lodge a strong protest.

United States & Canada

Bush News Conference Discusses World Changes

LD2401232990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Washington, 24 Jan (TASS)—President George Bush announced on Wednesday the draft military budget for the next financial year, which his administration will soon submit to Congress for examination. "The process of transition will begin" from the restructuring of the U.S. Armed Forces to a new, more flexible strategy aimed more at solving the problems outside of Europe.

At a press conference held at the White House in the morning, Bush noted that the changes being planned are dictated "by the far-reaching changes" taking place in today's world. At the same time he stressed that the United States remains devoted to its obligations to NATO.

Answering questons put by journalists, the President confirmed that a serious situation is taking shape in Soviet Transcaucasia. The Soviet leadership, he said, is coming up against "an ethnic problem, an internal problem of enormous scale" in this region. "Gorbachev has always stated his striving for peaceful transformations within the Soviet Union," the president stressed. He expressed the hope that the Soviet leader will retain strong positions. "I think it is in our interests that perestroyka should be successful and continue," Bush stated.

The President again defended the White House's position, speaking out against the draft law on a change in the visa regime for Chinese students studying in the United States. Last year the President refused to sign this draft law, after stating that this measure is interference in the prerogatives of the executive authority. The majority of legislators, however, expressed determination to defend this draft law and voted for the President's veto to be lifted.

Tutwiler Remarks on Transcaucasus Situation

PM2401163590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under rubric "TASS, REUTER, UPI Report": "Statement by U.S. Department of State Representative"]

[Text] M. Tutwiler, spokeswoman of the U.S. Department of State, made the following statement on events in the Transcaucasus: "We express hope for the earliest possible end to the bloodshed and assume that the sides involved in the dispute will display common sense and restraint. The acts of violence committed by some bellicose persons have caused events which led to the need to apply force so as to restore order. There is a fundamental difference between the short-term use of force to restore order and the use of force to stifle peaceful and legitimate political demonstrations. We hope that conditions will emerge in the near future making a political dialogue possible." Such a dialogue, she remarked, must respond to the aspirations of the republic's entire population.

PRAVDA on U.S. Regional Conflicts Policy

LD2201092390 Moscow TASS in English 0754 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Pravda's news analyst Yuriy Glukhov today described the U.S. invasion of Panama as "the outrage committed by the great power against the small country".

In the article titled "Games With Fire and Flashpoints", he writes: "Speaking once again about the implications of the U.S. invasion of Panama, Washington's growing imperial ambitions, and the propaganda camouflage of the conducted operation, it is worth drawing attention to how the mechanism of provoking, complicating and dragging on regional conflicts works. What levers are put to use and what methods are employed. The point is that, on the one hand, negotiations are conducted and a real search is under way to extinguish hot spots and, on the other, factors are preserved which bring to zero these efforts".

"In the Panamanian variant, for instance, U.S. military bases became such a factor, the springboard for aggression. In a matter of hours American troops turned into the occupation army. They instituted their order, ignoring even the diplomatic immunity of third countries".

The author regards weapons shipments to hot spots as another negative factor.

"One of the reasons why the Afghan conflict keeps raging, is the United States' refusal to respond to the Soviet Union's call to halt weapons shipments of the warring parties, stop pouring oil into the fire. Receiving multi-billion handouts from the United States and its partners, Mojahideens do not economise on shells but use the weapons supplied to them to kill peaceful residents, their foes...and each other in fratricidal clashes". The same picture is observed in other regions where armed gangs are nourished.

Glukhov notes that "the more the United States tend to recognise realities, abandon attempts to dictate and monopoly in handling international issues, the sooner positive solutions are achieved. This is exemplified by the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan and the settlement in the south of Africa".

"The mine fields of regional conflicts can be defused only by joint efforts and by peaceful means rather than violence that generates a new cycle of violence," the article concluded.

U.S.-Soviet Trade Cooperation Needs Review

WA2401191790 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by V. Mikhaylov: "Advantage of Mutual Advantage?"]

[Text] An interview with U.S. President George Bush was published in the first issue of READERS DIGEST this year in which he sets forth his views on a whole range of problems, including the processes taking place in our country. Wishing us success and assuring us of his desire for cooperation with the USSR, the President of the United States uttered a couple of sentences: "The Soviets... have moved to deepen cooperation with the United States. This is a very reassuring trend which, I hope, will be developed in the direction that we need."

I flinched. All my life I thought that the word "cooperation" always assumes "mutual advantage." We give you what we need less and you give us what we need more, and vice versa. But here we have "in the direction that we need...."

Does this not hide a stubborn reluctance to offer most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries? When the reason that this regime is not being offered disappears, then they name another reason, and then a third, and everything remains the same.

Incidentally, perhaps not everyone knows that "most-favored-nation" status means nothing other than simple, normal, equal trade. Its absence leads to imposition on exports to the United States from a "guilty" country of the kind of customs duties that discourage any potential buyers from acquiring anything. That is, it is essentially discrimination, which serious American businessmen call behavior that is not serious and which other thinking people call simply stupid.

This at least follows from a report in the American newspaper JOURNAL OF COMMERCE [name as published] describing the preparations for hearings scheduled for late January in a U.S. Congress House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee on East-West trade. According to the newspaper, people that are able to think and calculate are expressing keen dissatisfaction with the existing position, which is causing many businessmen to lose significant opportunities for successful deals in the USSR.

The fact is, obviously, that, as is accepted among honest business partners, they are thinking about mutually advantageous deals while the politicians are concerned only about winning for themselves. At least, that is how I see it.

FBI Drops Case Against Former Diplomat Bloch

LD2401122590 Moscow TASS in English 1217 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Washington January 24 TASS—The U.S. authorities have decided to suspend legal action against Felix Bloch, a former U.S. diplomat, charged with espionage. The ABC television network reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation could find no convincing evidence against Bloch.

Subjected to massive surveillance and outright FBI blackmail last spring, although no official charges were levelled against him, Bloch was compelled to go on administrative leave that is continuing to this day. Though lacking evidence, the U.S. Department of State thereby found "legal ways" to get rid of an unsuitable official.

According to press reports, the investigation was started because Felix Bloch, then U.S. minister-counselor in Vienna, while in Paris allegedly handed over an attache case to a man who U.S. counter-intelligence believe was a "Soviet agent".

The FBI was not able to establish whether this had really happened or what was in the case. Its officials claim the diplomat's tape-recorded conversations with his wife allegedly contain "admissions of espoinage". But this is insufficient evidence to convict Bloch.

The Justice Department has realised this, but officials believe the next step will probably be to exert psychological pressure on Bloch, to make him "plead guilty" in exchange for immunity against possible future persecution". [as received]

Poll on President Bush's Popularity Cited

PM2401162190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Shalnev dispatch: "President's First Year. Americans Support G. Bush's Policy"]

[Text] New York—It has been a year since George Bush took office as President of the United States. According to long-established tradition, a series of polls were conducted to establish what the average American thinks of the President, and of the way the White House chief is tackling the country's most acute problems.

The overwhelming majority of Americans are perfectly satisfied with George Bush's activity: According to the results of a poll conducted by THE NEW YORK TIMES and CBS-TV, this is the opinion of 76 percent of Americans. Another poll, organized by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL and NBC-TV, produced the somewhat lower but equally sizeable figure of 71 percent. In popularity terms, John Kennedy is Bush's only rival among all postwar presidents. By way of a comparison, only 49 percent of Americans approved of Ronald Reagan's activity at the end of his first year in power.

But a careful study of the poll results reveals a curious point: Bush's popularity as President is largely due to his foreign policy achievements, or to what Americans perceive as achievements. Regarding the economic and domestic policy spheres, U.S. inhabitants are not particularly inclined to give high marks to their President.

Whereas Bush's activity in the foreign policy sphere is approved by 73 percent of Americans, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES and CBS-TV poll, less than 50 percent approve of his activity on the economic front. It is noteworthy that the top marks given to Bush in the foreign policy sphere are mainly due to the Panama invasion, which was approved by 74 percent of those polled.

The polls show, however, that Americans are not all that prepared to support any future actions like the one in Panama. Fifty percent of those polled described Panama as a "special case" and spoke against the United States intervening in other states' affairs, even for the sake of overthrowing dictators.

The foreign policy sections of the polls are interesting. Some 46 percent of Americans are convinced that the start of a nuclear war in the next 10 years is extremely improbable. According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Americans "are still not ready to proclaim that the cold war is over," while those polled are inclined to give more credit for the changes in East Europe to M. Gorbachev than to G. Bush. Whereas 62 percent of those polled are in favor of rendering substantial economic aid to Panama, 66 percent are against aid to the Soviet Union. From the viewpoint of 71 percent of Americans, the United States is already providing too much aid to foreign countries.

Many political scientists are convinced that the President's popularity will remain high unless the U.S. economy experiences major shocks. At the same time, the polls indicate a steady—ever since G. Bush came to power—growth of the number of Americans who assume that there will be a deterioration in the economy. This opinion is now held by 36 percent, which is 11 percent higher than a year ago. Only 8 percent believe that the economic situation will improve. THE NEW YORK TIMES emphasizes that "these are the most pessimistic appraisals since 1981, when the country was plunged in the deepest recession in postwar history."

Economic and social matters worry Americans far more than foreign policy. Top position is held by the drug problem where, according to 54 percent of those polled, President Bush has achieved certain progress. On the other hand, the majority of Americans assume that the President is talking rather than acting in the sphere of environmental protection and improvement of the education system.

Summing up the overall results, it would appear that the U.S. President is riding high. For the time being....

China

Increased Sino-Soviet Border Trade Reported

OW2401200490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 6 Jan 90

[From "Along Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] The volume of trade between the Soviet Union and China has increased more than ninefold since the early 1980's.

According to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the volume of trade between the two nations for 1989 topped 2 billion rubles. The Soviet Union's exports to China mainly include machines and equipment, followed by ferrous and nonferrous metals, petroleum products, timber, construction material, chemical products, and chemical fertilizer. China's major commodities exported to the Soviet Union are consumer goods for daily use, industrial raw material, [words indistinct]. In the past few years, the Soviet Union has also increased imports of Chinese-made machines and technological products.

With the growth of bilateral trade, the two nations have also seen a rapid increase of barter trade in the border regions. Experts estimate that the volume of barter trade in the Sino-Soviet border regions will soon reach 500 million rubles. The reality proves that both sides are interested in border trade.

China's largest province, Liaoning, is building a thermal power station with Soviet assistance. The station is designed to have a generating capacity of 3.2 million kilowatts. This station's facilities are supplied by Soviet enterprises in Leningrad and the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. Just a few days ago, the Soviets shipped another 320,000-kilowatt generating set to the power station under construction. A XINHUA commentary said that the thermal power station, when completed, will notably ease the strain on electricity supply in northeast China.

The following news report came from the Chita oblast that borders on China, where a tentative agreement was reached with China on establishing direct telephone and telegram services between the Chita Oblast and Hailar City. Both sides also considered it necessary to build direct air routes between Chita and Hailar as their border contacts expanded.

In 1990, the Soviet Union and China plan to exchange 42 delegations on 10 sports programs. The purpose is to allow the two nations to continue training Soviet and Chinese athletes together and to exchange coaches and teachers. Not long ago the Soviet Union and China signed the 1990 Sports Cooperation Agreement. In addition, direct sport contacts between Soviet and Chinese

border regions will also further develop, including business contacts such as the establishment of joint ventures for the manufacture of sports apparatus and sportswear.

Now news from (Habolovsk). An Ice Lantern Festival is going on there. The festival has its roots in China. On this occasion Chinese ice carving experts joined Soviet artists in preparing for the Festival. Russian and Chinese folk tales are the inspiration for many of the completed works, which include an ice palace and legendary figures. This festival is a good present for the students during the winter vacation.

Northeast Asia

Rogachev Supports Relations With Asia-Pacific

BK2101053590 Bangkok THE NATION in English 21 Jan 90 p 7

[Statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev "sent exclusively to THE NATION"]

[Text] The Asia-Pacific region holds pride of place among the Soviet Union's foreign-policy priorities. In Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, this country put forward an integrated programme of our actions in the region. The programme aims at imparting dynamism and constructiveness to bilateral relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, at settling regional conflicts as early as possible, at taking practical steps to scale down military confrontation and building up our country's efforts to develop regional economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation.

Elaborating upon the new concept for our Asian policy, we proceed from the premise that genuine security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region can be ensured only by common efforts. We pursue the line for developing such a system of relations and cooperation between the states of the Asia-Pacific region that would presuppose participation by all these countries on the basis of equal security, advantage, respect and confidence.

The normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations has made a considerable contribution to strengthening stability in the region. After the meeting at top level, progress has been made in every area of cooperation between the two countries. We firmly intend to work for Soviet-Chinese relations developing in a line of ascent, without, naturally, affecting the interests of third countries.

Our relations with India have continued steadily developing. The change of leadership in that country has not affected the far-reaching and productive relations between our friendly states.

The Soviet Union would also like to achieve a new quality in its relations with Japan, with confidence and mutual respect prevailing in them. We welcome the first positive sproutings on this road, though we realize that the process of Soviet-Japanese normalization will not be easy. An important role in this matter, as we are hoping, will be played by the official visit to Japan by Makhail Gorbachev in 1991.

Relations with our allies and friends: The Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, have been raised to a higher level of mutual understanding and cooperation.

The political dialogue with the ASEAN nations, Australia and New Zealand has become more intense. Diplomatic relations have been established with a number of small nations in the South Pacific. The USSR Embassy is about to open in Papua-New Guinea.

The Soviet Union has taken a number of important practical steps to end confrontation and achieve disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region and to settle regional conflicts. The Geneva agreements on Afghanistan were signed. We have covered our part of the road, and, if bloodshed still continues in that country, the blame for this rests with those who are seeking, as before, to attain their aims by force of arms.

The new situation has taken shape in Cambodia after the pullout of Vietnamese troops. The present priority is to go through with a political settlement in that country, without slackening the efforts.

The Soviet Union has adopted new approaches to ensuring its security on the basis of the defensive doctrine and the concept for reasonable military sufficiency, taking the course for lessening its military activity in the Asia Pacific region.

Since 1985, the USSR has unilaterally reduced its armed forces in the Far East and committed itself not to increase the amount of any nuclear weapons in this Asian part.

In the eastern part of the USSR, 436 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles have been eliminated. In 1989-90, the group of Soviet forces in the eastern part of the country will have been reduced, also unilaterally, by 200,000 troops, including by 120,000 troops in the Soviet Far East. Land forces will have been reduced by 12 divisions, 11 air regiments disbanded, and 16 warships withdrawn from the Soviet Pacific fleet. Three in every four Soviet military personnel are being withdrawn from Mongolia.

Data has been made public on the strength of Soviet armed forces stationed in the Soviet Far East, including the Pacific fleet (the Soviet Far Eastern military district and the Pacific fleet have 326,000 personnel, 870 aircraft, 4,500 tanks, 55 large surface ships and 40 nuclear-powered submarines. the Trans-Baykal military district has 271,000 personnel, 820 aircraft and 8,100 tanks).

Standing for an end to foreign military presence and military bases on other people's territory by the year 2000, the Soviet Union has offered to the United States to give up, on the basis of reciprocity, the use of military

installations in Vietnam (the Pacific fleet's material and technical supply station in Camranh Bay) and US bases in the Philippines.

The USSR was the first nuclear power to have signed protocols to the Rarotonga treaty on the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet side has committed itself to be a guarantor of the zone's status. It has expressed the readiness for consultations with the ASEAN nations both on a bilateral and multilateral basis on the basis elements of ASEAN's concept for Southeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union has reaffirmed its principled stand in favour of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace.

Large-scale and mutually advantageous trade and economic relations between the countries of the region can lay the solid foundation for stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet Union, being aware of the important of the current economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, firmly Intends, on the one hand, to contribute to solving regional economic problems and, on the other hand, speed up the economic development of its Far-Eastern areas through participation in the regional division of labour.

In keeping with the economic programme which Mikhail Gorbachev set forth in Krasnoyarsk, steps are being taken to enhance the role of local bodies of authority in managing foreign economic activity and to grant enterprises in the Soviet Far East the right to establish direct links outside the country. A "favoured treatment" for them has been finalized in a special resolution passed by the USSR council of ministers.

A concept is being developed for the establishment in the Soviet Far East of special "zones of joint enterprise", with a preferential treatment in customs duties and reduced fees paid for the natural and labour resources.

A start has been made to joint venturing. Among other things, the question is being examined of cooperation along these lines on a tripartite, Sino-Japanese-Soviet, basis. Last October, Khabarovsk was the venue of a meeting of businessmen of three countries, where they discussed and outlined the basic areas and specific projects of cooperation. Frontier trade and other contacts are being particularly developed between the USSR and the PRC, in the first place, between the Soviet Far East and China's northeastern provinces. Moreover, not only trade turnover has lately sharply increased, but there has also been an increase in the variety of forms of economic cooperation: in agriculture, building construction, the recruitment of Chinese manpower and so on.

Of course, not everything proceeds as quickly and smoothly as we would like it to. The economic reforms in the Soviet Far East in many areas are being carried out far slower than planned. Soviet participation in economic activity in the region is still modest—the proportion of major countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the USSR's total trade turnover comes to a here 5.8 percent.

Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that the line which we are pursuing for extending our economic relations with the countries of the Pacific and our economic presence in the region is firm and consistent. We do not intend to turn off this road.

On the whole, the comprehensive programme advanced by the Soviet Union for improving international relations in Asia does work. Under the influence of Soviet initiatives and general improvements in the political climate in the world, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region is changing for the better. New approaches to tackling problems that have piled up and to creating conditions for a safer life for the peoples of the Asia-Pacific region are forging ahead.

Kaifu Europe Tour Evokes 'Contradictory Feelings'

WA2401133590 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 3

[Andrey Balebanov opinion: "The Premier Shifts the Emphases"]

[Text] Japanese Prime Minister T. Kaifu's 10-day tour of West and East European countries is evoking contradictory feelings. On the one hand, he attempted to do everything to ensure that Japan not lag behind the intensifying process of international cooperation and dialogue. In the course of the negotiations with West European leaders, the head of the Japanese Government paid particular attention to the changes occurring in East Europe and their influence on the world situation. Endeavoring not to remain aloof from the collective efforts of West Europeans toward support for these reforms, T. Kaifu announced the decision to allocate to Poland and Hungary large preferential loans, and also Japan's intention to take active part in the activity of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is in charge of financing the West's programs of economic cooperation with the East European countries.

On the other hand, T. Kaifu's negotiations in Brussels showed that their main topic of discussion was questions of the development of relations between Japan and the European Community (EC). The latter is profoundly concerned about the huge deficit in its trade with Tokyo, and Japanese spokesmen do not conceal their fears that the creation by the 12 West European countries of a single internal EC market by the end of 1992 could make this zone an impenetrable "trade and economic fortress" to which access for commodities from the Land of the Rising Sun would be made more difficult. The parties' consent to broaden bilateral dialogue was the result of the negotiations in Brussels.

It is difficult to shake off the impression that one of T. Kaifu's assignments during his tour was to try to win the

support of West European leaders for Tokyo's territorial claims against the USSR. His statements to the effect that Japan considers itself a "victim of Soviet expansionism," and that the policy of perestroyka being pursued by Moscow "has not been embodied in Asia" are not only totally without foundation, but also create an inauspicious background for the preparations for M.S. Gorbachev's planned visit to Japan. As follows from press agency reports, these pronouncements from T. Kaifu did not meet with understanding in West Europe. Tokyo cannot fail to draw certain conclusions from this, I believe.

Mr Kaifu's tour of European capitals is nothing but an attempt by Tokyo to become involved in the rapidly developing process of bridge-building between the socialist and capitalist countries. These intentions testify that the Japanese leadership is beginning, it would seem, to rethink the country's foreign policy strategy. But at the same time certain pronouncements of the Japanese premier demonstrate that the new political thinking is still having difficulty making a way for itself in Tokyo's corridors of power.

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh Meets With Iranian Envoy 24 Jan

LD2401132290 Moscow TASS in English 1250 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Some international problems and bilateral relations were discussed by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Iranian Ambassador Naser Heirani-Nobari today.

The meeting was held at the ambassador's request.

The ambassador conveyed a message, addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze, from Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.

The two sides discussed the state of affairs on the Soviet-Iranian frontier. They expressed the mutual desire to develop border relations in trade, the economy, culture and humanitarian areas.

Commentary on USSR-Iranian Border Situation

NC2401123290 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Sergey Salgirov commentary]

[Text] The situation is tense on the Soviet-Iranian border. [Words indistinct] of Iran and Azerbaijan continue extensively through the common border. However, the situation in the border region of Nakhichevan has stabilized to a certain extent. The Soviet-Iranian border committee met at Astara to discuss ways and means of ensuring border (?security).

The instability in Azerbaijan and Armenia resulted from the adventuristic acts by extremists and local separatists, and subjected relations between the Soviet Union and Iran to a rigorous and difficult test. These relations entered an important and new stage following the visit by the present Iranian president, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Hashemi-Rafsanjani, to the Soviet Union. The issue is that (?the pillage and vandalism) by armed individuals and terrorists in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the provocative propaganda and rumors by way of [words indistinct] have weakened the law and order situation on the borders and has created conditions conducive to tension. Such a state of affairs creates problems for Iran as well as the Soviet Union, including the need to provide housing and food for people, utilization of the joint power station on the banks of the Aras River, and the establishment of contacts between residents and their relatives on both sides of the border.

In such conditions, Soviet-Iranian cooperation is essential. Certain forces, whether in Iran or the Soviet Union, are creating obstacles to this cooperation. I am referring to the union forged between Iranian fundamentalists and the agents of force and dissension in the Soviet Union. The declaration of a state of emergency in some areas of the Soviet Transcaucasus is intended to ensure peaceful living and working conditions for the people following attacks by armed persons and terrorists. However, as can be gleaned from the news, no measures have been adopted in Iran to control the fundamentalists' (?destructive) activities. We are not commenting here on the legitimacy of the Iranian protest over the IZVESTIYA report regarding the transfer of Iranian arms to the Soviet side of the Aras River for the extremists. However, Iran will find it difficult to deny the facts of psychological manipulation of the Soviet Azerbaijan residents who crossed to the Iranian side of the Aras River.

The Iranian mass media have tried with all their might to portray the objective of their country's policies as the conversion of Soviet citizens into some sort of Islamic Revolution Guards. They are motivated to attend Friday prayers and visit Islamic holy places, and are incited against Soviet authorities. The Iranian mass media is disseminating shadowy hints and falsehoods about the Soviet Armed Forces' so-called repressive actions against Soviet Transcaucasus residents. In such circumstances, the fundamentalists are portraying the leaders of extremist groups and parties as the spokesmen for the Soviet Muslims' aspirations.

It is interesting to note that the extremists are trying to project the natural desire of Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border to exchange visits as a desire to participate in religious ceremonies. Meanwhile, Soviet Transcaucasus extremists are cloaking their nationalistic ambitions with slogans of Islamic solidarity. Take heed lest the bond between the fundamentalists and nationalist extremists spread the Transcaucasus' hardships and sorrows into Iran.

There is another point to consider. Irresponsible fundamentalists are attempting to convince Iran that it is

acting on the basis of a calculated and realistic assessment, (?while it is actually jeopardizing) solution of the Afghanistan issue, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598, and the elimination of obstacles in the path of relations with its Soviet neighbor. If the fundamentalists' influence on Iranian policymaking increases once again, this country will once again be plunged into an era of intense international isolation and domination by undemocratic regimes.

Iran can once again be confronted with devastation and destruction stemming from interethnic and religious differences. In my view, restraint and willingness on the part of Tehran to refrain from dangerous and [words indistinct] objectives regarding the problems in its neighboring country benefits not only the Soviet Transcaucus and the Soviet Union in general, but also Iran.

Deputy Ibragimov Ends Visit to Indonesia

LD2401144890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0927 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Jakarta, 24 Jan (TASS)—The visit to Indonesia of M.I. Ibragimov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Rupublic Supreme Soviet, has ended. During his visit talks were held with President Suharto, R. Prawiro, minister-coordinator for economics, finance, industry, and development supervision, and other members of the Cabinet. In particular, prospects for the expansion of commercial-economic cooperation between the two countries was examined, including the establishment of direct business ties with the Uzbek SSR, on the basis of accords reached during the visit of the Indonesian head of state to the USSR and the Soviet-Indonesian summit meeting in Moscow last fall.

The guest from Uzbekistan visited the town of Medan (administrative center of the Province of Northern Sumatra), and viewed a number of nearby major plantations and processing enterprises where he inspected samples of ready-made produce for export to the USSR.

There was also a meeting with representatives of business circles of Northern Sumartra. Both sides expressed interest in increasing the volume of bilateral deliveries of goods, and also in the creation of joint enterprises for the processing of agricultural raw material.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Meets Afghan Officials

LD2401182590 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Kabul January 24 TASS—A visiting delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet today met chairman of the Afghan Council of Ministers' Executive Committee Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand. Keshtmand praised Soviet aid to Afghanisan and its economic, political and military support for the Afghan Government's efforts.

The delegation also met Afghan vice president and chairman of the Central Council of the Afghan National Front 'Abdul Rahim Hatif to consider issues of mutual interest.

Head of the Soviet delegation and deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union Aleksandr Mokanu today addressed deputies of the National Council and representatives of Afghan parties in the Afghan Parliament.

He said that this visit opens a new page in the development of relations between the parliaments of the two countries.

On the same day the delegation met members of the parliamentary commission of the Afghan National Council on Liberation of Soviet POWs. The parliamentarians noted it is necessary to use their authority to free Soviet POWS and return them home.

Soviet Minister Addresses Libyan Visitors

LD2401210590 Tripoli JANA in English 1852 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, January 24. Jamahiriyah News Agency—The first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union asserted his country's keenness to consolidate the existing relations between Great Jamahiriya and the Soviet Union and develop them in various fields.

In his address to the opening session of the informational and cultural talks between Great Jamahiriya and the Soviet Union yesterday he said "We must continue to develop the bilateral work between our two countries in the informational and cultural fields and various other fields in which cooperation is successfully developing."

Agreement Signed With Israeli Group

TA2401171490 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 90 p C1

[Report by Avi Gan'or]

[Excerpts] The agreement between the Israeli Chamber of Commerce and the Soviet Chamber of Commerce was signed in Moscow yesterday. It stipulates that official representations of the chambers will be opened in Tel Aviv and Moscow by April. [passage omitted]

The accord, which was initialed several months ago, was signed yesterday after extended negotiations involving Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, and Industry and Trade Minister Ari'el Sharon. [passage omitted]

Under the accord, the chambers of commerce of the two countries will have three representatives who will enjoy full diplomatic status. They will deal with, among other things, the setting up of trade ties, and the exchange of information, public delegations, and information on science and technology.

The representations will also deal with promoting joint USSR-Israeli economic projects in third countries.

A joint economic committee will be set up to act as watchdogs over the agreement. It will convene at least once a year and will keep watch on the developing economic relations, as well as solve problems.

Bank Leumi Chairman Moshe Zanbar, who is in Moscow, conferred yesterday with the heads of the central bank and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank to institutionalize work relations and payments between the two countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Frontline States' Meeting in Lusaka Viewed

MB2501083690 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Mikhail Tsirilov comments on African National Congress-initiated meeting of six Frontline States of southern Africa in Lusaka—read by announcer]

[Text] The meeting in Lusaka could be put in the category of consultative meetings. Its aim was to determine the general strategy of the Frontline States in relation to South Africa in the light of the political changes taking place in that country.

As is known, this meeting was preceded by the session of the ANC's [African National Congress] executive committee, where representatives of the internal wing of that organization took part together with the ANC veterans recently released from South African jails.

The Harare declaration, the ANC plan for a settlement in South Africa, was in the center of the discussion by the heads of the six Frontline States. The leader of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], Mr Sam Nujoma, also took part in that meeting.

This plan is a detailed program of action directed at the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa. The basic means for its realization is the holding of direct talks with the existing government in South Africa.

However, before the talks can begin, the ANC has put forward a number of preliminary conditions. The main ones are the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all political prisoners, the removal of the ban on the activities of the ANC and other organizations subject to these laws. The Harare declaration was adopted by the Organization of African Unity.

At their opening of the meeting in Lusaka, the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, said prior to the meeting he had had a telephone conservation with the United Nations general secretary, Perez de Cuellar. Mr de Cuellar said the peace plan agreed by the United Nations General Assembly last month [as heard] had been officially forwarded to Mr de Klerk and his government for examination. It is in essence the notification of a peace settlement plan worked out by the ANC with a few adjustments.

It is difficult to foretell what Pretoria's reply will be. There will obviously be a cautious advance to reforms, a search for a way out of the protracted crisis.

De Klerk's government is experiencing strong pressure from the right and from the left, from the opposition and supporters of change. Mr Herman Cohen, the United States assistant secretary of state on African affairs, at present in South Africa, is no doubt also pressuring.

The time for Pretoria to think is getting tough. [sentence as heard] The radical changes taking place in the world are having an influence on the situation in the country. South Africa is standing on the edge of a grandiose shake-up.

It's perfectly natural that the wishes of the Frontline States can be seen against this background. In the words of Kenneth Kaunda, side by side with ANC, we are the direct participants in the struggle with apartheid in stepping up the process of the transformation of the apartheid system. This is why the participants in the Lusaka meeting called on all who find apartheid unacceptable to continue the pressure on Pretoria, to keep up the struggle.

East Europe

Reportage on LCY Congress in Belgrade

Pancevski Report Cited

PM2501100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Dispatch by TASS and PRAVDA correspondents Ye. Fadeyev, A. Bocharov, and V. Kuznetsov: "At a New Stage: From the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Emergency Congress"]

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Jan—"For Democratic Socialism in Yugoslavia" is the chief slogan of the 14th (Emergency) League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] Congress which opened here today. More than 1,600 delegates, representing the almost 2-million-strong LCY membership, assembled in the Sava Centar Palace of Congresses to sum up the results of party activity in the preceding period, discuss the most important issues concerning the country's socioeconomic development and party building, and plan long-term tasks.

A report entitled "The LCY and Social Reforms" was delivered by Milan Pancevski, president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium.

The LCY, he said, now finds itself at an historic crossroads. The responsibility of the LCY and other socialist forces in carrying out the radical reforms is enormous, as

it is clear that our model of social relations has objectively exhausted its potential to develop.

Faced with a deepening crisis, the LCY has launched radically new processes to develop a comprehensive program to speed up the country's emergence from crisis, which was particularly manifest in the preparation for the 14th (Emergency) Congress. In order to specify its program aims in a clear and well-defined way the congress should critically analyze the situation in society and the party, particularly in the intercongress period.

This period, the speaker noted, is characterized by an extremely exacerbated economic, political, ideological, and moral crisis within Yugoslav society. Realization of the urgent need for in-depth reforms has been slow in coming, half-hearted decisions have been taken, and reforms have met with covert or overt resistance. The galloping inflation and then hyperinflation, which has seriously disrupted the economic system and the basic features of economic activity, intensified social tension in the country, and produced strikes, serves to reflect the socioeconomic crisis in a distilled form.

An increase in negative phenomena in the sphere of political relations has also been characteristic of the intercongress period. The aggressive emergence on the scene of nationalism, intensifying confrontation among the leaders of republics and autonomous provinces, the unprincipled actions of some leadership bodies and actual officials, the holding of assemblies and rallies of protest, and a diverse attitude to their aims and content—all this has heated up the situation in society. The deterioration of the political situation has also been influenced by the resistance to reform changes in the sphere of constitutional and organizational [systemnyy] decisions, the drafting of a comprehensive reform program, and the consistent exercise of the functions vested in the federation. Attacks have intensified on the position and role of the federation, the name and work of J. Broz Tito, the Yugoslav People's Army, the role and place of the LCY in society, and the foreign policy of independence and nonalignment, confrontation over the problems of Kosovo has gotten worse, various hostile theses on the restructuring of Yugoslavia have appeared, and unions of a fascist and national chauvinist stamp have arisen.

All these extremely adverse phenomena and trends have frequently been assisted by opportunism and ideological neutrality on the part of the League of Communists and other progressive forces in society and the courting of nationalist forces by some leading political organs, particularly in the republics. At the same time forces seeking in the guise of criticizing weaknesses in the present system to inculcate the most blatant nihilism so as to destroy the major achievements of socialism and the nature of relations in the federation have stepped up their activity.

And yet the opinion has prevailed in society and the party that the roots of the crisis should be sought in certain ideological, political, and organization tenets of the economic and political system and the actual stance adopted by the League of Communists. The launching of the process of reforms in the economic and political system and within the party itself and the proposal of an initiative to amend the Constitution are an expression of the LCY's clear course of changes. The intercongress period has ended with a rapid, dynamic, and contradictory stage in the development of our socialism during which a concept has been worked out and ways of starting a process of radically new changes defined.

Our congress, M. Pancevski stated, is of exceptionally great importance, it must define the ideological and political bases of a new stage in socialism's development in Yugoslavia and elaborate the LCY's approach to the implementation of reforms. The speaker noted that the economic effectiveness of socialism in general and of the Yugoslav economy in particular is the basic prerequisite for the country's further development. Equality and diversity of forms of ownership should become a law of social and economic life.

The policy of accelerated development of lagging republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo is an extremely important economic and political question. It is essential to elaborate a new philosophy for the development of those regions and abandon the current predominantly administrative-based distributive system.

The LCY, M. Pancevski went on, favors the reform of the system of assemblies [skupstina] as the representative organs of the working people. The assemblies should become an indispensable factor in democratizing society and establishing a rule-of-law state.

It is impossible to emerge from the crisis and implement reforms unless the federation's place and role in these processes are defined. The federation should be an effective, law-governed, modern state developing in line with the principles of a market economy.

The implementation of all-embracing reforms in society puts the question of achieving a modern and effective party on the agenda. The congress must adopt a decision on drafting a new program in which the changes taking place in the world and Yugoslavia will necessarily be reflected. This involves the transformation of the LCY, whose activity should correspond to the new model of socialism based on a market economy, a pluralist political system, and the principles of a rule-of-law state. But that does not mean that Communists will quit the political stage or that their party will turn into a "discussion club." By abandoning dogmatism and bureaucratic, etatist narrow-mindedness, the LCY will be able to transform itself into an active ideological and political force of the working class.

Developing all the democratic institutions and relations in society and abandoning the monopoly of power, the League of Communists will be fighting for power in the period ahead through all the institutions and mechanisms of the political system, but not the power of

certain individuals, nor even that of the LCY, but the power of people as the producers of material and spiritual values, as free and creative beings, M. Pancevski stated.

The new conception of the unity of the League of Communists is a particularly important area in the reform of relations within the party. We are breaking once and for all with the concept of the directive-issuing party, seeking to establish the LCY as the party of workers and progressive movements. In the new conditions the LCY should operate as a united organization in which all constructive forces develop and implement a common united policy, however not in every detail but merely within the framework of the LCY Program and Statutes. This unity must be built and exercised anew, it should extend to the main strategic questions of implementing our socialism. Thus the stress is being shifted away from a political understanding of unity which in former practice could be imposed from above, dressing itself up as bogus monopoly and stressing its uniformity.

As far as the principle of democratic centralism is concerned, M. Pancevski noted that differences on this issue do exist in the party ranks. Any political organization, no matter what you call it or what system it operates within, should have defined principles and a mechanism guaranteeing its effective operation. Here, there is no argument, so to speak. Democratic centralism, party discipline, democratic unity, or something else—all this does not obviate the need for a mechanism guaranteeing and increasing the effictiveness of party work. We need a principle of mandatory execution throughout the LCY of all decisions adopted during democratic discussion, discussion in which democratic socialism assumes a qualitatively new democratic character. Without this the LCY would have no real chance of fighting for the unity of Yugoslavia. And the LCY Central Committee as the supreme party organ should ensure the effective elaboration of the democratic implementation of policy at party forums.

Speaking about Yugoslavia's attitude to the changes in the international arena, M. Pancevski stressed that the SFRY has a vital interest in the overall development of the relations and processes under way throughout the world, but not as a passive observer but an active participant making the maximum contribution to everything that consolidates peace, trust, friendship, cooperation, and progress. In ushering in this new vision of socialism in Yugoslavia and embarking on radical reforms of the economic and political system we will not only strengthen our shaken authority in the world but also establish our fundamental tenets and principles on international relations.

The current processes in the world are marked by the major radical changes taking place in the socialist countries. In resolutely breaking with authoritarian attitudes and boldly embarking on the social democratization of life and expansion of ties with the world they will be making a fundamental and major contribution to the overall process of democratizing and humanizing international relations. The LCY fully supports all these processes and progressive forces in socialist states.

We, M. Pancevski said, are extremely interested in ensuring that Yugoslavia plays an active role in the activity of nonaligned countries as one of the movement's founders and current chairman. Yugoslavia favors the Nonaligned Movement's involvement in all current economic and political processes to ensure that Europe becomes a region of the free movement of ideas, goods, knowledge, and people rather than a huge military test range.

The 14th (Emergency) Congress, M. Pancevski said in conclusion, epitomizes a time which could be described as deeply revolutionary, crucial, and historic. It is a time when one historical stage of socialist development in our country is finally coming to an end, a time of heightened social crisis and deep contradictions. It is a time which requires that everything obsolete be abandoned and a new vision of social development be boldly fashioned. This congress marks for the LCY the beginning of its radical transformation so that it may effectively fight for democratic socialism and a better life for every individual and society as a whole.

Slovenian Walk Out Noted

LD2301062690 Moscow TASS in English 0609 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] Belgrade, January 23 TASS—The delegation of Slovenia, one of the party organizations attending the 14th extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), decided to walk out of the party forum.

"For our delegation the congress is drawing to a close", Ciril Ribicic, Slovenian League of Communists Central Committee chairman, said at the plenary meeting. "During the discussion at the Congress delegates from the republican party organization repeatedly made futile attempts to change its course. Both our proposal to re-organise the LCY into a league of independent republican and territorial organizations and our right to have our own opinion before making a decision on drafting the new rules and programme of the party were not supported.

"The fact that the Slovenian delegation represents a small organization was ignored during the voting. Although there were important issues on the agenda, among them those concerning Yugoslavia's involvement in European processes, an extension of human rights and the country's federal structure, the main document of the forum, which was submitted for endorsement and whose discussions was completed, does not match the expectations by the Slovenian delegation", Ribicic said.

"Our decision does not mean a collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia but the beginning of a serious dialogue on the party's future structure", Ribicic said in a TANJUG interview.

"During the forum's proceedings our delegation did not feel that it was an equal participant in the discusison, which prompted us to make the decision not to attend it", Ribicic said.

Congress Suspended

PM2501110790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by special correspondents Ye. Vostrukhov and N. Yermolovich under rubric "Panorama of International Events": "After the Ultimatum—A Split?"]

[Text] Belgrade—The work of the 14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] has been suspended. It appears that hopes that, during these most difficult days of acute crisis in the party, the LCY would still manage to avoid a split during this extraordinary congress were not justified. Late in the evening of 22 January, C. Ribicic, chairman of the League of Communists of Slovenia Central Committee, stated from the rostrum: "The LCY has not taken a single step to implement social reforms. Slovenian Communists do not want to participate in the party's death throes any longer. They have unanimously decided to leave the congress..."

Ribicic slowly came down from the rostrum and made for the exit. The republic delegates stood up, following their leader's example, and also made for the exit. They were joined by some members of the working presidium of the congress, including Stefan Korosec, secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, a leader who enjoys great authority in the party and who did so much to prepare this extraordinary congress. At the first plenary session, he managed, as chairman of the working presidium, to direct the presidium's work into a constructive channel. And then, two days ago, he himself was in the group of people who ostentatiously spurned the unity of party ranks before the whole country.

Representatives of the most economically developed republic have left the congress which working people throughout the country had viewed so hopefully, expecting from the communists decisions aimed at improving life and good prospects for the future. Of course, everyone knew about the crisis in the party, but the Yugoslavs continued to believe in a revival of the LCY, which has traditionally had good relations with the people.

The same S. Korosec who had just left the extraordinary congress had spoken to journalists on the eve of its opening and stated that the new LCY documents expressed a readiness to display tolerance toward other views and opinions and even a readiness to hold free elections in April of this year with the participation of opposition forces. "The LCY is prepared to contend with other social programs and to struggle for its principles in an atmosphere of pluralism," Korosec told us. "Democratic socialism has good prospects."

This was confirmed by the stormy debates at the 14th Congress. The second plenary session was to open on the morning of Monday 22 January. But it did not open until the afternoon: It was delayed by the work of the commission on reforming the LCY and its statute. The participants in the debates came to the conclusion that in a democratic society no one can be the sole bearer of the sole political truth. They approved on principle the LCY's declaration put forward for discussion and adoption by the congress. It is this "New Plan for Democratic Socialism in Yugoslavia" that will determine the party's life until a new program is drawn up in the near future.

All the commission's proposals were submitted to the plenary session of the congress. It was to adopt the declaration and other documents after amendments and additions to it had been discussed. The delegates who spoke agreed that it is necessary to embark immediately on radical and complex restructuring of the LCY. Here are the political steps which have priority: straight after the congress the LCY is putting forward a political initiative to start as quickly as possible and in no more than 6 months a radical and complex transformation of the LCY, to prepare proposals for a new program and new statute, which will be submitted for discussion by all party members, and to start preparation of a new SFRY Constitution. The participants in the discussion stressed that the LCY must transform itself as quickly as possible into a modern democratic organization. Yugoslav communists intend to develop their activity, in conditions of pluralism in society, as a political organization with equal rights in democratic collaboration with all other parties and movements.

Certain delegates proposed that the article on the leading role of the party in Yugoslav society be omitted from the SFRY Constitution. But the congress rejected these proposals, as well as the Slovene delegation's proposal to form "a federal league of independent republic party organizations" instead of a single League of Communists of Yugoslavia for the whole country. There turned out to be relatively few advocates of splitting the single party and separating it into national republic units—only 10 percent of the total number of delegates. The idea of a "League of Leagues" failed...

But surprisingly enough the minority tried to impose its viewpoint on the majority, threatening the party with a split. C. Ribicic again mounted the rostrum. He announced that the Slovene congress had already adopted a decision to create an independent republican party organization and an appeal to all the country's communists containing the proposal to transform the LCY into a "League of Leagues." But since the Slovene initiative did not receive support, C. Ribicic stated, the entire Slovene delegation was leaving the congress. "We do not want to bear the responsibility, along with

everyone else, for political and economic failures," he said. "As far as we are concerned, your resolutions are invalid." And he added: "The League of Communists of Slovenia does not want a split in the LCY and is prepared to cooperate with all other parties and movements on a treaty basis."

The drama of this extraordinary situation in which the congress found itself was aggravated a few minutes after the Slovenes' demarche by I. Racan, leader of the Croatian delegation. He stated excitedly:

"Our delegation believes that the congress cannot work normally without the communists of one republic and without the representatives of one of the peoples in our federation. We propose that the delegates suspend the congress sessions and discuss the existing situation in the republican and local party organizations. And only then adopt a final decision."

This was the resolution the delegates adopted.

Political Demonstrations Held in GDR Cities

PM2401162390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "GDR: Discordant Demands"]

[Text] The start of the week was heralded in the GDR by a number of demonstrations under highly varied slogans—ranging from appeals for German unity to demands for the creation of special production councils at industrial enterprises.

The largest demonstration, of more than 100,000 people, took place in Leipzig. It was called by "New Forum." The Social Democratic Party [SPD] (GDR), the Christian Democratic Union, and "Democratic Breakthrough" delivered their slogans. The aspect of the rally was determined by banners demanding the dissolution and expropriation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS]. The demonstrators manifested clear intolerance toward those who held dissenting views. Virtually everyone who disagreed with the demands for reunification was heckled. Appeals for reason often went unheeded. Activists from the neofascist party of "republicans" once again distributed their pamphlets among the demonstrators.

At a rally in Schwerin, representatives of "New Forum" and the SPD (GDR) demanded the creation of democratic production councils. In their opinion, this is necessary in connection with the impending formation of joint enterprises involving West German capital.

The first demonstration this year also took place in the GDR capital. Many people turned out with homemade banners calling on the demonstrators not to vote for SED-PDS representatives at the 6 May elections. Demonstrators in Magdeburg, Halle, Suhl, and other cities made similar demands. More than 200,000 people in all participated.

We know how hard it is now for every SED-PDS member and we realize that many more people will leave us, particularly those who reject the idea of going into opposition, G. Gysi, chairman of the SED-PDS, has said. In an interview with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND published today he pointed out that internal changes will also be necessary in the near future in connection with the emergent change in the party's status. But all this can only help to develop the renewal process as a result.

We must constantly bear in mind, he continued, the fact that it is not primarily a question of the future of the party but the future of the country. We must not allow the phased plan for German unification being proposed by certain opposition forces to be implemented—it would result in the elimination of the GDR as a state and thus pose a danger to stability in Europe.

In the course of the transformations, the chairman of the SED-PDS believes, the workers interests are to a considerable extent still going unheeded. No political party expresses their viewpoint. There are also definite complexities on this issue within the SED-PDS, which is preventing workers from perceiving it as their own party. We will strive, however, to continue to express the working people's interests, he indicated.

It is reassuring that the party grass roots—young party members above all—are taking steps to set the situation to rights. For instance, when W. Berghofer, former deputy chairman of the party, and a considerable number of members of Dresden SED-PDS Bezirk Board announced their withdrawal from the SED-PDS, a competent new board was formed that same evening.

Savvin on Demonstrations

LD2301144890 Moscow TASS in English 1252 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] Berlin January 23 TASS—By TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin:

The week began in the German Democratic Republic with demonstrations. Slogans ranged from calls for German unity to demands to set up special production councils at industrial plants.

The largest demonstration, involving more than 100,000 people, was held in Leipzig in response to a call by the New Forum. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (GDR), the Christian-Democratic Union and the Democratic Breakthrough articulated their slogans. Posters demanding the disbandment and expropriation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism determined the image of the rally.

Participants were impatient with those who advocated divergent views. Almost everyone who disagreed with demands for re-unification was booed and shouted down. Calls for reason often remained unheard. Activists of the neo-Nazi party of "Republicans" again handed out their leaflets to demonstrators.

Social Democrats staged their demonstration in Potsdam. They called for patience towards dissident Democrats during the election battle and for active responses to extremists' actions.

At a rally in Schwerin, representatives of the New Forum and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (GDR) demanded the formation of production councils. They said they were necessary because future joint business ventures will involve West German capital.

Production councils would take part in the management and control of joint ownership. Marchers called for strong trade unions independent of parties, the government and economic managers.

This year's first demonstration was also staged in the GDR capital. Many marchers went out into the street with posters urging voters not to vote for members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-the Party of Democratic Socialism on May 6. Similar demands were issued by marchers in Magdeburg, Halle, Suhl and other cities. These demonstrations involved more than 200,000 people.

Maslov Ponders GDR Opposition Tactics

PM2301124190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 90 pp 2-3

[Own correspondent S. Maslov dispatch: "Dictatorship of Democracy"]

[Text] Berlin—Whom and what can we expect and be on the watch for amidst the political thaw—a complex situation whose development is taking on some not inoffensive features and the prediction of which is becoming more difficult—that has begun in the GDR?

I do not intend to overdramatize anything. But I also cannot gloss over the tension caused by the signs of dyarchy now apparent in the GDR. The "round table" enjoys greater authority than the government, its participants say, thereby emphasizing their importance. The chairman of the Council of Ministers does not conceal his concern over the numerous demands made by the opposition, which is attempting—in the form of an ultimatum—to order his line of conduct, even going as far as telling him when and where he must make an urgent appearance, for example. If the situation is really moving in the direction of dyarchy, how could it end? A paralysis of authority? Or....

The New Forum has threatened the cabinet of ministers that it will move from opposition toward confrontation and refuse to continue the "round table" talks if the government, concerned by the growth in radical right-wing trends, should take steps to set up a department to protect the constitution before free elections are held. The arguments? That this department will not protect the constitution but the interests and structure of the former state security services, whose disbandment was announced by the Council of Ministers in December. The trumps which the New Forum has laid on the "round table"—a round table that has justified its existence in the present situation—look fairly solid.

The opposition's sensitivity to questions of state security, to whom it posed a clear threat until quite recently, is perfectly understandable. But its edginess and painful reaction to the government's actions cannot be explained by this alone....

A GDR television reporter wandered through Berlin and put this question to everyone he met: Who will you vote for in the coming elections? Approximately two-thirds of the dozens of respondents showed indecision in front of the camera. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the remaining third who were specific as to where their affinities lay gave preference to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS]. Why? "The party has a clear concept," came the reply. The opposition has caused irritation and even disillusionment in some of the "don't knows": A lot of stupid things are being said at the "round table" sessions, they say, the New Forum only really took an active stand at the beginning, they say.... Here is an opinion, for example, which the author of these lines heard at a Berlin rally from young people mostly interested in the ideas of the Green Party: "Sympathizing with them is one thing. Voting for them is something quite different. We are not sure that the Green Party will be able to organize itself properly, and we are even more doubtful about its abilities to restructure society in line with its principles. So, what can we do? Play for time: Perhaps the SED-PDS will get a new image sufficiently attractive for people to follow it...."

These are just some individual symptoms of the fact that the euphoria caused by the very appearance of legal opposition is gradually ebbing away. The emotional field that sprung up around it has proved inadequate for sustaining the masses' attention for any length of time. Once their emotions had cooled, people looked for political self-determination from the opposition. All has not gone smoothly in this respect. The New Forum, for example, only made up its mind the week before last as to whether it was going to be a party or remain as a social movement. It seems from the long debate at their conference in Leipzig that the delegates themselves were not totally clear as to the fundamental difference between them either. In the end, they opted to remain as a social movement. But this decision is not final. If required to do so by the future Law on Elections (in which the New Forum intends to take part), it will possibly have to forgo its principles and hastily "redefine itself" as a party.

The New Forum—the first opposition organization in the GDR—has today perhaps receded somewhat into the shadows. It is simply that there are too many opposition movements now. Parties are springing up like mushrooms after rain. Naturally, every one of them would like to be unique and say something new to the people, but with every passing day it is becoming increasingly difficult to stand out in the GDR's variegated political scene.

Part of the opposition—six parties and movements—realizing their organizational weakness and lack of coordination, concluded that they needed to form an alliance in order to take part in the election battle. One of the first significant steps taken by this alliance was that the United Left soon withdrew from it....

Then we have the SED-PDS, which has entered the election campaign with vigor. Also the phenomenon of Hans Modrow, a personality who, in the Honecker era, rarely appeared on the television screen or in the newspapers but who was, nevertheless, fairly well known and, unlike the general secretary, someone who has won sympathy among the people. (Recent statistics provided by Berlin sociologists attest to Modrow's popularity boom: 58.9 percent of the respondents put him at the top of the league for authority among politicians. And he is a long way ahead of the rest). We also have a whole package of government measures consonant with the interests and attitudes of the majority of the population: from the first steps toward realizing the idea of a treaty-based community with the FRG (the "copyright" for this idea, as is well known, belongs to H. Modrow) to the release of all political prisoners. This was too much for the opposition. It could see the danger of the initiative slipping out of its hands—a far greater danger than that of state security, under whatever department the latter may emerge. H. Modrow, who has essentially become the main protagonist of state politics, has also gradually come to be the face of the SED-PDS, still in the process of renewal. Clearly, the opposition has been unable to forgive him this.

The opposition has switched to counterattack. Attacks on the SED-PDS have assumed the nature of outright warfare in the conditions of (or with the appearance of?) social peace. Essentially, the opposition has denied the SED-PDS the right to renewal. Very few have bothered to define the difference between Honecker and those communists who, on the day of his removal from power, with relief and with happy faces—like us after Brezhnev—carried the portraits of the aged general secretary from official buildings and who suffered in agony the ascent to the empty party throne by Egon Krenz, known among the people as the "crown prince." Honecker's regime has today been replaced by an anti-dictatorship, but can it be indentified with democracy? The majority defaming the minority—we are already familiar with this. In our own past, this was known as the dictatorship of democracy—is there any description more apt? Having originally proclaimed the slogan "no violence!" the opposition in the GDR has switched to strong-arm pressure and tough political coercion.

I could be accused of bias, however. But that would be quite difficult. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has suffered from the arrogance of the old high priests—I stress, the old high priests, namely, the SED and the Free German Youth League—if not more so then at least from an earlier date than did SPUTNIK or NOVOYE VREMYA, for example. My predecessor—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's own correspondent in the GDR—was simply driven out of Berlin: He apparently dared to cut an interview with Honecker and asked Eberhard Aurich [Free German Youth first secretary], the man himself (!), awkward questions. Komsomol officials gave such a sendoff to the author of these lines when he left for the GDR that you felt he was about to embark on some kind of corrective labor in order to rehabilitate the newspaper in the eyes of far from always welcoming friends.

So, criticism has been rained down on the SED-PDS from all sides: some is possibly fair comment but some, I think, is unjust. Settling scores with the communists, which was particularly apparent in the first 10 days of January, possibly initiated a new stage in the election battle. The principle of every man for himself and all against one has become firmly established in political life. A new opposition has even appeared out of the "old" parties now represented in parliament and in the government but categorically against cooperation with the SED-PDS in the future: some for ideological reasons and others evidently because they "want to go along with the crowd."

Rumors appeared and multiplied last week. But those responsible for putting these rumors about—whether in the GDR or in the FRG—were sometimes scared by their own conjectures. It was expected that the chairman of the Council of Ministers would raise the question of confidence in the government before the People's Chamber session and call for a national referendum. If successful, political experts of various calibers surmised, the SED-PDS would strengthen its positions. If unsuccessful.... Who and what could be expected in that case? Could the communists expect their final political crucifixion? And what about an opposition at a political crossroads, forced to decide immediately, without hesitation, which direction it was going to take and whom and what it was going to take with it into the elections—elections which could be held much earlier than planned? And what could society expect as a whole? Impassable slushy roads amidst the political thaw which has begun in the GDR, chaos? Perhaps the rumors were not totally unfounded, if you consider that G. Gysi made a statement in one of his interviews which suggested that he did not rule out the possibility of the question of confidence in the government arising.

During the parliamentary session, the premier gave no cause for accusations of exacerbating the situation in the country. Initially insisting on creating a department to protect the constitution, he later showed flexibility and a readiness not only for compromise but also for broader cooperation with the participants in the "round table" talks. The creation of new security bodies has been postponed until after the elections. Responding to opposition attacks regarding the legality of the present government, H. Modrow remarked not without irony, but also not without firmness in his voice, that for some reason he could not recall coming to power as a result of a coup d'etat.

The question of confidence was not raised. This apparently suited everyone, the opposition included. But the mass of people who had come to the Palace of the Republic, where the People's Chamber session was being held, remained unsatisfied (it is hard to establish quite why—but a reason will always be found). The perfectly democratically-minded crowd tore down the state flags from the parliament building. The police, evidently still not recovered from the syndrome of events on 7 and 8 October, impassively contemplated this scene.

On the days parliament was in session, warning strikes were held in Berlin: first construction workers and then taxi drivers who, to the accompaniment of klaxons outside the Palace of the Republic, demanded, among other things, the removal of the SED-PDS from the political arena. Naturally, the party did not remain deaf to these loud signals. A commentary appeared the next day in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, which asked the far from rhetorical question: Perhaps the only right decision for the party in the present conditions would be to withdraw into the opposition?

At the moment, however, Hans Modrow feels it necessary to try out other possible solutions. At the "round table" session held on Monday, he offered its participants a new package of proposals for cooperation. These include: direct participation in the work of the Council of Ministers by competent representatives of the opposition; joint preparation for the forthcoming meeting between the GDR and FRG heads of government and the presence of all interested parties at this meeting; and civic control over the disbandment of the national security department. The SED-PDS has also taken steps to meet the opposition halfway. It has been announced that 11 of the 16 party newspaper publishing houses and 21 of the 26 printing plants are to be transferred to public ownership.

But the opposition is sticking to its guns. Whatever the SED [title as published] does, it would be better if it did not exist at all. The GDR's social democrats (who recently changed their name from the Social Democratic Party to the Social Democratic Party of Germany) made the removal of the SED-PDS from power a paramount feature of their policy at their recent congress. In this, incidentally, the social democrats are not far from the republicans.

Meanwhile, the opponents of the SED-PDS are moving into the offensive, using not only political methods. The windows of the SED-PDS regional board building in Magdeburg were smashed by the participants in a rally convened at the appeal of the New Forum. The crowd burst into the building of the former regional party school—converted into a hotel quite some time ago, incidentally....

At the start of this week, the "round table" participants urgently interrupted their session to jointly attempt to calm the participants in a rally organized by the New Forum (a participant in the "round table"!). The rally was storming the building of the former national security department in Berlin.

Groups of people with broad sashes saying "no violence!" over their shoulders stood by, helplessly looking on from the sidelines while the orchestrated mob smashed up everything in sight.

Where is all this leading? To impassable and uncrossable slushy roads? A crossroads? Or nailing on a cross?...[alliterative jingle in Russian—rasputitsa, rasputye, raspyatiye]

GDR Parties Consider Coalition Issue

PM2301163190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "GDR: "Party Decision"]

[Text] To be or not to be part of H. Modrow's coalition government—that was the wording of the agenda of a GDR Christian Democratic Union [CDU] Presidium sitting that dragged on into the dead of night.

The discussion was emotional—and there was sufficient reason for this. A few days ago M. Kirchner, CDU general secretary, said in an interview with West Germany's DPA that the Christian Democrats, who currently hold three posts in the Council of Ministers, intend to leave because they disagree with the policy of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS], which hold the majority in the government. The CDU Chairman L. de Maiziere effectively repudiated Kirchner's statement, pointing out that only the party's leading organ is competent to adopt such decisions. The press reports that most CDU Presidium members voted to continue working in the government in order to avoid destabilizing the situation in the country.

Representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany [LDPD] will also remain in Modrow's government. This decision was adopted to support LDPD Chairman M. Gerlach's opinion, who believes that the party entered the coalition government to act for the good of the GDR.

However, following the 6 May parliamentary elections, as announced previously, neither of these parties will form a coalition with the SED-PDS and will abandon their involvement in the government if the latter's representatives appear there.

Premier Calfa Quits Communist Party

LD1801172790 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 18 Jan 90

[Text] Prague January 18 TASS—Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa quit the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, CTK reported.

Recent CSSR Government Decisions Summarized

PM2401092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CSSR: Changes Under Way"]

[Text] Prague, 19 Jan—The journalists who gathered for a news conference on the results of the CSSR Government session were familiarized, first of all, with a sensational report: CSSR Premier M. Calfa has left the ranks of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ].

He did this following his deputies—V. Komarek and V. Dlouhy, who had previously "terminated their membership in the Communist Party," as people say here. Thus, the government of national accord formed from representatives of various parties, including the Communist Party, is gradually losing its balance.

But, be that as it may, the government must tackle both economic and political questions. At this session it adopted a decision to abolish a number of indicators on which enterprises used to report back to higher organs. The remaining indicators, which previously were considered compulsory, will henceforth be for information only. This measure, so it is pointed out here, is aimed at decentralizing the economy.

During the session it was decided to accelerate the elaboration of the concept of the CSSR's approach to European integration. The economic council has been entrusted with preparing this document. Symbolic significance attaches to the government decision to stop supplying the imposing Tatra-613 car to state enterprises and organizations. In Czechoslovakia this vehicle had the same status as the Soviet Chayka.

It was also decided to reduce the length of active military service and to lift certain restrictions on admission to higher educational institutions. The government resolved, in particular, to reduce active military service for students from 12 to 9 months. Concessions were adopted to reduce the service duration for family reasons.

It was reported at the news conference that construction of the Temelin Nuclear Electric Power Station has been suspended for the time being, as the Czechoslovak side is not satisfied with the design of the Soviet reactor units. The possibility of redesigning the first two reactor units is being worked out together with Soviet specialists, and construction of the third and fourth units has been suspended.

The country's new government has recently come up against the first labor conflict. Slovak television workers have struck in response to dismissals. They protested against the form of resolving personnel questions, which they considered to be sharply at variance with ethics, morality, and, in the final analysis, the labor code. The strikers demands have been met. All those dismissed have been reinstated.

This is probably not the last of the labor conflicts awaiting Czechoslovakia's working people, is it? The trade unions, which fell apart during the "velvet revolution," are still inactive. And the Communist Party itself is unable to protect its members, who are being dismissed just for belonging to the CPCZ. Such are the ambiguous processes in Czechoslovakia today.

CPCZ Role in Czechoslovak Society Viewed

LD2401150990 Moscow International Service in Czech 1800 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Commentary by Valentin Aleksandrov of Moscow radio on position of CPCZ in Czechoslovak society; date, place not given - live or recorded]

[Text] One cannot give a clear-cut answer today to the question of the CPCZ' position in Czechoslovak society. It looks very complicated and it looks like the CPCZ will have to overcome many difficulties. This mainly concerns the conditions in which the CPCZ and Czechoslovak Communists have been working these days.

As is known, the party has lost its influence due to the shortsighted policy of its former leadership, which was infected with the virus of directives and bureaucratism and was unable, and perhaps also unwilling, to take into consideration not only the mood of the general public, but of hundreds of thousands of communists as well. Furthermore, some of its leading officials provided reasons to doubt their personal honesty. The result is that the party has found itself on a side rail of political life. Its place has been taken by other forces.

Unfortunately, the matter does not end with removing the party and Communists from public life. Regardless of assurances by Civic Forum, attacks by the media against communists have been continuing. Communists are expelled from jobs and jobs are not given to them regardless of their professional and human qualities. It has become a widespread phenomenon that the very people who recently were loudly proclaiming their obedience have become the most fervent persecutors. There is nothing strange about this. History has known many similar cases. The scale of these phenomena is so great that the leading representatives of Civic Forum, which declared the inadmissibility of any form of violence, are forced to condemn, at least in words, the persecution of communists. For example, a Civic Forum representative, (Petr Ctidra) said in a recent appearance that it cannot be said that every communist is amoral and every activist of the Civic Forum is clear as a crystal. MLADA FRONTA points out that under the cloak of Civic Forum, personal accounts are often settled. This is the situation around the CPCZ and communists in Czechoslovakia. It is necessary to get through this difficult test. The facts show that the CPCZ and its new leadership are not only aware of this, but that they have already started to make changes in their work. This was shown at the last session.

What will the CPCZ be tomorrow? Judging by documents of the session, it seems that it will be a left-wing party that takes an active part in the democratic process. Its leadership will render accounts to the primary party organizations, that is, to rank-and- file communists. To say it another way, all resolutions will be approved in conditions of complete information flow to the public and with the consent of rank-and-file communists.

The CPCZ is not making claims, and in the future it will not make claims, to leading society. It will serve it according to its strengths. This is the only way to get back the trust of the peoples. There is no doubt in the USSR that the CPCZ, purified and renewed, will be able to achieve this. Along with the other democratic forces, it wil work for the benefit of the peoples, their national interests. It will work for a really free and really democratic socialist Czechoslovak state.

Moldavian Aid to Romania Described

90UN0584A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by V. Letov: "Banks Will Come to Life"]

[Text] I am on my way to Ungeny, a rayon center on the Prut River. The only duty of the river is to serve as the border. I am on my way to the border with Romania which now has the right to be called "libere"—"free", free without quotation marks.

It is an hour of fast driving from Kishinev to Ungeny. A silver-latticed bridge connects the two banks. A passenger train from Bucharest just crossed the bridge. It was carrying some Soviet people who had found themselves, by mere chance, in the center of events—in the middle of a war. It was a war between light and darkness, between freedom and tyranny. One child, a diplomat's son, is showing a V-sign with his fingers through the train window—V for victory. Victory for everyone and for him too, as he is growing up.

Everyone knows that 22 December, the shortest day in the northern hemisphere, became the greatest day for the bright future of Romania—the day of victory over the Ceausescu regime. It also was a victory over the Romania of the past which used to holler frenzied "Long Live!" to the tyrant in its squares and halls.

I go to the Ungeny KPP-border checkpoint. Today it is a transshipment point and the checkpoint deputy commander, Major Bashkevich, says half-joking, half-serious that since 22 December he has been awake for every shift each day. All of Moldavia is sending trucks here and their cargoes are unpredictable. Sholdaneshty sent 52 tons of wheat, Chadyr Lunga sent sunflower oil, and Kotovsk sent flour. One sack bears a note: "20 wool blankets and 1-day's salary from the teachers and students of the Ungeny SPTY-70 [secondary vocational and technical school]". Mariya Sandulyak, a shift foreman at the transshipment point, is holding a long list of shipments—what goes where. The Kishinev Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] is sending medical supplies to Timisoara, the Moldavian People's Front is sending medical supplies too but addresses them to the Soviet Embassy in Romania to be directed to the hottest spot in the country.

The railway cars are full, they are full of kindness. Young Warrant Officer Vladimir Chaika, senior inspector at the checkpoint, repeats to me the words of Simonov: "There is no grief that is not mine..."

After they come out of the torture chamber, your neighbors at first need your support. At such a time a slice of bread becomes more than something just keeping you from being hungry. In the evening our border guards were to meet with their Romanian counterparts: The meeting had been planned but the questions they were going to ask, had not. "Still?" was my question to Bashkevich and Bronislav Borisovich answered: "It goes without saying that we'll ask when the Romanian side will be ready to receive our people going there for pleasure or on business."

Blood is still being shed in the streets and all of a sudden a question like that. "The overthrow of Ceausescu's dictatorship," says the officer, "will help to intensify the contacts between relatives residing along both banks of the Prut as well as the cultural ties and all that will enrich our lives, because it is not on bread alone..."

That is true: Not on bread alone. I could not but notice the changes in the border rhythms. The notorious barbed wire is being cut. The local population is also taking control of the river lands together with the border guards. The people are also acquiring a new concern: They should feel at home not only in their own casa mare [big house] but on all of this land. On the banks of the Prut they are already putting into practice the idea of one, all-European home, where a smile serves to disarm you and to replace a machine gun. No obstacles will be put in the way of those who would wish to cross the river to visit their neighbors on this land.

"It is a nonsensical situation," a frontier post commander near Ryshkany told me, "if a man on the river bank cannot fish in that river. We are building our world on trust. And the banks of the Prut will come back to life."

Walesa Cited on Polish, Soviet Way Forward

PM1701162790 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 1, 7 Jan 90 p 13

[Len Karpinskiy interview with Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa "while in Moscow to attend the funeral of Andrey Sakharov": "Beware of Sharp Turns"]

[Text] While in Moscow to attend the funeral of Andrey Sakharov, Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa spoke to MN political analyst Len Karpinsky about what, in his view, awaits the Soviet Union in 1990.

Walesa: You are in for difficult times, just as we are. We will have to exert every effort to cope with our critical situation.

MN: What do you mean by critical situation? The bankruptcy of totalitarian "socialism" or an actual economic crisis, i.e., empty shops, inflation, loss of economic ties?

Walesa: Acturally, these things correlate with each other as cause and effect. We in Poland are in an economic crisis, whereas you are only approaching it. And you will come to it, if you remain stuck in the old command system. Our countries have no other way out than radical social reform. It's very important to move towards every kind of freedom at the same time—towards economic, political and social freedom. We need a comprehensive approach. We should not sail "where the wind blows". Freedom is not anarchy but a conscientious and purposeful search for the best solutions. The problem is which way to turn and when.

MN: The December Congress of USSR People's Deputies voted for the government's proposed programme of gradual economic change which, while developing elements of the market economy and various forms of property, preserves the old administrative structures and methods. But the radicals, who represent a fairly substanital segment of the population, uarged for more drastic measures, arguing that a market economy is incompatible with the bureaucratic system.

Walesa: I'm not a fortune-teller and think that no one—be it Solidarity or Gorbachev—can determine which way to go. I will only say: beware of sharp turns. You won't be able to escape them and shouldn't even try to. Your country is not a small wagon, but a huge train. If you forget about the brakes, including administrative and political, you'll over-turn and smash everything. As for the radicals, let them speak their mind and suggest their solutions. Practice will decide whose are the best.

MN: Where, in your view, will we wind up provided we keep our balance on the turns?

Walesa: It's impossible to build capitalism out of our "socialism," and I doubt whether we should be trying to do this at all. The only thing that will help is if we renounce the stereotype based on an abstract antagonism between socialism and capitalism. We must look for unorthodox solutions oriented towards higher living standards for the working people. It's very important that we should no longer view socialization, a basic socialist notion, as the alienation of property and power from individuals. Actually, it's the other way round: socialization of property and power should extend to every single person, so that each individual can be involved in owning the means of production and handling social processes.

Old patterns are no good in this respect. The working man must become a master at last. Most of the property should be controlled by self-governing bodies, by work collectives and cooperative associations. Equal opportunities should be enjoyed by all forms of ownership, including private, which means that a certain party of society owns a certain part of the means of production and uses it efficiently for the country's and its own benefit. it stands to reason that in some industries state ownership should be preserved.

The main thing is to allow people to work creatively and to produce not only material things, but also new forms of social relations. Both our countries have a multitude of intelligent, talented and honest people. Having acquired their freedom, they will undoubtedly find the right solutions and make their historic choice. Cooperation and traditional friendship between our countries will obviously be further enriched next year and replenished with new searches and solutions.

Renewal of Socialism Group Meets in Sofia

PM2401155390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "Sofia Conference"]

[Text] Sofia, 23 Jan—The first national conference of the Movement for the Development of Marxism and the Renewal of Socialism has been held in the Bulgarian capital.

The movement advocates Marxism free of the dogma of Stalinism and raised to the level of modern knowledge and problems. It seeks to galvanize and organize the theoretical and political activity of everyone who seeks a way out of the current economic, sociopolitical, and moral crisis in Bulgarian society.

The conference examined questions of modern Marxism as well as the problems of political pluralism and the expansion of glasnost.

The national conference adopted a resolution welcoming the idea of holding a national "roundtable" on the questions of the development of Marxism and the renewal of socialism.

West Europe

Kornilov on Turkish MP's Remarks on Azerbaijan

LD2401164290 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

Strange things are being said in the Turkish parliament these days. Some speakers, discussing events in Soviet Transcaucasia, say that Turkey is not indifferent to the destiny of Azerbaijani people, whom it regards as closely related.

Others, referring to some "information" allegedly received from Baku, assert that Soviet troop operations mean the massive violation of human rights.

And some even suggest that "military equipment" be sent to Soviet Azerbaijan, specifically to Nakhichevan.

All these statements sharply contrast with the objective and balanced stand with regard to the events in Soviet Transcaucasia that Turkish official circles have held so far.

It can be recalled that in its recent statement the Turkish foreign minister declared that events in Transcaucasia are the domestic affair of the Soviet Union. It condemned those who were engaged in the instigation of rioting and armed clashes and stated that this is contrary to the interests of the region.

The January 20 statement of the Turkish foreign minister was in the same spirit. He spoke about the need to support justifiable actions of the Soviet authorities aimed at ensuring stability in the region.

These assessments were made just a few days ago, and any objective observer could realise that Soviet troops have been sent to Azerbaijan for the sole purpose of restoring law and order there.

It is also known that the death toll occurred in Azerbaijan only because extremists have been deliberately provoking armed clashes.

Why are calls for interference in the affairs of others now being made in the Turkish National Assembly? Why are there allegations about massive violations of human rights in Soviet Azerbaijan? Who is misinforming Turkish parliamentarians and for what purpose is this being done?

I do not have any answer to this question. One thing is clear: That such misinformation cannot help stabilise the situation in the Soviet republic bordering on Turkey. Nor do allegations about massive violations of human rights in Azerbaijan and calls to send military equipment to the Soviet territory promote the development of Soviet-Turkish good-neighbourly relations....

Voronin on USSR-French Business Ties

PM2401160990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by IZVESTIYA own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko, datelined Paris: "Peugeot Cars on the Soviet Highways?"—no date given]

[Text] [Kovalenko] Lev Alekseyevich! You signed an agreement on economic, industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation between the USSR and France a few days ago in Paris. What are its basic new aspects? What prospects does it offer for the development of bilateral relations?

[Voronin] First of all, this agreement follows the spirit of the declaration on the principles of the development of cooperation between the USSR and France signed by M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand in July 1989. It will offer an opportunity to pursue a more flexible policy in the sphere of trade and economic cooperation. The agreement will consolidate the positive trend now emerging in the development of our ties, including the setting up of cooperation between regions in the two countries.

Our trade and economic relations with France have undergone positive development in the last 2 years, and trade turnover has increased. The work on organizing joint enterprises, more than 30 of which were formed last year, started yielding positive results in 1989. Specifically, this includes a major enterprise, created jointly by the USSR Ministry of Communications and the "Thomson" firm, which will produce 600,000 color television sets a year. The USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and the "Pechiney" Firm agreed to create a plant for the production of packaging materials based on fine alloys and others. Important meetings with French businessmen were held in 1989. More than 60 of the largest entrepreneurs visited the Soviet Union and were briefed on our country's national economy. Ties are also developing in the agro-industrial sphere.

[Kovalenko] The USSR and France, the agreement says, intend to apply joint efforts to overcome the obstacles hindering the development of bilateral relations. What obstacles are these, and how can they be eliminated?

[Voronin] One of the main obstacles is the inadequate knowledge—by Soviet enterprise leaders and French business people—of each other and of the reciprocal opportunities. Our enterprises must be helped to find partners. This would require the organization of exhibitions and trade fairs in order to better acquaint the business world with our republics and to help them enter the French market. Our partners still suffer from a certain passiveness and fear in the creation of joint enterprises.

[Kovalenko] During your talks with P. Beregovoy, minister of the economy, finance, and budget, did you discuss the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls [COCOM] restrictive lists which are a serious brake on our ties?

[Voronin] Beregovoy is perfectly well aware that COCOM hinders the development of Soviet-French relations. He, as well asPrime Minister M. Rocard and President F. Mitterrand, is striving to do everything possible to weaken COCOM's negative influence.

[Kovalenko] Let us turn back to the activity of joint enterprises. We attach great importance to this form of cooperation, but are we not overestimating their potential? Are there already any specific results of such enterprises work?

[Voronin] In 1990 we expect to see a considerable increase in the number of Soviet-French enterprises which will supply our market with consumer goods like refrigerators, television sets, gas stoves, furniture, and so on. Why can we still not feel the effect of considerable yields? Because joint enterprises were set up only recently, they have still not gathered pace, and have spent a very long time on organizational questions like selecting their apparatus, premises, and equipment.

[Kovalenko] According to estimates in the Paris press, French investments in the Soviet economy still remain insignificant. Why is this? Are business circles not interested, or are we unable to provide the necessary conditions and offer guarantees?

[Voronin] I do not think so. In terms of investment volume, France ranks second after the FRG, and I think that it could take top position in the next few months. There is a good headstart. France with its capital plays an active role in our economy's development. I hope that 1990 will bring a breakthrough. For example, the USSR Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building intends to conclude in 1990 a contract with the "Peugeot" Firm to organize joint production of 160,000 of the latest "Peugeot 605" cars a year. This will be a colossal enterprise and the French will invest their capital. Furthermore, the "Thomson" Company will continue its work with our enterprises to organize the production of domestic appliances and is prepared to invest large sums in the creation of such enterprises.

[Kovalenko] About 3,000 "perestroyka managers," as they are known here, from the USSR will undergo training in France in the next few years. But will they be able to apply the knowledge and experience they will gain once they return to their enterprises? The two countries have different economic systems and what might be good for the "Peugeot" firm, for example, might not necessarily "work" in our conditions?

[Voronin] I believe that this training will be useful. Now we are switching from the rigidly centralized directive system of planning to a market-planning system, and from administrative edict management to management by economic levers and incentives. And even with the different systems of economic management, there are principles, approaches, and market and demand problems that are common to all economies.

[Kovalenko] The first sitting of the Intergovernmental Soviet-French Commission for Economic, Industrial, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, which was only just set up to replace the two previous ones—the "Grand" and the "Small" commissions—will be held in Moscow this March. What issues will be the main focus at the forthcoming meeting?

[Voronin] Primarily, we wish to check the fulfillment of the 14 agreements on trade and economic questions which were signed during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to France in July 1989. We also want to hear reports from our committees on trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation and from the working groups which deal with specific projects, especially along priority avenues. The question of new forms of cooperation will be specially considered. During the sittings we will study the problems of organizing ties between our republics and individual regions in France. Furthermore, we will brief French entrepreneurs on our scientific achievements and will organize for them a seminar for the study of the Soviet market.

Falin Meets European Social Democrats Chairman

LD2401214790 Moscow TASS in English 2004 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Valentin Falin today met visiting Chairman of the Alliance of Social Democratic Parties of the European Community and Chairman of the Belgian Socialist Party—French-speaking wing Guy Spitaels, and the Alliance's general secretary.

They discussed the present situation in Europe, the development of the European process and other issues.

The meeting was attended by First Deputy Head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Karen Brutents.

Zagladin Receives Nordic Parliamentarians

LD2401220190 Moscow TASS in English 2006 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Ways to step up interaction in the human rights field and strengthen democracy in Europe were discussed today during a conversation between Vadim Zagladin and a delegation from the interparliamentary group of Nordic countries for human rights.

A counsellor to the Soviet president, Vadim Zagladin, who heads the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, met parliamentarians from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and representatives of the North European committees for the protection of Soviet Jews.

The interest of Nordic parliamentarians was evoked by the statement on the Soviet Union's stance towards nationalist and chauvinist orgnisations. Zagladin pointed to the inadmissibility of persecuting people for their views and considered opinions. But in some regions of the Soviet Union, he said, the people in question do not only hold nationalistic views but are connected with corrupted individuals and defend their interests.

People who speak out in defence of national rights are not viewed as chauvinists, Zagladin stressed.

Head of the delegation, Norwegian parliamentarians Reiulf Steen noted great changes in the Soviet Union, especially in the field of openness.

The sides favoured going over to more specific forms of cooperation in order to resolve national and European problems and establish regular contacts between specialists, including, for instance, lawyers and psychiatrists.

Cooperation Program With Spain Signed

LD2401215890 Moscow TASS in English 1906 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin and the Spanish Foreign Ministry's Secretary of State Luis Yanez today signed a programme for cultural and scientific cooperation between the two countries for 1990-1992.

The programme provides for the further development of Soviet- Spanish ties in science, education and culture.

It reflects the two sides' desire to democratise bilateral cooperation in these spheres and their search for new areas and forms of interaction.

Latin America & Caribbean

Petrov Cites President Bush's Remarks

LD2401155590 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 24 Jan 90

["U.S. Anti-Nicaraguan Campaign—TASS comment"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—By TASS news analyst Gennadiy Petrov:

The success of the U.S. anti-Panamanian action appears to have inspired the George Bush administration to take further action in Central America.

This was made clear by threatening remarks against the Cuban and Nicaraguan Governments made by President George Bush in Miami.

Bush stated, to the applause and cheers from the Cuban emigree community, that the fate of General Noriega should provide an object lesson to the two regimes preventing the establishment of full democracy in this hemisphere.

There is no sense in entering into polemics with the president concerning the implication of his vague rhetoric on "full democracy". Concern is caused in Latin America and elsewhere by another thing—the proclamation by Washington of its "right" to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign countries and impose regimes the United States finds suitable by any means, including the use of armed forces.

The malicious anti-Nicaraguan campaign, intensified by the present U.S. Administration as the Nicaraguan general election, scheduled for February 25, is drawing nearer, provide incentive for stepping up the subversive activity of the contra rebels.

Last Sunday [21 January] an attempt on the life of President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua was disrupted. The Nicaraguan Government described the preparations for this barbarous action as a threat to the normal development of the election process in the country.

As the contras get financial and military assistance from the United States, the Managua government addressed a note of protest to State Secretary James Baker.

In his address in Miami President George Bush expressed satisfaction with the fact that the world situation in January of this year differs completely from that in January 1989. He meant above all changes in Eastern Europe and the toppling of General Noriega in Panama. Changes are striking indeed, but ways to bring them about differ as do the attitudes of the two great powers towards their neighbours.

The Soviet Union strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, the United states continue regarding Latin America as its back yard where unsuitable governments may be removed and obedient new governments imposed.

Havana Experiences Food Crisis; Prices Rise

PM2401161790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Commentary by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Necessary Measure. Prices of Some Foodstuffs Have Been Raised in Cuba"]

[Text] Havana, 23 Jan—A government announcement has been promulgated here on a number of measures to regulate the population's consumption of certain basic foodstuffs. For instance, in all provinces of the Republic of Cuba where bread is rationed (aside from the capital), the allowance per person is cut by 20 grams per day as of 1 February, while the price remains the same. In turn, the people of Havana, who can buy what they like at the baker's, will now pay 5 centavos more for a 400-gram loaf (9 centavos are approximately 10 kopecks). Supplies of bread to the public catering network (except for hospitals) are reduced by 10 percent.

The new measures also affect the free sale of eggs to the population. The price rises from 10 to 15 centavos per egg due to the publication of the government announcement. If, as a result of the implementation of development plans, the authorities' announcement says, circumstances create an egg surplus in the future, the price will fluctuate between 12 and 15 centavos in order to regulate consumption.

The Cuban Government's official document provides a general assessment of the difficulties involved in supplying the consumer with a number of foodstuffs and analyzes their basic causes. In particular, it notes that the accord on early grain supplies from the USSR has not been implemented. Despite the Soviet side's desire to

assist us, the document points out, difficulties in trade and shipments by sea have meant that cargoes of grain and flour originally scheduled for this January have still not been received. The Cuban Government has decided to obtain a certain quantity of feed grain for hard currency, which is seen as an extraordinary and exceptional measure, in view of the republic's limited opportunities in that sphere.

The population was also given information concerning exports of Cuban citrus fruits. December and January have seen a drop in exports of citrus fruits because of a lack of ships from Poland, the GDR, and, above all, the Soviet Union. This has meant that only 72,159 of the planned 113,505 tons were shipped in December and only 28,350 of the 45,300 tons planned for the first half of January were shipped. It is forecasted that the shortage of ships will result in an increase in export delays, posing the danger of the loss of tens of thousands of tons of fruit that have been harvested and of those that are yet to be harvested.

In view of the present situation, the republic's authorities have decided to dispatch all the fruit that cannot be kept in refrigerators or in the fields to trade outlets. The quantity could be over 30,000 tons more than what was originally intended to be sold to the consumer.

It should be said that trade between Cuba and the USSR has become so big that very strict observance of mutual commitments, improvement of fleets' work, and prompt dispatch of ships and a rapid unloading of them are essential.

One imagines that all ministries, associations, departments, and institutions directly responsible for freight deliveries at both ends of the Soviet-Cuban "friendship bridge across the ocean" must be taken aback by the situation described in the Cuban Government announcement. They have something to work on, since there are many untapped reserves in our cooperation. What we and the Cubans lack at the moment is effective joint labor and far-sightedness and there is often a lack of urgency and organization and, on occasions, of sheer competence and efficiency in meeting commitments.

There is no sense, it seems to me, in blaming either side for all the shortages, errors, and slip-ups. Moreover, it appears to me that the sides ought to be frank with one another and form a proper picture of the whole range of accumulated problems. What else can they do? Indeed, we have to solve them together, in tandem.

Bread Shortage

LD2401160990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Report by Viktor Gorbachev, Moscow radio correspondent in Havana]

[Text] From 1 February, the daily norm for bread sales will be cut by 20g per person throughout Cuba. Havana will be an exception, where bread is sold freely, but prices will be increased here. The supply of bread to the public catering system is being cut by 10 percent. Only hospitals will be unaffected by this measure. The Cuban Government explains the decision it has taken by the shortage of flour and food grain. Reserves of forage grain are also in short supply, leading to difficulties with fodder in livestock breeding and poultry farming. Therefore, since yesterday egg prices have been increased.

To judge from the government announcement, the main reason for the situation which has arisen is that at the end of last year Soviet foreign trade and transport organizations were unable to carry out advance deliveries on this year's account, even though agreement was reached on this with our government. I went to the Soviet permanent mission in Havana, and the staff there confirmed that the above-plan deliveries of grain, which have for the last 20 years been standard practice, really were delayed this time. At the same time, our country last year did fulfil all its planned obligations. We delivered over 1 million tons of wheat alone.

Visit of Brazilian President-Elect Viewed

PY2401225390 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] There is great interest in the Soviet Union over the upcoming visit of Brazilian President-elect Fernando Collor de Mello, who will make his fist visit to the Soviet Union where he will meet with Soviet politicians and statesmen.

It is expected that the meetings will be productive. This optimism is based on the successful development of Soviet-Brazilian relations during the last few years. This follows the new political way of thinking that is current in international and interstate relations.

The Soviet-Brazilian Political Declaration on the Principles for Interaction in Support of Peace and International Cooperation was signed in October 1988 during the visit of Brazilian President Jose Sarney. From the Brazilian point of view, the declaration represents the basis for understanding between states that have different sociopolitical systems. It is also a model for relations among east-south countries.

The declaration is important because of its content. It says that the Soviet Union and Brazil will try to enhance cooperation and to strengthen multilateral negotiations, especially at the UN level. It also seeks to improve dialogue and to solve the many economic and political problems which affect the vital interests of the international community, especially in the areas of peace and development.

I would like to emphasize three concepts in this diplomatic formula: dialogue, peace, and development. It is impossible to solve any world or regional problem, be it disarmament, ecology, or the Central American conflict,

without dialogue. Brazil, like all Latin American countries, approves the disarmament agreements that were reached during the Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush summit in Malta.

The Soviet Union supports the Brazilian initiative to make the South Atlantic a peace zone, and it also supports the strict observance of the Tlatelolco Treaty because these are the bases for a denuclearized zone in Latin America.

During the international ecological forum held in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev supported the idea of holding a summit meeting in Brazil on the environment in 1992. This is another effort by the Soviet Union and Latin American and other countries to try to save humanity from an ecological catastrophe. In order to solve this problem it will be necessary to hold a constructive multilateral dialogue.

Regarding development, there are many factors in Latin America which curtail development; among them is the very large foreign debt. The Soviet proposals on the foreign debt are well known and if they were to be implemented they would lessen the burden on debtors. These are some of the issues which Fernando Collor de Mello will discuss with Soviet leaders in Moscow.

Transcaucasus Situation

Ships Open Fire on Baku Port Building

LD2401184790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast; telephone report from Baku by special correspondent Yevgeniy Blokhin]

[Text] Good evening, comrades. We start the program with reports from Azerbaijan and Armenia. Yevgeniy Blokhin, our special correspondent in Baku, has just phoned in to the editorial office. Let us hear what he reported:

[Blokhin] Today, ships of the Caspian oil fleet opened fire upon the marine port terminal building. An exchange of fire commenced. Two soldiers were wounded. Some time later a group of persons whose identity is being investigated was detained in this district. Cold steel weapons and narcotic substances were confiscated.

Exchanges of fire flared up sporadically near the Salyanskiye barracks. The situation in the city is extremely alarming. Rumors which spread about the city at the speed of sound, so to speak, tell of a real danger of an escalation in the tension. In these conditions an evaluation which is as balanced as possible is required about the situation in Azerbaijan. It is evident that when shots sound out, calls for reason are impotent. An equal dialogue with all the organizations of Azerbaijan, including the Popular Front, is necessary. I say this as an eyewitness of the tragic events which are currently happening in Baku.

At approximately 2000 today, shots were heard not far from the building where our correspondent's office is located.

AFP Report

AU2401183590 Paris AFP in English 1821 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Nov 24 (AFP)—Ships of the Baku oil fleet, enforcing a protest blockade of the Azerbaijani capital Baku, exchanged fire with land-based Soviet troops after opening fire on port installations Wednesday, Soviet television said.

Two soldiers were wounded in the shooting, the television said.

A spokesman for the nationalist Azeri social-democratic group Leila Yunusova, contacted by telephone, told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that soldiers fired cannon from the city's Lenin Square in the direction of the port for some 40 minutes.

Bakatin Says Baku Curfew May End Soon

LD2501103890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1009 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] Baku, 25 Jan (TASS) —TASS special correspondents Aleksandr Budris and Vladimir Fomin report:

The matter of the lifting of the curfew in Baku will be resolved as soon as possible if the work of the republican militia is effective and allows the situation to be stabilized, dangerous groups to be disarmed, and a feeling of confidence in the forces of law and order to be restored in people, stated Vadim Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs.

TASS correspondents were informed at the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, that a meeting of officials of this ministry was held on Tuesday with the USSR minister of internal affairs. Matters were discussed relating to the search for the most effective ways to stabilize the situation in Baku and in the whole republic.

The minister noted there are, undoubtedly, sensible forces in the People's Front of Azerbaijan [PFA] with whom the militia should actively cooperate. He stressed that today, MVD officials together with party bodies should take on the burden of imposing order and restoring guarantees of Soviet power.

The majority of those who took part in the meeting unequivocally stated that it was the militia's duty to protect the constitutional rights of citizens whatever their national affiliation. It was emphasized that the temporary loss of clear orientation on the part of the personnel of the Azerbaijani law enforcement forces enabled a number of groupings to take the initiative into their own hands for a certain period. Extremist and criminal elements, who carried out pogroms and acts of violence, took advantage of this.

The minister and all those present observed a minute's silence in memory of those who have died during these past few days.

As already reported, the blockade of Baku bay was lifted on Wednesday. By a decision of the military commandant, the activities of the so-called "PFA Defense Committee" have been banned and the law enforcement bodies have undertaken measures to neutralize the headquarters of extremist nationalist organizations.

At the same time the situation in Azerbaijan remains complex. In Baku and many rural areas of the republic industrial enterprises are not working and transport and commercial buildings are functioning in a restricted manner.

Mutalibov Elected Party First Secretary

NC2501121190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1032 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] We now present a report on the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee plenum:

The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee held a plenum on 24 January and examined in detail the social and political situation in the republic. The members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau briefed the participants in the plenum on the talks they held with the country's supreme leadership in Moscow. In the debate that was held on the matter, 18 participants spoke.

The plenum examined the question of organization and relieved Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov of his reponsibilities as first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, because of the serious developments which have caused a crisis situation. The names of two candidates were proposed for the post of first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee: Ayaz Mutalibov, member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and chairman of the presidium of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers; and Gasan Gasanov, member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee.

Ayaz Mutalibov was elected by secret ballot to the post of first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. The vote was 82 in favor and 31 against.

Primakov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of the Union; and Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in the work of the plenum and addressed the meeting. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, also addressed the plenum.

Committee Says Nakhichevan Talks Still Blocked

NC2501102090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] The ARMENPRES correspondent was given the following information on 24 January at the meeting of the operational committee attached to the republican council on the special situation:

The situation in the republic and especially in the border areas is still extremely tense, even though [words indistinct], and although the local self-defense groups are displaying restraint and are not responding to provocations.

Negotiations with the representatives of Nakhichevan are now being impeded for the 2d day. The opposite side is claiming that its autonomous republic has ostensibly left the structure of the Soviet Union and that it has not yet been granted powers to negotiate by the new authorities.

The negotiations between Azerbaijan's (Tovuz) and (Get Adi) and Georgia's (Marlenli) rayon party and soviet party bodies have also been unsuccessful.

The telecommunications ministry, however, has been able to re-establish the link between Yerevan and (Marlenli's) Armenian-inhabited villages.

During the operational committee's meeting, it was said that the report alleging that Meghrinskiy has blockaded Nakhichevan and that this is the reason why trains are not arriving in Armenia is completely false. Trains have now been ready in Meghrinskiy for 3 days, waiting for the arrival of locomotives from Julfa so that they can transport the cargo to Nakhichevan.

The situation in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] is causing great concern. A state of emergency established on the basis of the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is operating there. A similar situation has also been established in Azerbaijani rayons neighboring Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Azerbaijani brigands are sending armed groups to Shushi and Azerbaijani villages from Agdamskiy and other rayons. This is giving rise to justified indignation. It was decided that this issue should be brought up by the republican council on the special situation.

The operational committee also discussed the situation in the border areas, the question of not responding to any provocation, and the possibility of continuing the activities of the committee members and the people's representatives.

It was proposed that the pilots should make flights to Shaumyanskiy and Getashen villages because of the situation there; serious problems are being created by the shortage of foodstuff, fuel, and medicine.

By 24 January 219 refugees were being treated in Yerevan clinics.

Armenians Try To Continue Dialogue

LD2401142390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jan (TASS)—TASS special correspondent report from the sites of events:

The situation in the Transcaucasus is still tense.

As was learned at today's session in Yerevan of the operational headquarters of the republican council for the emergency situation, talks between representatives of Armenia and Azerbiajan, held in the area of Yeraskh, on Armenia's border with Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (part of the composition of Azerbaijan), have been broken off by representatives of the autonomous republic. Nevertheless, Vladimir Movsesyan, first

deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Armenia, is trying to establish contact with representatives of other areas of Azerbaijan bordering on Armenia.

According to information received in Yerevan several hours ago, on a section of the railroad in Georgia's Marneuli Rayon, inhabited predominantly by Azerbaijanis, part of the track has been dismantled, which caused a passenger train on its way from Yerevan to Rostov-on-Don to be derailed. There were no fatalities, but four people were injured. The accident hampered the work of the line by which goods go to Armenia.

In Baku last night the atmosphere was calm. There are no new fatalities. This is stated in a report by Lieutenant General Vladimir Dubnyak, military commandant of broadcast on local radio this morning.

In the last 24 hours 1 person has been arrested for a crime, 57 have been arrested for infringement of the curfew, and 53 have been arrested for administrative offenses. Servicemen have confiscated one firearm and three other weapons. Following implementation of measures to neutralize the headquarters of illegally operating informal organizations 43 people have been arrested, and duplicating equipment, technical devices for propaganda, passports, and savings books have been confiscated.

Today, the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh can be termed relatively calm. As was reported at the temporary press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as a result of the measures taken to stabilize the situation, the blockades have been lifted on the Stepanakert-Agdam-Barda-Yevlakh-Udzhary road and the Shusha- Stepanakert-Agdam road. This was to a great extent helped by meetings held with the residents of a number of population centers and with representatives of party and soviet bodies from the neighboring rayons of Azerbaijan, and with representatives of certain informal organizations.

However, for the moment the blockade has been lifted on the roads only for columns of military vehicles. Civilian vehicles are not yet risking the journey. As before, the railroad is out of action and communications are not working. In the last 24 hours 10 people have been detained for violating the curfew.

Nakhichevan Representatives Walk Out

AU2401152890 Paris AFP in English 1504 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 24 (AFP)—Peace talks between Azeris and Armenians have broken down after representatives from Nakhichevan walked out, TASS news agency said Wednesday.

A leader of the Armenian Nationalist Movement, interviewed by Agence France-Presse in the Armenian capital Yerevan, said the delegates quit the talks saying "Nakhichevan is no longer part of the Soviet Union".

Nakhichevan, an autonomous republic administered by Azerbaijan, declared independence from the Soviet Union on Saturday.

The talks, aimed at ending ethnic conflict in the Transcaucasus, were held at Eraskhavan, on the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan.

TASS said Armenian first deputy prime minister Vladimir Movsessian was now trying to reach representatives of other parts of Azerbaijan bordering Armenia.

It said the report was based on information obtained from the recently-created Armenian emergency council.

Refugee Accommodation, Situation Discussed

State Commission To Coordinate Relief

LD2401211690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 90

[From "Vremya" newscast; announcer-read report]

[Text] We also want to inform you that the USSR Council of Ministers, in its decision on measures for urgent assistance to citizens obliged to leave the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as a result of the aggravation of interethnic relations, has entrusted the coordination of the activities of the Councils of Ministers of the two republics, as well as ministries and departments of the USSR, to the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Extraordinary Situations.

Azerbaijan Refugees Accomodated

LD2401211390 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Refugees from Azerbaijan continue flowing into different Soviet cities.

Nearly three thousand Armenians and Russians, partners in mixed marriages, have arrived in Moscow from Azerbaijan in the ten days since pogroms began in Baku, a spokesman for the Armenian permanent representative in Moscow told TASS.

Most of them have been provided with accommodation at recreation centres and summer camps for children outside Moscow as well as in Moscow hotels.

However, it has been impossible to provide accommodation for all people and several hundred refugees are staying in the building of the Armenian office in Moscow.

New arrivals are being registered to receive a lump sum allowance to buy them warm clothes, footwear and other essentials. The money was allocated by the state under the Soviet Government decision of January 17 on urgent assistance to refugees.

The refugees cannot live permanently in Moscow because more than a million Muscovites are currently in need of better housing, TASS was told in the Moscow city soviet.

As anti-army agitation continues in the border area in Azerbaijan with servicemen and members of their families being threatened and Russian-speaking people under pressure in border areas, the evacuation has begun from Baku of the members of the families of the servicemen with the Soviet Army, Interior Ministry troops, border guards and KGB forces.

Nearly 2,300 members of the families of border guards have been evacuated via Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and Simferopol in the Crimea. Air Force transport and border guard aircraft airlifted them out of Baku and areas north of the Soviet-Iranian border in Azerbaijan, TASS was told in the political administration of the KGB border guards.

The evacuees have been accommodated in recreation centres in the Black Sea resort cities of Gagra in the Caucasus and Yalta in the Crimean as well as in recreation centres outside Moscow, the two Moscow higher border guard educational establishments and in a border guard unit of the Moscow garrison. Many families are currently staying at their relatives' homes.

Money is being raised to launch a fund to help border guard families evacuated from Azerbaijan.

More than 500 families of the servicemen in the Interior Ministry troops have been received and accommodated outside Moscow where the Felix Dzerzhinsky division of the USSR Interior Ministry is stationed.

"We were taken out of Baku in an army truck escorted by two armoured veicles," Nadezhda Appakov, an officer's wife told TASS. "We could hear shooting in the city. We feared for our children most of all, because those militants stop at nothing".

Servicemen's wives have lots of questions to ask—where they will get housing, whether they will see their husbands soon, what will be done with their possessions left behind.

Deputy chief of the political administration of the Soviet Interior Ministry troops Major-General Yevgeniy Nechayev told TASS that all preparations for receiving the evacuees were completed very quickly. Barrack rooms were supplied with everything families might need. Special facilities were equipped for women with babies. Food stocks were replenished and shops were stocked with additional supplies of clothing and footwear, as many people had had no time even to pack essentials.

A lump sum allowance will be paid to all members of servicemen's families.

Members of the families of the Caspian Navy seamen are taken care of by Black Sea naval sailors and officers. Over 500 refugees have been accommodated at naval recreation centres and on board ships. Fares are paid to enable the evacuees to reach their relatives and money is being donated by many people.

Families of Soviet Army servicemen keep arriving in the Moscow and Kiev military districts. More than 9,000 people, including wounded people, have been brought by Air Force transport aircraft from Azerbaijan to Moscow garrisons.

Kiev Receives 3,500 People

LD2401151890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Kiev Military Okrug: As Major General (Kurdakov), chief of the Tactical Headquarters and chief of the okrug's Rear Services, stated today, the okrug has received more than 3,500 people from Azerbaijan. The Tactical Headquarters helps provide the arrivals with the barest essentials and puts them up in military sanatoriums, rest houses, and hotels. A one-time money grant is given to each family along with a document certifying that its members are refugees.

Moscow Okrug Garrisons Host 9,000

LD2401150690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow Military Okrug—More than 9,000 refugees have been airlifted by the military transport aviation planes to the Moscow Military Okrug garrisons. These are mainly members of servicemen's families. Unfortunately there are also wounded among them. As a TASS correspondent was told at the okrug's political directorate, the servicemen's families are mainly housed at the Taman and Kantemir divisions. Military hotels, a part of the barracks, have been vacated for this purpose; clubs, libraries, and officers' messes have been re-equipped for residential purposes. The military trading organization stores have been set up at all the places where people have been housed. Essential medical and financial assistance is being provided to those who have arrived. Women's councils, veterans' councils, and representatives of other public organizations are devoting a great deal of attention to the servicemen's families.

Red Cross Sets Up Headquarters

LD2501115590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] The sharp aggravation of interethnic relations in Azerbaijan and Armenia has brought in its wake human casualties and suffering for thousands of totally inocent people. The executive comittee of the USSR Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent has organized a headquarters for coordinating operations connected with rendering aid to refugees. It is acting in close concert with government organisations engaged in these problems. Work is underway round the clock.

Emergency Evacuations Carried Out

Border Troop Families

LD2401142590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] According to information released by the USSR's KGB border troops Political Directorate, an emergency evacuation has been carried out of approximately 2,300 family members of frontier troops; their wives, children, and old-age pensioners. This includes more than 400 people evacuated on the night of 24 January. They were evacuated through Krasnovodsk and Simferopol, leaving on board military transport and border aviation planes from units deployed along the Azerbaijani secton of the Soviet-Iranian border and from border sub-units deployed in Baku. People were put up in rest homes in Gagra and Yalta, in bording houses near Moscow, in two Moscow higher frontier educational establishments, and with a Moscow garrison unit. Hundreds of families of servicemen have temporarily taken up residence with their relatives. An assistance fund for the servicemen's families evacuated from Azerbaijan is being set up. Money can be transferred to the USSR's KGB border troops Main Directorate, current account number 4140157, to the directorate of the cash-account execution of the state budget of the USSR State Bank, Moscow, NFO 299101.

Caspian Flotilla Families

LD2401151590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet—This term of refugees, which belongs to times of war, has entered general usage as far as the Black Sea sailors are concerned. Already more than 500 women and children, members of the Caspian Flotilla servicemen's families, have been airlifted to Sevastopol via the airbridge that links the Caspian Sea coast and Sevastopol. We are doing everything necessary so that families of the flotilla's officers and warrant officers have normal conditions for temporary residence, states Captain 1st Rank (Sirkin), deputy chief of the Fleet Rear Services Political department. We house them in the rest and recreation bases and the best vessels. A free journey to the place of abode of their relatives is ensured for all evacuees. Essential material assistance is provided to them.

Dzherzhinskiy Division Puts Up Families

LD2401150190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow Oblast—The Dzherzhinskiy Divison of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has received and put up more than 500 people, mainly members of servicemen's families. Soldiers evacuated us in a truck, under the protection of two APCs, states Captain Opakov's wife, Nadezhda Nikolayevna. There was firing in the city. One felt terrified thinking about the children; after all, the guerillas [boyeviki] had no regard for anything. Servicemen's wives have many questions: Where are we to live; how are our husbands; when will it now be possible to see them; what will happen to the property left behind in the apartments?

It is profoundly symbolic that it is precisely the personnel of the famed formation which on more than one occasion extinguished hotbeds of national tension in various regions of the country that has been among the first to hasten to the assistance of people who have suddenly found themselves in trouble, says Major General Nechayev, deputy chief of the Internal Troops Political Directorate.

The work to receive them was done in the shortest possible time. Barrack premises have been prepared and equipped with whatever is necessary. Mother and child rooms have been equipped for women who have arrived with their babies. The food problem has been resolved. Clothing and footwear have been delivered to the storerooms: After all there are many who did not manage to take even the barest essentials. A one-time money grant is paid to all the members of servicemen's families.

'Pro-Azerbaijani' NKAO Commandant Said Replaced

NC2401170990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 90

["(?Statement)" by (name indistinct), member of the USSR Journalists Union; date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] We journalists (?also) have lived through a period of crisis and spiritual tension during the past two years when the Armenian people have made their just demand for the solution of the NKAO problem [passage omitted]. I have before me a statement by Maksim Ovanesyan, editor of KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH, which says that the paper's deputy editor, Arkadiy Kukasyan, has been detained for 30 days at the order of Major General Kosolapov, NKAO commandant during the state of emergency, on the charges that he dared to publish an article entitled [words indistinct] under his own byline. This article, which speaks the whole truth, has completely enraged the autocratic general. At the instigation of the Azerbaijani extremists, who are the opponents of restructuring, and acting with extreme bias, he has resorted to a despotic move and trampled upon the constitutional rights of the journalist by detaining him [passage indistinct].

My long years of experience in (?party work) allow me to say unreservedly and unwaveringly that the general's action is a despotic step incompatible with the high calling of a Soviet soldier and that it contradicts the moral norms of the Soviet soldier. Let us state that the article's author justly criticizes [word indistinct] the vandalism by Azerbaijani scum in Baku [passage indistinct]. It appears that (?when the truth is said by an Armenian), it does not please Kosolapov and that these

people, including the author, must be punished. Kosolapov denies the fact that the Azerbaijanis [word indistinct] in Baku are burning, killing, cutting off limbs from living people on the streets, gouging out eyes, raping, and torturing. Armenians are being uprooted and are taking the road of exile. It is as though this is the year 1915 [passage indistinct] and (?these are taking place) under the restructuring and Soviet laws. People have used force to savagely (?butcher) their fellows just because they are Armenians or foreign Christians. [passage indistinct] Would Kosolapov have put up with this if his family were treated similarly? Families of his colleagues have already suffered almost the same fate. The soldier Kosolapov should be kind enough to go to Baku to see with his own eyes what sort of barbarism is being committed there [passage indistinct]. Is Kosolapov denying that all these accounts confirm the argument in the article [word indistinct]? Is it not correct that all along the Nakhichevan border the Azerbaijanis have barbarically [words indistinct] the border—the holiest of holies for us—without any resistance from the soldiers?

Anyway, this pro-Azerbaijani soldier has now been released from the post he was occupying. Someone else has been appointed in his place, and (?we hope) that he will correct the mistake of his predecessor and will release the renowned and widely respected Arkadiy Kukasyan. I, as a member of the USSR Journalists Union and as a Communist, call on all my colleagues to join in supporting the message of Maksim Ovanesyan, KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH editor, and demanding the quick release of journalist Arkadiy Kukasyan. That will be a correct step on the road to somewhat mitigating the heated ideological [word indistinct] atmosphere.

Baku Commandant Warns Against Use of Firearms

NC2501061390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0404 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Notice by Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku—read by announcer]

[Text] The situation in the city was largely peaceful last night. In accordance with the laws [words indistinct]. Forty-two persons have been held in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision, dated 15 January 1990, and 68 have been detained for violating the curfew. Many firearms and cold steel weapons have been seized by the military troops. Intermittent fire was opened by [word indistinct] persons.

I wish to inform all the residents of the city that those resorting to such actions against the military troops, who are fulfilling their miltiary duties and safeguarding law and order, can create a disastrous situation.

In accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision, dated 15 January 1990, the troops are allowed to open fire.

Lieutenent General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku.

Cites 'Relatively Calm' Situation

LD2501064690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0628 GMT 25 Jan 90

["Report by Baku Military Commandant on Situation up to Morning of 25 January"—TASS headline]

[Text] Baku, 25 Jan (TASS)—The situation in the city remained relatively calm last night. This is stated in a report by Lieutenant General Vladimir Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku, broadcast on local radio this morning. The forces of law and order continued to carry out measures to neutralize the activity of the headquarters of individual illegally-functioning informal organizations. Forty-six people were detained for administrative violations and 68 for infringements of the curfew; 4 firearms and 2 other weapons were confiscated. Individual criminal elements continued to use firearms during the night. The Baku military commandant's report makes clear that no casualties were recorded in the city for last night.

Reports 'Peace,' Strikes in Baku

NC2401185390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1702 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Notice by Baku Military Commandant Lieutenant General Dubinyak on 24 January—read by announcer]

[Text] Peace prevailed in the city all day. According to a state vehicle inspectorate report, a [word indistinct] Soviet Army vehicle and a civilian truck crashed at kilometer marker 22 on the Baku-Sumgait highway at 0900. Five people were killed, and two others were seriously injured. A criminal investigation is under way. Strikes are continuing everywhere despite my order banning them. The city's transportation is not operating. During these grave days in the republic, irresponsible individuals are making the city more tense. They are creating food shortages (?by saying) that supplies are not being sold. Public food suppliers are not being supplied with provisions. The city transportation [words indistinct]. I declare [words indistinct] that the individuals who break laws that apply to the abovementioned matters or who circulate false rumors will be detained for 30 days or will have to account for their actions in accordance with the law.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku

Interior Ministry Terms Baku 'Relatively Calm'

LD2501062490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] I shall begin this bulletin with a report from the USSR Interior Ministry Press Center in Baku. The situation in the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic still remains tense. The city was relatively calm last night. The forces of law and order continued measures to neutralize the headquarters of individual illegally-functioning informal organizations. In accordance with

the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 15 January this year, 46 people have been brought to account for administrative violations and 68 have been detained for infringements of the curfew in the past 24 hours. Arms are being confiscated by troop detachments. Isolated gunfire by individual criminals continued during the night. The situation as a whole is being kept under control.

Armenia's Arutyunyan Comments on Situation

NC2301201590 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] The republican council on the special situation held its regular meeting under Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. He briefed the council about the operational situation in the republic and underlined that thanks to the measures adopted, no incidents on interethnic grounds have taken place on the borders of the republic for the last two days.

The troops of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and Soviet Army units are maintaining order in the Shaumyanovskiy and Khanlarskiy Rayons of Azerbaijan. The two sides have exchanged hostages.

The flow into Armenia is continuing. As of 22 January, there are around 8,000 refugees in Armenia, and Suren Arutyunyan said everything is being done to settle the refugees and to provide material and moral assistance. Dwellings have been assigned for the refugees in different regions of Armenia. The situation in border regions is under control. Party and soviet workers have been sent to these areas and, in cooperation with the local authorities and representatives of the public and informal organizations, they are making explanations and doing everything possible to check hostility and intolerence and to forestall undesirable acts. The council also discussed other issues in the prevailing situation.

MVD Official Reviews Transcaucasus Developments

LD2401172990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] On the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Our correspondent has just been talking on the telephone to Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nechayev, deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. Here is what he said:

[Begin Nechayev recording] The situation in the city of Baku and the rest of the republic is being monitored by servicemen. In many regions the situation is still tense. Shooting continues in Baku. There have been cases of attacks on road transport. Pogroms against apartments are not stopping. The National Defense Committee is actively opposing the troops. The Azerbaijan Popular Front at its meetings is demanding the withdrawal of the troops from the city.

On 23 January at 0500 hours Sergeant Pushkov, from one of the troop units performing their duties, escorted a girl to her home at her request. On his way back he was beaten up by persons unknown, taken by car to a cemetery, and his clothes were removed. With great difficulty the serviceman was found and his gun recovered.

On the town of Gyandzha. During the past 24 hours the situation in the town of Gyandzha and the surrounding area has also remained tense. But at the same time, it appears that today the situation is relatively calm. There are no armed men on the streets. Urban transport, shops, and public catering establishments are working normally. However, the unofficial strikes continue. Industrial enterprises, with the exception of enterprises with a constant production cycle, have not been working for over 3 days.

A few words about Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. Stepanakert. The situation in the rayons of NKAO and the town of Stepanakert remains tense also. Measures are being taken to unblock the roads, through the efforts of the internal troops servicemen. A number of people have been detained for violating the established curfew regime.

On the Armenian SSR. The situation in Yerevan and the rayons of the republic also remains tense. There are continuing thefts of weapons and ammunition from state organizations in the city of Yerevan and in a number of other rayons. It should also be noted that all measures are being taken by the servicemen of the Soviet Army, the Internal Troops and the troops of the State Security Committee to introduce proper public order and to put an end to these acts of violence and illegal actions. [end recording]

Kafarova Questions Timing of Troop Movements

PM2401160590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p4

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent D. Muratov dispatch: "Transcaucasus, 23 January"]

[Excerpt] Baku—[Passage omitted] 1200 hours. I went to the president of the republic. I went to see E.M. Kafarova together with a delegation of captains from the "rebel" "Kaspneftegazflot" (we wrote about their demands—either the troops are withdrawn or they destroy more than 50 ships and floating oil bases—in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 23 January). The captains were worked up, their voices were strained. The atmosphere was tense. It was with great difficulty that the deadline for meeting the ultimatum was pushed back. The conditions remained the same. The captains said: We will go up in flames together with the fleet if our conditions are not met.

Kafarova: Just listen a minute, we really must calm down a little. We have to get the situation in the city under control. I beg you, do not be in so much of a hurry, do

not be so hasty. You must be aware that there is panic in the city. There are plans to evacuate some of the Russian-speaking population. We must, we simply must create the kind of conditions in which no one need be evacuated, so that everyone living in Baku feels safe. Do not make any rash moves. We will look at your demands again and try to satisfy them.

Here follows a brief interview with E.M. Kafarova for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Question: Were there any alternatives to the decision to bring in the troops?

Answer: Perhaps extra militia units should have been drafted in, but to introduce troops and military hardware at the point when people had surrounded the city with pickets and were intending to offer resistance was an ill-considered move.... Another meeting should have been called, possibly in the Bureau, to weigh up the situation and give it more thought.

In response to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's request to provide guarantees of safety for Baku's Russian-speaking population, E.M. Kafarova, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, dictated this address: "Both the recent session of the republic's Supreme Soviet and I personally have assured and continue to assure our Russian compatriots, who, together with us, have created the very best in our life, that we will protect their safety and allow no unfriendly actions against them. This is a point of honor for our people."

1400 hours. A platoon of "special troops" prepared to go out on route: The commanding officer inspected their bulletproof vests. He asked that his name not be given in the newspaper. ("One of our men gave an interview and he was misquoted in everything....")

"The troops had to be brought in, no one was in authority, and, after all, what could the militia and their night sticks do against a mob mounting pogroms? We could not have made our way into the city by peaceful means in any case. They did not even let through the unit's vehicles carrying provisions: We were blockaded on all sides. And when they came at us on 19 January.... That shook me. Our colonel approached the pickets and pleaded with people by megaphone to disperse and let the column through. I personally ordered the soldiers to unclip their 'magazines.' But then a petrol bomb was thrown at the colonel. Bricks rained down on the soldiers. A young man in his first year of service was shot in the head through his protective helmet....

"People are saying that the curfew has only made the situation in the city worse. But what else could we have done? No one was in authority anymore! Although I do understand that we can stabilize the situation but not resolve it—that is not up to us."

In the evening the city's military commandant signed an order to disband "the so-called People's Front national defense committee and its formations." On orders from the commandant, strikes, marches, rallies, and meetings were prohibited from that hour (approximately 2000 hours on 23 January).

This is the tragic picture of one day.

Azeri Scientist on Unity, Goal of Sovereignty

LD2401081890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Some people are trying to use the trials which have fallen to our lot to sow panic and intimidate the Russian-speaking population, and to provoke their departure from Baku, N. Suleyman, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and member of the republican council of elders, has stated in an address to the republic's Russian-speaking inhabitants. In this difficult hour, he noted—speaking on local radio—the Azerbaijan people assure you of the inviolability of our friendship. Azerbaijanis angrily and contemptuously condemn anyone who attempts to encroach on our togetherness, or to drive a wedge between us. We have a common path, a common goal, and a common struggle for a sovereign, peaceful, and prosperous Azerbaijan, which has been and will always continue to be our common home, the scientist stressed.

Posner on Army, Leadership in Azeri Conflict

PM2301091690

[Editorial report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1900 GMT on 18 January, on channel 4's "News" program, carries an interview with Soviet commentator Vladimir Posner by David Smith during a video report on the fighting in Azerbaijan. Smith reports that the Soviet Army has now been given the order to shoot, if necessary. Commenting on this, Posner says: "There will be shooting, definitely; there will be killing if the Army starts doing the job it's supposed to do; but there will be less carnage than if the Army does nothing at all. It will have to learn how to do the task, and I think it will have the support of the population of the Soviet Union in this matter." Smith asks: "How well prepared, in your view, is the Soviet Army for this kind of action?" Posner answers: "I don't think it's well prepared at all. Generally speaking—on a much broader scale—we now know that the Soviet Army is not the military machine it was predicted to be: Afghanistan showed that pretty clearly. And I don't think that the Army is prepared—if I might put that—inside: Spiritually, it is not prepared to deal with that kind of situation inside the country. I think it's a real problem there."

The report continues with footage of refugees and reports from both the Azerbaijani mission in Moscow and the Armenian mission in Moscow: Representatives at both missions urge negotiation by diplomats. Smith goes on to say: "That suggests Mr Gorbachev does have diplomatic options. Time and the conflict on the ground

are working against him, but experienced observers believe he has to prove to his people now that he can solve problems."

Responding to this comment, Posner says: "This one person who has been elected to this office and who has this tremendous power must take responsibility. And I think Gorbachev has to show that in this particular area. If he doesn't, then it could be dangerous, because people would say: 'Where is the quality of leadership in this man? It's all wonderful to talk to the Americans and to solve the problems of Eastern Europe, but what about at home?' And that would be a dangerous turn of events."

Chief Rabbi Appeals to Azerbaijanis

NC2401213290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1420 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Appeal by "Chief Rabbi of the Jews," (Simon Davidovich Bergichevskiy) to the Azerbaijanis; date, place not given—read by announcer]

[Text] My beloved fellow countrymen, Azerbaijanis, Russians, Jews, and others: During these grave moments I call for your republic to unite and struggle against everyone who tries to disrupt the sound friendship among you and to create discord. The Azerbaijanis are our brothers and sisters; we want to stay true friends and brothers and share our bread with them in the future. They have always treated us with goodness and sincerity. We have always experienced brotherhood, which is the most sacred thing in the world.

Separating us from each other may be beneficial for you, but God, who is the same for everybody, will not forgive this. Do not believe in rumor and gossip; come, let us reject them together. The prophets, Jesus, Moses, and His Eminence Muhammad, are in the hearts of the people of every religion and they will stay there. Each and every one of you has a sacred duty these days to do everything possible so all nationalities in Azerbaijan can exist in peace, harmony, and friendship. We must work together to turn Azerbaijan into a sovereign and flowering republic. This is what we need for ourselves, our children, and our future generations.

Order Being Restored on Soviet-Iranian Border

PM2401165390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[IZVESTIYA correspondent F. Ivanov report: "On Soviet-Iranian Border"]

[Text] The situation on the border remains complex, B. Golyshev, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Troops Political Administration, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent.

Attempts to cross to and from Iranian territory are continuing in a number of rayons. Those who oppose the restoration of the border regime are exploiting new border units' arrivals to fuel hostility toward servicemen. Rumors are being circulated that the reinforcements have been sent to conduct actions against local inhabitants.

Firearms and other weapons are being confiscated every day in the border areas. Several dozen pieces have been confiscated to date.

Close cooperation with the local population has been established in the Gadrutskiy border detachment sector, where the inhabitants of the surrounding villages condemned the illegal actions on the border and gave assurances that they would prevent further destruction of the border installations [inzhenernyye zagrazhdeniya]. The inhabitants of the Privolnoye, Lyakino, Dekali, and Shikhmer populated points themselves asked the border troop command to restore order on the border. Strange as it may seem, those people who crossed into Iran and returned to their native villages are also helping to dispel certain illusions.

At the same time, people are also voicing a wish for the speedier opening of simplified border crossings. Concern is being expressed at the delay in resolving this problem on the part of the USSR and Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs. Border guards interested in the speediest restoration of order support these demands.

We obtained this report on the evening of 23 January. The following morning B. Golyshev told the editorial office that as of 24 January the entire Soviet-Iranian border is under border guard control. All movement across the border is being effected via entry points prescribed by border guards. Order is being restored along the border via collaboration with party and soviet organs and sensible People's Front leaders, with support from the local population.

In the last 24 hours 1,322 people have crossed to the Iranian side, while 1,601 have returned. Some 66 violators who tried to cross the border illegally in either direction have been detained.

The international communications route has begun to operate in Astara City. In the last 24 hours 52 "Sovavtotrans" vehicles have crossed the border using this route—40 of which were heading for Soviet territory.

Nevertheless the restoration of the border regime is meeting with resistance from antisocial forces, and extremist sentiments have been fanned by a provocative report concerning the alleged shooting of servicemen—Azerbaijanis and Georgians—in Baku's Salyanskiy Barracks. That same day Azerbaijani Peoples' Deputies O. Akhmedov, S. Vezirova, A. Namazova, and M. Gadzhiyev were invited to the barracks, met with troops from their republic, and saw for themselves the provocative nature of these rumors.

after this article had already been composed, we were told that the Salyanskiy Garrison is still coming under

fire. Militants drove up to the gas tank truck enclosure and threatened to blow it up. Garrison troops successfully repulsed the attack.

Border Controlled by Guards

LD2401145590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1414 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jan (TASS)—The entire length of the Soviet-Iranian border, from today, has been taken under control by border guards. All movements across the border are via checkpoints set up by the border guards, Boris Golyshev, deputy head of the Political Department of the USSR KGB Border Troops, has told an IZVESTIYA correspondent. He stressed that the restoring of order on the border is being carried out in cooperation with party and local soviet bodies and sensible leaders of the People's Front with the support of the local population.

Over 24 hours, 1,322 people went over to the Iranian side, 1,601 returned, and 66 offenders, who tried to cross the border illegally in either one direction or the other, were detained, Boris Golyshev said.

An international route has begun functioning in the town of Astara. In 24 hours, 52 "Sovtransavto" trucks crossed the border along this road, 40 of them into Soviet territory.

Every day, steel weapons and firearms are confiscated in rayons near the border. As Boris Golyshev reported, several dozen items have been seized.

Close cooperation with the local population has been established on the section of the Gadrut Border Detachment. Residents of surrounding villages have confirmed that they will not permit any further barrier constructions.

Border Under 'Full Control'

OW2501020690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Jan 90

[From "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] As was reported at a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing, Soviet border services this past Tuesday [23 January] have taken under full control the 720-kilometer border with Iran.

During the past 24 hours, 322 persons crossed from Azerbaijan into Iran on the basis of issued permits, while 1,601 persons returned to Azerbaijan legally from Iran. At the same time 366 persons were detained for attempting to cross the border illegally.

Front's 11 Jan Takeover of Lenkoran Detailed

PM2201163190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 4

[Special correspondent A. Krayniy report under "Reporting Details" rubric: "Provisional Government in Lenkoran"]

[Text] Lenkoran—...They assembled outside the People's Front premises at 0200 hours. Some 30 minutes later they had taken over the rayon militia department, the post office, and the telegraph office. The party city committee [gorkom] was the last to fall. The sleepy watchman on duty answered the knock on the door, was told "We are taking over this building," and handed over the keys.

By morning, all power in the city was in the hands of the provisional defense committee. Patrols armed with hunting rifles were out in the streets in place of the militia. Not a single shot was fired during the Lenkoran operation. In my view, even the provisional committee members themselves were amazed by the ease and simplicity with which they managed to do what they did.

But morning had already dawned. The city was waking up. The city was washing and having breakfast, getting ready for work. They—the 15 members of the Azerbaijan People's Front [APF] Lenkoran Branch Board who set up the provisional defense committee—addressed the people.

"By decision by the APF Lenkoran Branch, the activity of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs is suspended throughout the rayon's territory as of the morning of 11 January 1990. The leadership of these organizations has been taken over by a constituted provisional defense committee headed by the APF Lenkoran Branch Board.

"The Provisional Defense Committee has decided to perform functions for the implementation of the people's justified demands, which are as follows:

"1. The Provisional Defense Committee does not recognize the local central authorities in the republic because they do not protect the honor, dignity, and sovereignty of the Azeri people and scorn the status of sovereign republic.

"2. The republic's Supreme Soviet must urgently abolish the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, replacing it by rayons subordinate to the republic's central organs.

"3. Once central organs in the country, the republic, and especially at local level adopt and implement specific decisions and measures to protect the local population's national honor and dignity, our demands will cease to obtain and the defense committee will resign its powers."

Never mind the appeals, there was work to be done. To be done so as not to disrupt the city's pace of life.

It had been disrupted for several days prior to 11 January. The huge snowfall which covered the city had paralyzed transport. Lessons were suspended in several schools, and two apartment blocks had been without heating for 2 days. Snow in subtropical Lenkoran is a natural disaster. Having won the battle with the local authorities, the defense committee also defeated the elements. The heating system was repaired within 8 hours, and roads and schools were cleared within 1 day.

Meat supplies to stores from the local meat combine and bread baking were organized in the very first days of people's self-management.

The defense committee also encountered problems which it could not solve. Like sugar and butter coupons, for example (a ration coupon system is in operation here, as everywhere else). The coupons are invalid without a stamp, and the stamp was held by the chairman of the city soviet executive committee [gorispolkom]. They called on the chairman and he "got busy stamping."

I have used the pronoun "they" all along simply because there is no chairman of the People's Front in Lenkoran. There are 15 people, each responsible for something specific, and all decisions are made collegially. Nonetheless, let me describe 1 of the 15 in greater detail. Alakram Gummatov is 42 years old. His hollow cheeks are covered in the 3-day stubble which is almost traditional in the Transcaucasus, his eyes peer from behind thick lenses. He is not only a member of the Lenkoran People's Front Board but also deputy general director of the Lenkoran motor vehicle production association. Gummatov has been a nonparty person since last year. And he has not been at work for long, he was unemployed for 10 months. He has three children, has been on the waiting list for an apartment for 12 years already, and rents a shared accommodation for which he pays R50 a month.

Since Gummatov's spirit had not been broken, attempts were made to bribe him. The former party gorkom first secretary offered him an apartment in Baku and a good job—just get out of here. He was also offered money. But when neither money nor an apartment in the republic's capital "worked," an attempt was made on Alakram's life. Since then he has been guarded by People's Front members.

The coup in Lenkoran, as Gummatov told me, was not brought about by Karabakh alone. Social problems have remained unsolved in both the city and the rayon for years on end. There are about 24,000 unemployed here. Those who are at work, especially in collective and state farm fields (mainly women), were and still are paid a pittance for their truly forced labor.

So what is happening in Lenkoran today?

Outwardly nothing special. Enterprises and stores are functioning, and children with satchels walk along the sidewalks on their way back from school. And suddenly you see a tricolor with a sickle and crescent fluttering in the wind above Lenin's portrait on top of the gorkom building.

The gorkom is closed. A sign in the window reads: "Entry only by permission of the defense committee." We knocked and, after some negotiation, we were allowed inside. A. Asadov, member of the provisional defense committee, was in the first secretary's reception room.

"You see," he indicated the closed door to the office of the "first," "we don't even go inside there."

Information on what is happening in the city arrives here, in the reception room. Last night, for example, armed patrols (they are unarmed during the day) detained two suspicious persons. One of them—a young boy—was sent home, the other was handed over to the militia.

While on the subject of the militia. Its building, like the gorkom building, is surrounded by those who worked there just a week ago, but only the duty officer and his assistant are allowed inside. Militia Senior Lieutenant Aliasker Tagiyev is on duty today.

Tagiyev speaks cautiously, choosing his words, and looking at my notes to make sure I have made a correct record. The rayon soviet executive committee [rayispolkom] chairman is even more cautious. "I have nothing to do with the city," he said, frequently smiling in the oriental manner, "I'm the rayon and all facilities [khozyaystva] in the rayon are operating normally."

He repeated these words time and again, as if he had not heard my question, which actually concerned events on 11 January. He did not even give me his name. "Afterwards, I'll tell you afterwards." I had to read the metal plate in the passage, on my way out: "Rayispolkom Chairman M. Gasanov."

I was forced to agree with Alimukhtar Asadov:

"The authorities proved to be nothing but a soapbubble."

Not the authorities, of course, but the specific individuals representing them in the city.

For a week now these individuals, have been assembling in the tearoom, drinking tea, and waiting and waiting for someone to come and tell them: "Get back to your offices and get down to work." Ridiculous and shameful....

It must be said that the party gorkom and the gorispolkom issued a statement 14 January:

"In connection with the APF Lenkoran Branch resolution dated 11 January, 1990, we declare as follows:

"Once more expressing the will of rayon party and soviet organs, we deem it necessary to announce that we fully uphold these demands.

"Party and soviet organs will not function until such time as the APF Lenkoran Branch adopts an appropriate resolution. But we firmly declare that, if need be, we will act jointly with the People's Front..."

...A rally started in the square at 1400 hours. The slogans called for protection of the republic's territorial integrity. People armed with hunting rifles were also to be seen in the square—Lenkoran is forming a volunteer detachment to defend villages in Martuninskiy Rayon, which borders on Armenia.

And so the warning action by the People's Front was successful. All members of the provisional defense committee with whom I spoke emphasized that their actions should not be perceived as an attempt against the foundations of socialism. They are in favor of socialism, but a democratic socialism, a community of free people living on land that belongs to them rather that land expropriated by the state.

Realizing that it did not take power by democratic means, the provisional defense committee is ready to resign its powers. It is, however, hard to say when this will happen if shots continue to be fired and blood continues to be shed in the republic.

And to whom will it hand over [the power]?

Threat to Gorbachev, Perestroyka Discussed

PM2401120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[IZVESTIYA parliamentary commentator Vyacheslav Shchepotkin article: "For Dictatorship of Law! Only Strict Observance of Legality and Law and Order Can End Dangerous Situation and Protect People"]

[Text] People are reluctant to switch on the television or pick up a newspaper because they want to avoid the shock of the reports from the Transcaucasus. But you can't switch reality off, nor can you throw it away. It grimly makes its presence felt, especially the kind of reality that has befallen us now. Now I have every reason for saying: Yes, the "decoys" have achieved their purpose—they have brought people to the brink of disaster.

People may ask me—What "decoys" am I talking about? Those who divert danger away from themselves and turn it onto others. I am talking about the corrupt and criminal world which emerged during the years of stagnation in a number of regions of the country and even then began to shake up the people's masses into various kinds of conflicts.

I very much regret that I did not show the proper determination at the time and have published my short article "Decoys Leading to the Brink" just a few days before the Karabakh events. In that article—in which I pondered the welter of information circulating in journalist circles and originating from colleagues, readers' letters, and visitors to the editorial office, as well as being based on my own observations of the actions of the corrupt Kazakh elite which disguised its family and personal greed in "national garb"—I wrote about the possible dramatic development of events in the Armenia-Azerbaijan region if the people's masses do not recognize the relentless truth about the secret springs which had already begun to divert the arrows away from themselves onto the easily wounded and very sensitive track of national mutual relations.

Did it need great insight to foresee such a development of events? Many people at that time were expressing opinions similar to mine. Especially since even before the Karabakh conflict both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA had already noted the unhealthy atmosphere in Armenia and the attempts to divert the people's attention from the true reasons for the economic and social difficulties. The former first secretary of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee "berated" both papers at a CPSU Central Committee Plenum at that time, to the tumultuous applause of the hall, it is said.

Let us recall and consider the events of that time. In Armenia, people began talking, albeit indistinctly, about the corrupt circles which were hindering the process of perestroyka. Approximately the same views were voiced about the resistance to perestroyka in Azerbaijan. People who until very recently had been all-powerful had been sacked. Was it really not clear that those people in both republics who were aggrieved at losing their job and especially those were threatened with exposure as having links with shadowy forces would if possible offer fierce resistance to perestroyka? After all, perestroyka as understood by the vast mass of people meant not only a change of economic and political structures but also meant calling to account those who had brought the country to the verge of ruin, and the exposure and punishment of wheeler-dealers who exploited the stagnation conditions to get rich. But that means that various dubious characters and petty thieves from the world of trade, the bigwigs of the underground business world, and the officials of the party and state sphere and law-enforcement organs who had links with them should have answered to the law, too. Very clear questions could have been put to them. Such as, where did the diamond-studded sword given to Brezhnev during the visit to Baku in 1981 come from? Or whose money paid for the ring symbolizing the Soviet Union (a large diamond surrounded by 15 smaller ones) again presented to Brezhnev and displayed to the television viewers of the whole country.

In saving themselves the "decoys" were prepared—and many people saw this—to provoke sundry diversionary actions. And nothing affects people more powerfully and more alarmingly than national feelings.

We journalists saw that—and at the time we were by no means the best-informed people in the atmosphere of still prevailing tight-lipped attitudes. Could it possibly be that other people failed to see it, and lacked sufficient

information about the individuals making waves in the ocean of interethnic dissension and about their strategic goals? I don't believe so.

Yet if they did know, what were they waiting for? An opportunity to reprove Gorbachev? Were they hoping that local official leaders who were fast losing their authority while giving loud assurances that their regions were "all in order" would take a grip on the development of events? Did they not know what forces were taking shape beneath the banners of people's movements and which today have "suddenly" turned into virtual military formations?

A strange situation emerged and steadily deteriorated in the explosive region. No sooner had it shown the slightest sign of easing than one or the other side immediately followed up with a step which again fueled the fire, again whipped up tension and lawlessness. There ensued, of course, accusations against the center, with the simultaneous presentation of demands. At the same time there was almost total deafness regarding the center's exhortations and decisions.

We are living through bitter times now; these are sorrowful days for many, many people and for the country as a whole. Maybe now both sides will heed the blunt words: Stop! Stop, think, and bring these forces to book.

There is only one way to achieve this—through the resolute and energetic imposition of law and order. Through a real dictatorship of the law.

Society today is right at the point where it must answer the question: Will there be perestroyka or not? Right-wing forces which, together with ultraleft radicals, have set numerous destabilizing processes in motion are now steadily implanting in society the idea that it needs a firm hand capable of imposing iron order. It must be said that a certain section of society is beginning to accuse democracy of being unable to control legal nihilism and rising crime originating on everyday economic and interethnic grounds. Moreover, the initiator of perestroyka and head of state is the direct target of criticism. This is not without its dangers. People whose main objective is to return the country to the pre-April horizons could—if not today, then tomorrow—exploit a mass mood which has been skillfully channeled in a particular direction.

But if this is so, we do have the right to voice our opinion. Millions of people have today staked all their hopes and energy on the perestroyka card. They are far from indifferent to the future development of events. This is why we tell the head of state: Act! Real democracy must be capable of defending itself. And we all must defend democracy. At the same time, this mean defending the law, defending the people, and defending human rights!

Western Reaction to Troops in Transcaucasus Noted

LD2401143790 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] The U.S. President, George Bush, has expressed understanding of measures taken by the Soviet Government in the Transcaucasian republics. The rest of the Western capitals take a similar view, on the whole, which is somewhat of a paradox. For the first time ever, the West makes no protest against Moscow's use of troops in a hotspot. Mikhail Moyorov of our staff comments on the situation:

Did Gorbachev act in the right way? The question is being asked in the Soviet Union and abroad. The answer depends on the criteria with which you approach the issue. Generally, the use of troops in a crisis is inadmissible in a law-based democratic state, but in this case the Kremlin is using them as a last resort. Moscow has been seeking for 2 years a peaceful political solution for relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, though there were demands of immediate use of force. But, restructuring called for a different approach based on new political thinking. The diplomacy of force has been giving place to diplomacy of peace—the evidence was seen in the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the admission that sending troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a mistake.

Now, for the first time in 5 years, since the beginning of restructuring, troops have been sent to one of the ethnic problem areas with the sanction of Gorbachev. Is that a reversal of restructuring, a reassessment of values?

We can hardly accept the rebuke by the speaker of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi that Soviet officials ought to know that force is no means to solve Azerbaijan's problem. We know force is a poor means to solve any problem. This is no revision of restructuring. The point is that the situation is too complicated to take it in at a glance.

What choice should be made from the point of view of protecting human rights? Shall we stand by ovserving outrages committed by both Azeri and Armenian nationalists, or shall we use the Army to shield innocent lives, both Azeri and Armenian? The choice has been made. It's taken with understanding both in the West and in the East by those who say the state has a duty to protect the rights, interests, and lives of its citizens. As to what's better, dialogue or use of force, we can hardly doubt which is preferable to Gorbachev. His decision is an exception caused by the dramatic turn of events.

Blaming the Soviet leader is over hasty. I can't but agree with the remarks of the Vatican newspaper OSSERVATORE ROMANO: The erupting conflict does not follow from the bold restructuring in the Soviet Union, but from the preceeding period of stagnation.

Not that I am trying to impose outsiders' view on the participants of the events, but I am sure the situation should be better if the conflicting sides took heed of the

call by the Shi'ite leader Ayatollah Mehdi Ruhan who lives in Western Europe—unless you take the opportunities offered by Gorbachev's glasnost policy you're sure to find yourself under another dictatorship.

Never mind the shades of opinion, you might disagree with it—the call appeals to reason and not to emotions, concludes our commentator Mikhail Mayorov.

Paper Describes Army's Move Into Baku

PM2401124190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 90 p 1

[Special correspondent A. Krayniy report: "More Casualties..."]

[Text] Baku—Shots were heard in the city from the evening of 19 January. The firing had not ceased by 0400 hours the next morning. The first thing I heard on waking up today was the rumble of a column of tanks and infantry combat vehicles crossing the square outside Government House.

A state of emergency has been proclaimed in Baku. Military helicopters are dropping leaflets with an appeal by the city's military commandant which says: "By decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium a state of emergency is introduced in Baku City as of 20 January 1990 with a view to normalizing the situation.

"Citizens! The following are banned while the state of emergency is in force: the holding of strikes, rallies, demonstrations, and other mass events; the carrying and possession of firearms and nonfirearms, explosive devices, incendiary substances and life-endangering explosive and toxic substances; being out of doors and the movement of transport without special permits between 2300 and 0600 hours.

"The temporary commandants are empowered: to terminate the activity of any organizations and unsponsored associations, as far as closing them down and disbanding them; to inspect means of transportation and monitor the observance of passport regulations in citizens' apartments; to impose administrative arrest of up to 30 days on persons violating the state of emergency.

"The state of emergency presupposes the use of weapons by Army, Navy, and Ministry of Internal Affairs subunits in the event of their being attacked."

Weapons have already been used. According to what Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Gorovoy told me, their unit was deployed near Baladzhary Station. At noon they were ordered to move into the city. The road was blocked by KamAZ trucks, tractors, excavators, and barricades. It took the unit 5 hours to cover 11 km. Meanwhile, shooting had started. There are casualties among the military. One soldier died of bullet wounds. Another suffered a serious jaw wound. Two officers have been hospitalized with second-degree burns.

There are also casualties among the attackers. I myself saw eight bodies near the Salyanovskiye Barracks. The city is festooned with black flags, and small black flags are flying from many cars.

Armored personnel carriers and military patrols are to be found at all intersections. Armed soldiers. Many of them are in a gloomy frame of mind. One soldier told me: "I don't understand why they call us occupiers? After all, we only came to impose order."

Today was a day of funerals in the city. I saw many people weeping.

According to Muslim rites, the body of the deceased must be buried as soon as possible. Inasmuch as nerves are stretched to the limit, it is quite probable that fresh clashes might develop during the funerals. The soldiers' nerves are also taut.

What will tomorrow bring?

ARMENPRES: No TASS Office in Yerevan

NC2401221190

[Editorial report] At 1215 GMT on 24 January, Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian reports that in order to keep the "relevant bodies informed," a "press 'center' has been set up attached to the republican council for the special situation."

In the republican press review carried at 1630 GMT on Yerevan International Service in Armenian, it is reported that according to an ARMENPRES correspondent from Stepanakert, in addition to the telephone lines from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast having been cut off from the outside world since 20 January, it has been a "few days" now since "the daytime news program on Moscow television has been permanently discontinued" there.

In an item questioning the authorship of a TASS item on Armenia, Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian reports at 1215 GMT on 24 January that "at present, there is no TASS agency office in Yerevan and not even one special correspondent of that respected and internationally renowned agency."

PRAVDA Reviews Azerbaijan, Armenia Events

PM2501104890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 3

[Text] Eyewitnesses say that the events in Baku from early January, the imposition of a state of emergency, and measures taken in connection with it were extremely necessary.

Pograms and violence could have resulted in a national catastrophe of the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples.

The presence of servicemen in Baku and some districts of Azerbaijan and Armenia is a stabilising factor preventing the further escalation of violence in the region.

A report of the Baku commandant says that the past night in the Azerbaijani capital was relatively calm. There was no loss of life.

The blockade of the Baku harbor has been lifted. The commandant outlawed the activity of the so-called "Defense Committee of the Azerbaijani Popular Front".

The military authorities offered representatives of the public, of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet and party bodies to go on board ships, which they did. They were convinced of the falsity of allegations that these vessels take dead bodies to dump at sea.

In Gyandzha, the unit command offered the public the opportunity to visit a garrison and talk with soldiers.

People were convinced of the falsity of allegations that Azerbaijani servicemen are being beaten up and murdered in that unit.

A group of people's deputies of the Azerbaijanian Republic and local residents went to Salian Barracks in Baku. They were convinced that provocative rumours regarding the barracks are also absolutely groundless.

Reports that came from Imishli say that the calls of extremists to destroy the monument to Lenin were rebuffed by local communists and non-party people.

Army commanders, political instructors, soldiers and sergeants talk with people, address rallies and this helps ease tension. And this is a meeting with a response amoung local inhabitants.

"Azerbaijanis will condemn with wrath and contempt anyone who dares encroach on our common values and drive a wedge between us", Nizami Suleyman, member of the Republican Council of Elders, corresponding member of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences said in his address to the Russian speaking population of the republic. "We have the common road, the common objective, the common struggle for a sovereign, peaceful and flourishing Azerbaijan which has been and remains our common home".

These words and calls of other authoritative people for sanity are now topical as never. Deplorably, the situation in the republic remains complex.

Robberies and attacks on citizens continue. In addition to that, terrorists made nine raids into the zone of the deployment of anti-aircraft defense units, wounding two soldiers.

The attempt to seize a munition depot was made in Lenkoran. Within 24 hours more than 100 people were detained in Baku for various offenses.

Industrial enterprises are idle in Baku and many rural areas. The operation of transport and shops is limited. As many as 189 trains congest the Azerbaijanian railway.

A dialogue is being established in a number of Armenian populated localities to stabilise the situation. There are no conflicts with military units. Reports about the aggravation of relations between the Armenian and Kurdish population have not been verified. Industrial enterprises and public transport are operating.

Aside from some improvements, there is an increase in the number of crimes with the use of the earlier captured arms.

Two cooperative stores have been exploded. There were armed attacks on people.

Means of transportation, including private cars, have been seized. On January 23 in Artashat eight bandits beat up a local resident and stole his car.

A tank, two 76 mm guns, and an anti-aircraft gun were driven away from the Second World War Memorial Museum in Yerevan. Two machine guns and two mortars were stolen from the museum.

The presence of a large number of armed extremists on both sides has led to the complication of the situation on the frontier in the Yekhegnadzorskiy district of Armenia and the Il'chevsk district in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. A teacher from the Armenian village Areni was killed in a skirmish.

Control has been restored over the whole of the Soviet-Iranian border in Azerbaijan. All border crossings take place under the established procedure through checkpoints. In the last 24 hours, 1,322 people crossed into Iran, and 1,601 arrived from across the border. Sixty-six people who tried to cross the border illegally—from both sides—were detained.

The population of borderline areas increasingly supports these measures. Order along the frontier is being restored in cooperation with party and local authority bodies.

All Soviet peoples are striving to contribute to the normalisation of the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Former soldiers in Central Asia and Kazakhstan who did their military service in Afghanistan addressed former soldiers in Azerbaijan and Armenia and asked them not to get involved in the fratricial conflict.

Road Blocks Being Lifted in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD2401125590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Today, one can describe the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it as relatively calm. It was reported at the temporary press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that, in the region of the state of emergency, subunits of internal troops and the Soviet Army and the internal affairs bodies have, over the last 24 hours, taken measures to stabilize the situation in the autonomous oblast and neighboring rayons. In particular, the blockades have been lifted on the Stepanakert-Agdam-Barda-Yevlakh-Udzhary road and the Shusha-Stepanekert-Agdam road. The civilian population took

an active part in this. This was helped to a great extent by meetings held with the residents of a number of inhabited localities by the party, local soviet, and economic aktiv of the oblast and of neighboring rayons of Azerbaijan and representatives of certain informal organizations. However, one should also bear in mind the fact that the blockade has been lifted on the roads only for convoys of military vehicles. Civilian trucks are still not taking the risk of driving on a number of roads. As before, the railway is out of action and communications are not working.

Subunits of internal troops and the internal affairs bodies are continuing to implement the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the declaration of a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and certain other rayons. A number of operations are planned in the immediate future to check passport procedures in the area of the state of emergency. The lifting of road blockades continues. Over the past 24 hours, ten people have been detained for violating the curfew.

TASS Refutes Baku Rumors; Strikes Continue

LD2501091490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0811 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Report by TASS special correspondents Aleksandr Budris and Vladimir Fomin]

[Text] Baku, 25 January. (TASS)—Those who do not want peace in Azerbaijan will resort to any lie. Journalists who visited the Salyanskiy barracks in the capital of this Soviet republic in the Transcaucasus had occasion to be convinced of this. Over several days all kinds of rumors have circulated about the alleged seizure by a group of servicemen of various nationalities, including Azerbaijanis, of a store of ammunition, and it was maintained that these persons had supposedly taken up all-round defense positions and were defending themselves by firing back at commandos. [Words indistinct] were cited for Azerbaijanis killed in the barracks.

Together with representatives of the public we visited these barracks. [Word indistinct] soldiers doing their military service here [Word indistinct] refuted the rumors. In their words, they were particularly pained by the fact that the lies had reached their parents and relatives.

Colonel Boris Kovalenok, deputy head of a department of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops, reckons that the reports which continue to emerge about clashes or shooting between servicemen situated on the premises of barracks and troops alleged to have surrounded them are a fabrication concocted by these with an interest in heightening tensions in the republic. At the same time, extremists continue even now to direct targeted fire at the barracks from nearby houses. A soldier died at about 1530 hours. Last night another private died and a warrant officer was badly wounded.

Captain (Third Class) [name indistinct] duty officer at the premises of the Caspian Flotilla supervisor on 21 January, answered a question on the alleged removal of corpses out to sea. From 18 to 23 January, he said, the bay was blockaded by merchant ships which did not allow a single vessel out of Baku. Communications between ships were maintained. The leader of the blockade was the captain of the motor vessel "Sabit Orudzhev." Agreement was reached with him by radio on the safe passage of two hydrographic ships carrying wives and children of servicemen accompanied by two military patrol boats. The captain of the "Sabit Orudzhev" allowed this on condition that these vessels be inspected, but this condition was not fulfilled, since the duty supervisor of the Caspian Flotilla reported a radio intercept talking of a provocation being prepared against the hydrographic vessels. The flotilla commander ordered the ships to maintain course for Makhachkala. He went on the air himself and proposed to the captain of the "Sabit Orudzhev" that a meeting of the vessels in Makhachkala be organized for purposes of the check, but the latter ignored the suggestion.

Major Gershov replied to a question about the ferry "Sovetskiy Kazakhstan" and the 1,500-2,000 corpses of those killed during the events of 19-21 January allegedly aboard it. He announced that the ferry was anchored in the roadsteads of Baku Bay and had been there (?during) the events which occurred in the city.

During an investigation carried out jointly by the bodies of the Interior Ministry and KGB, some people suspected of carrying out pogroms, murders and other grave crimes were detained. As Baku Radio reported, among those detained is Baku resident Mamed Ali- Zade, chairman of the so-called "Defense Committee of the People's Front of Azerbaijan." Firearms and sidearms, ammunition, explosives, homemade explosive devices, molotov cocktails, several lorries containing military uniforms and insignia of the National Front, medical supplies, and radio equipment were found with him, and agitation materials calling on the population to put up resistance to the authorities were also confiscated.

Despite the ban by the military commandant, strikes continue in the city and public transport is not working.

Armenian Special Situation Committee Meets

NC2501075290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] The republican council on the special situation met on 24 January under the chairmanship of Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

Discussing conditions in the republic and the region, Comrade Arutyunyan pointed out that the situation is still grave and explosive and that there is still tension on the areas bordering Azerbaijan.

Calm has prevailed and no (?raids) or similar acts have taken place in these regions for a few days. However, on 23 and 24 January fresh incidents took place. One resident of (Arev) village on the border of Armenia's Yeghegnatsorskiy and Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic's Iliychevskiy rayons was killed in a (?raid) while (?one person) was seriously injured. An electric train and six wagons were derailed in Noyemberyanskiy rayon, near (Ayrum) railway. As a result, several people were injured.

The first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee pointed out that there are constant consultations with the country's leadership and that those issues concerning the Soviet Government and the relative ministries and departments are being studied.

The council pointed out with satisfaction that the residents of Armenia have a basically correct understanding of the difficult problems facing them and that a normal moral-psychological atmosphere is being maintained in the workers' collectives and educational institutions. The voluntary handing in of arms continues.

Dear friends, the full text of the 24 January regular session of the republican council on the special situation will be published in the press.

Dismantled Track Causes Train Derailment

Goods Bound for Armenia

OW2501021290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Jan 90

[From "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] According to reports received from Yerevan, some of the track was dismantled on a section of the railroad in Marneulskiy Rayon in Georgia, settled predominantly by Azerbaijanis, resulting in the derailment of a passenger train heading from Yerevan to Rostov-na-Donu. There were no fatalities. Four people were injured.

The crash has complicated the work of the railroad along which goods are supplied to Armenia.

Fear of Further Clashes

LD2401183990 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Yerevan January 24 ARMENPRESS-TASS—Rumours about a train crash at Sadakhlo junction in Georgia have been circulating in Yerevan throughout the whole day. An investigation has revealed that a train from Rostov bound for Yerevan derailed.

No fatalities have been reported. A few passengers were injured.

According to preliminary information, the accident was due to track wear on a short section.

The volatile situation in the region prompted many to fear that news of the incident would trigger further ethnic clashes as Georgia's Marneuli district, where Sadakhlo is located, is inhabited mainly by Azerbaijanis.

An emergency situations group, set up in Armenia, managed to defuse the situation in time.

It was said at the group's meeting that the situation in regions bordering Azerbaijan is under control, although it remains extremely tense.

Much attention was given to the problem of refugees arriving from Baku. In all, 220 people with grave injuries are currently at Yerevan clinics.

Printing workshops are running out of newsprint due to the continuing rail blockade. It has been decided to cut the number of times republican and departmental newspapers appear as a temporary measure.

Due to a lack of oil, Armenian power plants are not generating enough electricity. For this reason, the production line has been stopped at the Zangezur copper and molybdenum works, one of the biggest Soviet suppliers of rare non-ferrous metals.

According to the Republican Council of Ministers, work at the Kanaker Aluminium Plant has also been stoppped. Several industrial enterprises under all-union bodies are operating at one-third of their capacity.

The republican government is taking measures to stabilise the situation. Some factories are on short time, while others are to work at night.

The consumption of electricity for domestic purposes has been reduced, all neon signs and some street lights have been switched off.

Yerevan Radio Updates Armenian Train Situation

NC2401230190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] No trains entered Armenia on 23 January through Norashen and Idzhevan via the Azerbaijanian railways. On 23 January, 14 trains with 359 freight cars entered the republic via the Transcaucasus Railways by 1000 Moscow time. They brought 154 tankers of fuel oil, 45 of benzine, 13 of diesel oil, and nine of aircraft fuel. They also brought 13 freight cars of construction material, seven of cereal, and one of butter.

The Yerevan railway department stated that five trains with 112 freight cars arrived by 1400 on 24 January. They brought 61 tankers of fuel oil, seven of diesel oil, and other goods.

Media Criticized for Coverage of Events in South

LD2501114690 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] Soviet mass media are giving extensive coverage to events in the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia. But sometimes it appears reports are not quite authentic, or perhaps perceptions of the events differ. Our reporter Leonid Zhukov, just back from Yerevan, has the details:

[Begin recording] [Zhukov] On arriving in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, I went to the republic's Ministry of the Interior to obtain first-hand information and to clear up some points made by the Moscow press regarding the situation in the area. I met Rafeyel (Oslamyan), who heads the political department of the Interior Ministry, but first I asked him to state his attitude to Moscow media coverage of the events as far as the Armenian Republic was concerned. Here is what he told me:

[Oslamyan] In my view their reports are far-fetched, containing facts taken from unknown and unreliable sources. Here in Armenia we wonder sometimes where they get this information and why developments are presented in such a way.

[Zhukov] We then turned to some reports in the IZVESTIYA daily and found that according to Rafeyel (Oslamyan) information attributed to the national Interior Ministry's press centre appeared to be distorted.

[Oslamyan] We contacted the head of the national Interior Ministry's press centre and received the answer that the information in question had never been issued to the newspapers. He also confirmed that changes had been made in a series of reports published in the name of the ministry. As proof of this, he pointed out that this information was not present in the ministry's press releases. All these cases were reported to the head of the news department of the IZVESTIYA newspaper.

[Zhukov] I was given a specific example: Last weekend the Moscow television programme called "Seven Days" reported strong feelings among the Armenian population against the troops. The local newspaper KOMMUNIST immediately denied such reports, saying its sources were not among the military. Reports of this kind in the Moscow mass media could, it said, worsen the relationship between the local population and the troops sent to protect them from the Azerbaijani militants. I turned for comment on this to Armen (Tomalyan), who heads the ideological department of the central committee of the republic's Komsomol youth organization:

[Tomalyan] Reports in the Moscow mass media about appeals from the Armenian population for the troops to be withdrawn from the republic are not true. They were not properly verified.

[Zhukov] The situation in Armenia remains complex, although less tense than it is sometimes presented. The continued blockade of the republic by its Azerbaijan neighbor republic makes it worse. There are shortages of fuel and electric power. The Armenian Government has enforced measures to save electricity. Industrial establishments are switching to a 4-day working week. Even lighting is being cut by 70 percent and television hours are being reduced. These forced economy measures could of course have social repercussions. [end recording]

Armenian Power Situation Outlined

NC2401225390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Report by (name indistinct): "For Sake of Overcoming Power Shortage"]

[Excerpts] The basic subject of conversation among people everywhere is the grave situation prevailing in the republic and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. They direct their criticisms at the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and USSR Supreme Soviet which postpone adoption of urgent and practical measures for the solution of the NKAO problem. The people demand that the government ensure the security of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan and resolutely prevent the armed savagery. By blockading the railway the extremists have created a grave situation in the republic. No fuels, foodstuffs, or diesel oil has been received and as a result, the power stations are not operating. Meager amounts of power are supplied, therefore forcing enterprises into idleness and making them suffer losses of millions of rubles because they are unable to fulfill their contractual obligations. In short, the railway blockade by Azerbaijan has created a grave economic situation not only for our republic but also for the entire Soviet Union.

I visited the Armenian Power Production Association and inquired about measures being taken to overcome the power shortage. The chief [word indistinct] (?Mez) Agopyan said the following:

[Begin recording] As you know, the so-called Azerbaijan People's Front shifted the field of conflict around NKAO to a war situation it found suitable. Primarily by the blockade of railways, roads, and natural gas pipeline, they hope to bring our people to their knees and force them to give up their just demands.

The Soviet leadership, by its irresolute and unobjective stance [words indistinct] the Azerbaijan which realizing its potential to economically damage Armenia, has resorted to that means for the third time now. After the closure of the nuclear power plant, an enormous energy shortage had already developed, and some measures were thought of to take care of the shortage. However, (?under these conditions), we cannot operate the thermal power stations at their full capacity because of severe fuel shortages. Therefore, we are forced to introduce a more stringent power saving regime in the entire republic. The lack of natural gas and heating [word indistinct] has substantially increased domestic power consumption. Though at present almost all the republic's

industrial enterprises have stopped operating, total energy consumption went down only by 10 percent.

The only way out of this situation is to bring enough fuel into the republic and to enforce a stringent power saving plan. [passage omitted] The republic's leadership must also start thinking about creating enough fuel reserves in the republic. The issue of laying a natural gas pipeline [word indistinct] through Georgia must also be resolved. We power workers must take all measures to complete the commissioning of two 300-megawatt energy [not further specified] units in 1991 and 1992 in the Razdan state power grid. [passage omitted] Concerning taking water from Lake Sevan for power generation, I could state my own views; I do not know what stance the republic's government might assume. Sevan is a bounty for our people and is required for their existence. Today, when the very existence of Armenian people is questioned, the Sevan waters could only be taken, if ever, under extraordinary conditions and then only in a limited quantity. [passage omitted] I hope that we will not reach that critical moment and that the fuel problem will be solved and republic's normal life restored. [end recording]

We should not postpone measures to terminate the prevailing and exceedingly tense situation. Measures must be taken to ensure the security of the Armenians in Azerbaijan, to unblock transportation lines with Armenia, to supply the republic with foodstuffs, and to radically improve the situation. However, before solving all these problems our priority issue is to save power.

Azerbaijani People's Front on Goals, Ideology

90US0393A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 16 Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with Gamid Kherishchi, associate of Academy of Sciences Literary Institute, recorded by correspondents A. Azhubalis and A. Zdanavichyus: "The Caucasus on Fire"]

[Text] **A series of reports from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan by special correspondents Audris Azhubalis and Audris Zdanavichyus was published under such a title in the 20 November 1989 Lithuanian newspaper ATGIMIMAS ("Soglasie").**

We offer for your attention the conversation recorded by them with one of the ideologists of the Azerbaijani People's Front, Gamid Kherishchi, associate of the Academy of Sciences Literary Institute.

The Azerbaijani People's Front views the USSR as a dualistic state, a Muslim-Christian, or, to be more precise, a Turkic-Slavic one. Therefore, we have completely different tactics from those of the Baltic peoples. We are not even considering withdrawing from the USSR, as for us that would mean withdrawing from the Turkic unity. But yet the possible withdrawal of the Baltic republics would be to our advantage: There will be three fewer Christian peoples. This will intensify Muslim influence in the Soviet Union. Based upon this, we must regard your efforts with understanding. The break-up of the USSR, and thus, the collapse of Turkic unity, is not to the Muslims' advantage. Azerbaijan, Kirghizia, Bashkiria, Povolzhye, Tataria, Yakutia, Turkmenia, the Crimea, the Northern Caucasus—these are all Turkic lands. And we do not intend to cede them to anyone. While the existing pseudo-democratic movements were coordinating the tactics of their struggle with the totalitarian USSR, they were not interested in our opinion, and we are not cooperating with them now. Nor, incidentally, are we cooperating with various rights organizations abroad. We have different goals, different tactics. But we are not against democracy, no.

The Turkic peoples live substantially worse than you do in the Baltic republics. By comparison to us, you have paradise. Cover a kilometer of the Uzbek earth and you will perceive the tragedy; you will feel what anger ripens among the people. A people 25 million strong has reached its limit. And the Kazakh people? Here we are saying, "Karabakh, Karabakh!" And after all, three times more territory was taken from Kazakhstan for proving grounds. Also autonomous okrugs in their own way, only military ones. Sometimes I cry when I talk with Kazakhs and Kirghiz, even though I am not a sentimental, but a hard person. I like to look the truth straight in the eye. Our religion teaches us this; our Turkic nature is such—one must be a man in any event. I was in the Fergana Valley, Ashkhabad, Kazan, and Tashkent, and I have not the powers to describe what I saw there. They fashioned a hell from our lands. Bad enterprises, harmful conditions. But take a look at the factories in Ivanovo: cleanliness, order, trade union vacation packages, women in coveralls. They are on our necks, working on Uzbek cotton. But once we will take them by the throats: "So, you've made the good life for yourselves? Look at how our women work in the 40-degree heat, when even a dog crawls into the shade, but here are people—under the burning sun!" All this is done for you through legislative acts. Your factories are in Russian hands, and thus only Russians strike. But here, in the Turkic republics, all factories are in the hands of the people. And our primary weapons are strikes and civil disobedience. The economic decline they threaten does not frighten us: In Azerbaijan, 93 percent of industry is subordinate to Moscow, and only 7 percent is under the republic. The Russians thought that we would suffer, and they themselves were caught in the trap. I was a member of the strike committee, and saw with my own eyes the telegrams signed by Ryzhkov and Yazov. There was panic there in Moscow. We produce almost all the petroleum, 95 percent of lubricants, and the main component of aviation fuel, including for military aviation. On 16 August, the intelligentsia appealed to the people to gather all forces, both political and spiritual, into a single fist. And the People's Front has achieved this. Yes, there are elements of a jihad (Arabic—a war for the faith, prescribed by the Koran—editors) in our struggle: To gather all together, to swear that we will stand to the end; that if we lose, then we would be better off not to live in

this world. Yet it is to the Russians that it seems the Azerbaijanis are on the verge of declaring a jihad. For the time being, there is no need for such a powerful weapon, when everyone, big and small, and women as well go to battle, and by perishing, according to our faith, go to heaven. We may use more peaceful, democratic means of influence. This, for example, is a blockade of the railroad lines, first and foremost an economic embargo. Direct your attention to the fact that our struggle is reminiscent of that of the Arab people against Israel; let us say, both they and we have an oil embargo (we have declared it against Georgia, Armenia, and Russia). On 13 July, the Armenians began the blockade of Nakhichevan and the Azerbaijani villages of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. But they lost this war when we began the blockade from our side. Well, they are globalizing the Karabakh problem; they tell the Russians and the Balts that, so they say, they will annex the oblast to Armenia; there will be a precedent for withdrawing from unjustly established borders. And if we define the problem and globalize it as a conflict between Christianity and Islam, what will happen then? Then the Armenians will seek help from the outside; they will send letters to the UN, the Roman Catholic Pope, the United States Congress. And we, in accordance with our faith, rely solely upon ourselves, even though we know that the entire Islamic world, Iran, and Turkey stand behind us. The main thing for the Armenians is not to sit down to the negotiating table face to face. They absolutely must have an audience: The Balts should participate, or the Muscovites. But only two peoples must decide. The Armenians have lost their struggle, yet they will never tell the people about this frankly. Pure adventurism is at the foundation of all their actions. Zoriy Balayan spoke at a recent session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet; he glorified the Slavic-Armenian ties, saying that Armenia has always been Russia's outpost in the Caucasus. Who are these Armenians, that they should be an outpost?

In general, the West is in its decline. Spengler was essentially correct. And the renaissance will come from the East. Heaven on earth has been created in certain Arab states. In Iran, for example, the standard of living is significantly higher than that of Europe. I was in this country and I saw how great the culture is, how responsible the people are to the homeland, toward true piety. If the development of world history continues this way, I think that about 20 years from now, the picture will change radically. Now they are getting hysterical about Armenia. Yet attend to the fact that its defeat coincided with the defeat of all Christian forces in general. The people who speak of the idea of a common European home simply want to remove the East-West opposition and confirm what is new: North-South. And to switch the USSR over to themselves. And who is proposing this? Francois Mitterand, France's minister of foreign affairs from 1954 to 1958, who was directly involved in the mass killing of Algerian Muslim mujahidin. This man who is up to his elbows in Muslim blood speaks of human rights! The idea of a common European home will be a fiasco, since this home will show the rift in the split in the USSR. There will be no avoiding a tragedy. And as far as internecine wars in the Muslim world are concerned, they will promote the unification of the Turkic peoples, the confirmation of Islam.

The editors could have accompanied this publication with the appropriate extensive commentary. But the pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic, anti-Russian, anti-Armenian, and finally anti-Christian concepts of the author-ideologist of the Azerbaijani People's Front are so frank and obvious that they are perhaps not in need of any commentary. Each line of this publication breathes with hatred toward all that is Soviet, giving a foundation to assume how dangerous the program is, and consequently, the activity of the Azerbaijani People's Front, with its fanatic rejection of all that is not Islamic.

Treatment of Kurds in Azerbaijan Defended

90US0401A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 22 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Sh. Azadov and G. Tagiyeva: "Outdated Methods]

[Text] The weekly NOVOYE VREMYA prepared a pre-new year surprise for its readers—a free supplement "Perestroyka and Nationality Problems." Obviously, the subject is timely and interesting, and we had the right to expect from the authors an objective and competent discussion about nationality problems in the period of perestroyka.

An important item in the supplement is historical studies under the general title "Experiences in Political Ethnography" dealing with the least numerous peoples of the USSR, including those persecuted during the years of the Stalin regime—the Gagauz, Veps, Akkin-Chechens, Karaims, Greeks, Crimean Tatars, Kurds, Nogay, Volga Germans, Meskhetian Turks... As if understanding that some statements might call forth misunderstanding and occasionally indignation, the editors warn readers first that "opinions and evaluations presented here should not be taken as the final truth. Not all scientific disputes are resolved, not all historical facts are clarified..."

But in a scientific argument, in a clash of opinions, one would think one should observe objectivity, trustworthiness, and simple orderliness. Unfortunately the authors of some publications placed in the weekly far from observe these principles at all times. For instance, in the article "Kurds" by S. Arutyunov, supervisor of the People of the Caucasus Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, takes it upon himself to speak of the problems of a nation of 20 million, living in four countries, divided not only by state boundaries but also by religious differences. Moslem Kurds live in Azerbaijan and Christian Kurds-Yezids in Armenia and Georgia. The author of the article declares that "a Kurd-Yezid intelligentsia appeared in Armenia, a department of Kurdology was created in the Academy of

Sciences, the newspaper RIA TAZA is being issued, and in Kurdish village schools instruction is in the native language."

As far as Georgian Kurds are concerned, if in the past they occupied themselves with essentially unskilled physical labor, worked as loaders, porters, janitors, and guards, "in Soviet times a Kurd intelligentsia arose from their midst. The credit be given to the leadership of the republic and the Georgian intelligentsia—to a great extent it is to their credit."

And thus, having convinced us what care and attention surround the Kurds-Yezids in Armenia and Georgia, S. Arutyunov turns to the condition of Kurds in Azerbaijan. A perceptive reader has already guessed that the comparison will not be to our benefit. But the author's final statement is capable of amazing even those who long ago became accustomed to countless provocations by Armenian nationalists: "Census figures do not distinguish Kurds in Azerbaijan; in the 1920's a Kurdistan district existed in Azerbaijan, but at the end of the 1930's and beginning of the 1940's an assimilationist tendency took the upper hand and today all Kurds, regardless of what they call themselves, are registered as Azerbaijanis." Is it not their new version that S. Arutyunov is repeating, following their path of inciting one nationality against another, insisting that similar processes touched not only the Kurds, but also national minorities of the republic—the Tat, Talysh, Lezgin, and others?

It appears that our neighbors, tired of endless suffering on mass information media "problems of Karabakh" and consequences of the blockade, "much-suffering Armenia" has found a new, unexhausted vein. The article in the supplement to NOVOYE VREMYA is unfortunately not the only confirmation that it is aimed at diversionary inflammation of the differences between nationalities in our republic. And to accomplish purposes, as is known, all means are fair: One can lie, presenting the desirable as the real, extensively using the popular newspapers, magazines, and television.

Remember the recent roundtable on international relations broadcast on central television. Some of the conferees assiduously whipped up the version about artificial assimilation of less-numerous peoples in Azerbaijan. With an even more openly dashnak position, a certain B. Mirzoryan, head of a chair at the Yerevan zoological-veterinary institute, appeared on the pages of KOMMUNIST, organ of the Council of Ministers and the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. (Let us note between the lines that at times reading this newspaper it is difficult to figure out whose it is—the republic party organization or the antisoviet dashnaks). Thus his article "What Statistics Are About" is full of crude distortions and juggling of facts about the current demographic situation in the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. But it requires a special discussion and reply to the inventions of a falsifier.

However, let us return to the author of the publication in NOVOYE VREMYA. According to it, representatives of a rootless nationality in Armenia are treated practically with tenderness and paternal concern. What hypocrisy! Then explain, S. Arutyunov, why Armenia today is the only practically one-nationality republic in the country? Why are there so few citizens of other nationalities living there? And finally, why were almost 200,000 Azerbaijanis driven off their native lands, many of whom were peasants, and, in fact, fed the republic with their callused hands.

When it comes to facts pertaining to the position of Kurds in Azerbaijan, over the past 4 decades we can remember two elections of chairmen of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium who were Kurds by nationality, N. Geydarov and M. Iskenderov. And according to preliminary data of the republic's statistical commission obtained during the last all-union census, on 12 January 1989 Kurds in Azerbaijan numbered 12,200. Quite a few of the representatives of this people work at various duties in party and soviet organs, the people's economy, and areas of science and culture. One is compelled to ask why such concern is suddenly displayed in Armenia. It is easy to find the answer: During the last months Yerevan extremists, bearded and armed with automatic weapons, began systematically to shoot up Azerbaijani villages in Kubatlinskiy and Lachinskiy Rayons on the border of Gorisskiy Rayon of Armenia. This way they hope to aggravate the situation to the limit, spread panic and terror, and force people to abandon the villages. Then, according to their plans, it will be possible, having settled a strip of land 15 kilometers wide, to territorially unite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. And in order not to excite indignation on the part of the Kurds living there, a campaign of "defense of their rights" was begun. However, the Kurdish population is in no need of such care. On the contrary, attempts to aggravate relations between the two peoples brought forth only indignation on the part of the Kurds. In their appeal to the USSR peoples' deputies published in the rayon newspaper LACHIN on 28 September this year, representatives of the Kurdish population wrote simply: "About 10,000 Kurds live in the Lachinskiy Rayon of Azerbaijan alone, tied to the Azerbaijani people with blood and ties of friendship for centuries. One must not allow ill will to tear them apart. The time has come to suppress the intrigues of Armenian extremists and adventurers striving to impugn the most sacred friendship of our peoples."

One would like to remind those who try to instill provocative thoughts in the public of this country about discrimination against the less-numerous peoples in Azerbaijan, to accuse an entire people for stepping onto a dangerous and slippery path, even if they do it in the form of scientific hypotheses and prognoses.

Armenian Draft Law on Citizenship Reported

90US0384A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
20 Dec 89 p 2

[Armenian SSR draft law on Armenian SSR citizenship]

[Text] Citizenship of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] is an expression of the sovereignty of the Armenian SSR and contributes to the further all-around strengthening of the Armenian SSR.

Armenian SSR citizenship is the political and legal affiliation of its citizens to the Armenian SSR, by virtue of which Armenian SSR citizens possess the plenitude of socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and liberties proclaimed and guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, the Armenian SSR Constitution, and Soviet laws.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. The Armenian SSR Citizenship Law determines the procedure of the acquisition, loss, and restoration of Armenian SSR citizenship.

Article 2. In accordance with the USSR Constitution and the Armenian SSR Constitution, each citizen of the Armenian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.

On the territory of the Armenian SSR the citizens of other union republics enjoy all the rights of Armenian SSR citizens, but acquire Armenian SSR citizenship in the procedure determined by this law.

Article 3. As a guarantee of the patronage and protection of citizens of Armenian nationality, the Armenian SSR may in compliance with the principle of voluntariness and preservation of their citizenship admit to Armenian SSR citizenship persons of Armenian nationality residing outside of the Armenian SSR.

Article 4. Citizens of the Armenian SSR are persons who:

—Have a permanent place of residence on the territory of the Armenian SSR and who have not forfeited Armenian SSR citizenship;

—Have a permanent place of residence outside of the Armenian SSR and have acquired Armenian SSR citizenship in accordance with this law.

Article 5. Armenian SSR citizenship guarantees Armenian SSR citizens on republic territory realization of their constitutional rights and requires of them performance of their constitutional duties.

Article 6. The Armenian SSR exercises protection of Armenian SSR citizens on Armenian SSR territory and outside of the republic.

Article 7. Any citizen of the Armenian SSR and also a person who is not a citizen of the Armenian SSR who has done the Armenian people particular service may be an honorary citizen of the Armenian SSR.

An application concerning conferment of the title of honorary citizen of the Armenian SSR is examined by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The title of honorary citizen of the Armenian SSR is conferred by Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict.

The status of honorary citizen of the Armenian SSR is determined by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

II. Acquisition of Armenian SSR Citizenship

Article 8. Armenian SSR citizenship is acquired:

1) By birth;

2) As a result of admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship;

3) On the grounds stipulated by international treaties of the Armenian SSR;

4) On other grounds stipulated by this law.

Article 9. A child born on the territory of the Armenian SSR acquires Armenian SSR citizenship by his birth if at the time of the birth of the child the parents or one of them are Armenian SSR citizens.

Article 10. A child born outside of the Armenian SSR is a citizen of the Armenian SSR if the parents or one of them were Armenian SSR citizens by the time of the birth of the child.

Article 11. A child, one of whose parents was by the time of the birth a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other, a stateless person, or a person lacking proof of his possession of other citizenship, regardless of the place of his birth, acquires Armenian SSR citizenship.

Article 12. The marriage of a male or female citizen of the Armenian SSR with a person of different citizenship or a stateless person and also the dissolution of such a marriage do not entail changes in the couple's citizenship.

The acquisition or loss of Armenian SSR citizenship by one spouse does not entail a change in the citizenship of the other.

Article 14. Foreign citizens and stateless persons with a permanent place of residence on the territory of the Armenian SSR, regardless of their racial and national affiliation, sex, education, language, and attitude toward religion, may be admitted to Armenian SSR citizenship upon application.

Article 15. The question of admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship is examined following an application in writing from the person concerned.

Applications for admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship from persons who have not reached 18 years of age are submitted by their lawful representatives.

Article 16. Persons who have not reached 18 years of age acquire Armenian SSR citizenship simultaneously with the acquisition of Armenian SSR citizenship by their parents if this was stipulated in the parents' application and also in the event of one parent acquiring Armenian SSR citizenship.

When the question of admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship of minors aged 14 to 18 is being decided, their written consent is necessary.

An application for admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship is submitted to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Article 17. The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issues an edict on admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship, and if applications concerning admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship are rejected, adopts a decree.

Armenian SSR citizenship is acquired as of the date the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict is issued.

A certificate of Armenian SSR citizenship is issued.

Article 18. Reapplications for Armenian SSR citizenship are examined upon the expiration of one year following the adoption of the decision on the preceding application.

Article 19. The procedure of registration of applications for admittance to Armenian SSR citizenship and their examination and also of the issuance of Armenian SSR citizenship papers is determined by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

III. Loss and Restoration of Armenian SSR Citizenship

Article 20. Armenian SSR citizenship is lost:

1) As a consequence of relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship;

2) As a consequence of deprivation of Armenian SSR citizenship;

3) On the grounds stipulated by international treaties of the Armenian SSR;

4) On other grounds stipulated by this law.

Article 21. Relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship is authorized by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Article 22. Relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship is not allowed if in respect of the person applying to relinquish it a court conviction has taken legal effect or is due to take effect or if a person's relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship is contrary to the interests of state security of the Armenian SSR or a person has outstanding obligations to the Armenian SSR or property liabilities with which the material interests of citizens or state, cooperative, and other public organizations are connected.

Article 23. The relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship by the parents extends to their under-age children if stipulated in the application.

When the question of relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship by minors aged 14 to 18 is being decided, their written consent is required.

If a minor loses Armenian SSR citizenship on the grounds of his parents' application, he has the right upon attaining the age of 18 to be restored to Armenian SSR citizenship status.

A certificate of the relinquishment of Armenian SSR citizenship is issued.

Article 24. Deprivation of Armenian SSR citizenship may occur in an exceptional case at the decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium if a person has perpetrated actions debasing the high title of Armenian SSR citizen and damaging the prestige or harming the state security of the Armenian SSR.

Deprivation of a person's Armenian SSR citizenship does not entail a change in the citizenship of the spouse and children.

Article 25. A person who has forfeited Armenian SSR citizenship may upon application be restored to Armenian SSR citizenship by a decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

IV. Citizenship of the Children Given a Change in the Citizenship of the Parents and Upon Adoption

Article 26. Given a change in the citizenship of the parents, as a consequence of which both become Armenian SSR citizens or both relinquish Armenian SSR citizenship, the citizenship of their children who have not attained to 14 years of age changes accordingly.

Article 27. If one parent becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other is a foreign citizen, the child may acquire Armenian SSR citizenship upon application by the parent acquiring Armenian SSR citizenship.

If one parent becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other is stateless, the child living on the territory of the Armenian SSR becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR.

If one parent becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other is stateless, the child living outside of the Armenian SSR may acquire Armenian SSR citizenship upon application of the parent acquiring Armenian SSR citizenship.

Article 28. If one parent relinquishes Armenian SSR citizenship, and the other retains Armenian SSR citizenship, the child retains Armenian SSR citizenship.

Article 29. A child who is a foreign citizen or stateless, adopted by citizens of the Armenian SSR becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR.

A child who is a foreign citizen adopted by a couple one of whom is a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other, a stateless person, becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR.

A child who is stateless adopted by a couple one of whom is a citizen of the Armenian SSR becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR.

A child who is a foreign citizen adopted by a couple one of whom one is a citizen of the Armenian SSR, and the other, a foreign citizen, becomes a citizen of the Armenian SSR as agreed by the adopters.

V. International Treaties

Article 30. If an international treaty to which the Armenian SSR subscribes determines rules other than those contained in this law, the rules of the international treaty apply.

Political & Social

Soviet Official Criticizes Estonian Price Rises

LD2401173890 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Vyacheslav Senchagov, chairman of the USSR Committee on Prices, has described as anarchy the decision passed by the Estonian Supreme Soviet to raise the republic's retail prices of individual goods in defiance of federal legislation. He criticises the measure in the latest issue of PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (GOVERNMENT HERALD).

He stresses that "revision of prices in the republic on alcoholic drinks and tobacco, received from abroad, is absolutely unlawful." It contradicts the Soviet consitution which stipulates that the policy of prices is shaped by federal bodies.

"The skyrocketing demand, triggered by Estonia's decision, has already hit neighbouring regions of the Russian Federation: Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Smolensk and others," Senchagov writes.

"Letters and appeals, received by local bodies, by the USSR Committee on Prices and the federal government note with alarm that large quantities of goods are being bought up in those regions for official prices and taken to Estonia. There is also information that the export of goods from Estonia is prevented by unilaterally set up control posts, where documents of people from other republics are being checked, and their vehicles and luggage inspected."

The head of the USSR Committee on Prices believes Estonia's argument that its decision was motivated by the need to create a special fund to raise the wages of people working in the socio-cultural sphere, to increase pensions and monthly allowances, as well as student scholarships, and to accelerate the transition to market economy, including in union republics, holds no water.

"I am convinced that such 'commerce' will yield nothing but blackmarketeering and growing prices," Vyacheslav Senchagov writes. "Normalisation of the market by means of voluntaristic commercial prices is impossible. Revision and boosting of prices without due regard for the interests of neighbouring regions and the federation as a whole is beyond criticism from the political point of view.

"It engenders friction with other union republics, adds grist to various speculations concerning the central authorities, which allegedly oppose steps to raise the living standards of low-paid sections of Estonia's population."

Senchagov stresses that this also deals a blow at the strategy of the on-going economic reform. "By intruding into the sphere of state monopoly, encouraging the ejection of large masses of free money from Estonia into the consumer market of neighbouring regions, the republic's authorities are undermining the national policy of prices and seriously complicating the implementation of the programme to revitalise the national economy, approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR."

Estonian Activists View Independence

90UN0663A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 p 16

[Roundup of comments under rubric: "What Are They Thinking in Estonia about Probability of Secession From USSR?"]

[Text] A great deal has been said about this recently—with, of course, different degrees of information about and understanding of what is happening in the republic. In the present situation the most sensible thing to do is listen to the opinion of those who are directly influencing the political situation and the political struggle. The SOYUZ editorial offices asked this "direct question" of six representatives of the various public organizations. **Mikk Titma, secretary Estonian Communist Party Central Committee:**

There is probably no unambiguous answer to this. Undoubtedly the people of any numerically small nation whose self-awareness has been shaped through their own statehood react painfully to its loss. The decades pass but it is as if, whatever the fate of the people, the memory of their statehood is carefully preserved as an end in itself, as an image of the future. This is quite natural for a numerically small nation whose existence has always been threatened.

But there it is, remain in the union or try to cope with the misfortunes that have befallen our society, or build the future themselves, alone? The answer to this question depends largely on whether the union will guarantee for Estonians as a nation their independence, without which an assured, prosperous future for Estonia is impossible. Let us be honest: 50 years ago there was virtually no hope of this as part of the Union. The experience of those 50 years is unfortunate: The proportion of Estonians living in their own motherland fell from 93 percent to 61 percent. And a numerically small people that does not have a majority living in the motherland is inevitably threatened with the prospect of sinking into oblivion forever; there are many examples of this in history. Consequently, for Estonia to remain in the union it must provide the guarantees for Estonia's future that a nation deserves.

But let us turn once again to the past and admit that independence for the Estonians has almost always been relative. This is the historical reality. Fate set us on the shores of the Baltic Sea, which throughout time has been strategically important, and the land of the Estonians has many times been conquered by stronger peoples. And so today the Estonians, whose thinking is sober, nobody will deny that, understand that their independence is possible only on condition that their strong neighbors—and today these are undoubtedly the Russian people—are able to develop as a democratic state. The Estonians see in the democratic movements gathering strength in Russia a guarantee for their own future as a nation, a guarantee of their own independence. Our goal is to create a democratic union in which self-determination for nations will be really guaranteed, and therefore the problem—whether or not to be in that union—will disappear.

I am convinced that no responsible circles in Estonia approve or support the idea of secession from the union as a political act, an act of desperation. The problem lies elsewhere: What status will the republic have during the transition from its present condition to its future condition? This should be the status of a truly sovereign republic, within the framework of the union, that has not only purely political sovereignty but also legal, economic, and social sovereignty. We and the other republics should achieve this step by step.

If the union guarantees the republic future preference in the economic and political sense, the Estonians will prefer to remain in the union. They will abandon the intention to secede by breaking the links with it, for undoubtedly the consequences of this will be enormous political, economic, and social losses.

And so if thanks to perestroyka Russia becomes truly democratic then Estonia will gradually develop along with it, in alliance with the other republics. If this does not happen, an attempt will undoubtedly be made to separate from the union. And even possible losses will be unable to prevent this. No matter how enormous they may seem. **Rein Veydemann, chairman of the People's Front Representative Council:**

Before 17 June 1940, when Soviet troops violated the treaty and crossed the border into Estonia, an independent Estonian state existed. It was a member of the League of Nations and took part on an independent basis in the Olympic Games. In short, the Estonian Republic was a legal entity under international law. After violating the election law and disdaining the will of the people, in the presence of Soviet troops and with the direct intervention of the Soviet embassy, on 22 July 1940, under the open dictatorship of A. Zhdanov, an illegal Estonian State Duma requested that Estonia be accepted as part of the Soviet Union. On 12 November 1989 the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet proclaimed this act legally null and void. If the USSR Supreme Soviet or the USSR Congress of People's Deputies will unconditionally condemn the secret protocols to the treaty concluded on 23 August 1939 between the Soviet Union and Germany this will be a major step forward in restoring historical justice. For the inclusion of Estonia as part of the Soviet Union, just like the neighboring states of Latvia and Lithuania, was the grossest violation of the right of nations to self-determination, and of international law.

Thus, the essence of the matter is the restoration of sovereign Estonian statehood. Can this statehood be restored to an Estonia that is part of the Soviet Union? This depends on the Soviet Union, and particularly on Moscow. Until recently the affiliation of Estonia, and of the entire Baltic area, to the Soviet Union had been achieved by coarse pressure. It might be said that psychological warfare is being waged against us. Estonian initiatives and the latest decisions reached by our highest organs of power and stemming from the status of a sovereign republic as part of the union are being protested. It goes without saying that in this kind of atmosphere it is difficult to restore Estonia's independence in a way that suits both parties.

One thing can be said definitely. If we have an opportunity freely and without outside interference to decide the fate of our own state ourselves, the Baltic question will have been resolved in a way that does not infringe upon the strategic interests of the Soviet Union but could be accomplished by giving the Baltic states the right of self-determination. We simply need to sit down at the negotiating table as equal partners.

(On 24 December 1989 the USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted the resolution "A Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 1939."—SOYUZ) **Sergey Petinov, deputy chairman of the United Council of Labor Collectives:**

Even quite recently the Party of National Independence was counseling in favor of Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union. Now this idea is determining the activity of many public organizations in the republic.

The danger in this kind of thinking is obvious. The seeds of separatism are being planted in fertile soil. A new stage has obviously started in the realization of what previously was only thought about. It is linked directly to the decision by the republic Supreme Soviet session with respect to an historical and legal assessment of the events of 1939 and 1940. The resolution concludes that the annexation and occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union and the decision by the State Duma on 22 July 1940 whereby Estonia became part of the Soviet Union are legally null and void. That is, Estonia is an occupied country. And hence the calls for the "occupying" troops to leave its territory and for the start of talks with the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding, Estonia's secession from the USSR is, I think, very problematical. Four circumstances hamper this. And each factor could be decisive. For a start, relations with the center and with the other union republics, and with the world community must be clarified, and also relations within the republic itself. Attempts to ignore even one of these factors could lead to economic and political consequences that are serious for Estonia. One can scarcely find a positive comment from other states for an initiative to re-draw the map of the world yet again, or to a demonstrated violation of the Vienna Convention that established the inviolability of state borders.

We can hardly expect a favorable reaction to secession from the center, nor from the other union republics. This will signify the start of the breakup of the USSR as a single state, and given the present level of internal state integration, it will lead to negative and painful processes.

The internal factor is of exceptional importance. Today it is even extremely doubtful that the polls conducted by the "Maynor" KTV [Public Opinion Research Center] (there simply are no other figures) will show that among the non-Estonian population, which makes up about 40 percent, only 1 in 10 is morally prepared to live outside the USSR. It is more likely that the other 90 percent of non-Estonians living in compact enclaves would decisively oppose secession from the USSR. And if nevertheless this happens, the Estonian Government will have to assume the burden—one that is beyond its strength—of settling hundreds of thousands of refugees, which will set the republic back many decades on the economic plane. And if we take into account the fact that the Russian-speaking population makes up the backbone of industry, construction, and transport, then it is not difficult to guess the consequences.

I am therefore convinced that the idea of secession from the USSR is today not only unrealistic but is being deliberately used by the local leadership as a means of political blackmail in order to obtain additional advantages and privileges. **Eve Pyarnaste, member of the board of the Estonian National Independent Party, secretary of the General Committee of Estonian Citizens:**

The question of restoring state independence to Estonia, like other states annexed by the Stalinist empire, is becoming increasing urgent. The entire world is watching Estonia's peaceful aspirations for freedom, and they cannot be concealed. And the world knows that Estonia has a perfect right to freedom, for most democratic countries (including the United States) have never recognized as legal the annexation of the Baltic states.

The USSR now has a great opportunity to show itself and the world that its attempts at perestroyka are serious: No new treaties are needed for this. The 1920 peace treaty concluded in 1920 between the Estonian Republic and Soviet Russia is still in force, no one has annulled it; all that is necessary is to observe it.

For whom will this be useful? For both parties: Estonia will again become a neutral and peaceful neighbor of Russia and will be able to determine its own fate in accordance with its own wishes and possibilities. Moscow will be able to concentrate its attention on solving its own problems in order to save Russia from catastrophe. And the world will breathe easier. A step toward peace! And it will probably agree more willingly to give Russia economic aid.

With respect to the Russians and people of other nationalities who decide not to return to their motherland but to remain in the restored Estonian Republic, they can be assured that the Estonian people have not had, do not have, and will not have any inclination toward national enmity or the oppression of others. We shall never, for any reason, willingly set ourselves against other nationalities and thus bring shame upon ourselves. We and our homeland need freedom and peace. We also wish this for other peoples. **Vladimir Malkovskiy, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Narva Gorkom:**

I think that a launching pad for this is being laid in the republic. And those involved include not only the party for national independence, the citizens committees of Estonia, and the democratic movement-88, but also the mass organizations like the People's Front. In its election platform it announced the creation of Balto-Scandinavia and the restoration of Estonian statehood. The entire propaganda machine—press, radio and television—serves the idea of secession from the USSR. Day after day the thought is propounded that if Estonia were independent it would develop to the same extent that Finland has. National sentiments are being fanned and the image of the immigrant enemy is being thrust forward.

A solid creative and scientific potential is "working" for the idea of the republic's secession. And not only within the boundaries of the union. For example, the American professor Rein Taagepera, who is Estonian by nationality, is actively involved in working out the strategy and tactics for political movements. And they have been quite successful. According to published sociological studies, 64 percent of the indigenous population favors the republic's secession from the Soviet Union. The

more complicated the situation becomes, the more rapidly the ideas of separatism are being spread. And the situation in the republic is being artificially complicated just by the publication of various draft laws that infringe on the rights of the nonindigenous population. And laws that are manifestly at variance with the country's constitution are being deliberately passed.

Given today's political, economic, and demographic situation, a program of secession is an impasse program. And I am sure that the leaders of the Estonian movements understand this. But they continue to play on national sentiments. The morality of this game is another matter.

Something else must also be said. The population of the major industrial region—the northeast of Estonia—is categorically against leaving the Soviet Union and against being turned into second-class citizens. They will defend the integrity of the USSR and their own equality of rights... **Igor Konovalov, member of the Intermovement Coordinating Council and engineer at the Baltic Ship Repair Yard:**

Today almost no one can respond to this question unambiguously, including me. I do not know. Let me say candidly that I would not want this. But there are many who support the idea of the republic's secession from the union. The party for the national independence of Estonia has not hidden its goals ever since the first days of its existence. At a recent press conference at the Union of Journalists the members of another public organization—the general committee of citizens of Estonia—again confirmed that their basic opinion on the nature of today's relations between Estonia and the USSR has not changed, and that as before they regard as inevitable a return to the Estonian Republic in the form which existed before 17 June 1940, and only after that, in their opinion, will it be possible to discuss how Estonia will move further ahead—as a state with a socialist social order or a capitalist social order.

Both the People's Front leadership and the leaders of the Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia emphasize the idea of secession. Well, that is their right. And in and of itself a desire to leave the USSR is not something seditious. But the supporters of secession often lack perspicacity in their actions, and the ability to consider the conditions of reality.

...An independent state cannot exist without its own army, but the creation of such an army requires considerable funding from the treasury, which is already poor: Will the Estonian people agree to this? I do not think so...

...And do they who counsel in favor of secession remember that everyone has the right to self-determination, including the 600,000 Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia?

We suggest that if we come to it, the formation of an independent Estonian state must, according to the rules of a civilized society, be preceded by a referendum and by talks not only between the public organizations, the party, and the movements of the indigenous population but also with the organizations and movements representing the interests of the Russian-speaking population. Today this rule is often being ignored. The fate of Estonia and of its people are being decided without us, no account is being taken of us; what I have in mind is the political bloc that expresses the interests of most of the Russian-speaking population in the republic—the Union of Labor Collectives of Estonia, Intermovement, the strike committee, the alliance of war veterans. Moreover, virtually all the actions of Intermovement are being covered in the republic press and on television in a manner totally lacking in objectivity. Our mistakes are exaggerated out of proportion, even though everyone makes them.

The USSR Supreme Soviet recently passed the Law on Economic Independence for the Baltic Republics. The road has been opened to the desired independence and real sovereignty for Estonia. And logically the first thing to do is test this model—outline specific ways to implement the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] (in Estonian the word IME means miracle) and then implement it. And if this "miracle" fails to take place then raise the question of secession from the union. But here it should be remembered that to implement IME in the situation that has taken shape here now will be difficult. For the main work force at our plants and in transport and the construction organizations are non-Estonians, and today they are worried and alarmed about the future, and they distrust the republic leadership and the People's Front. Is it possible to work calmly in such conditions?

And finally, Estonia's secession from the union will become a colossal psychological burden on all Soviet people. In terms of their future. In terms of perestroyka.

As a representative of Intermovement I believe that the national interests of the Estonian people would be better answered not by a total break with the union but by having an economically independent and sovereign Estonia as part of a renewed Soviet federation.

From the editor: We are publishing these responses unedited, as we promised the people we interviewed. Of course, what has been said is very debatable, and sometimes simply unacceptable. Nevertheless we do believe that at this turning point of history we should be aware of and soberly evaluate all viewpoints no matter how contradictory they may be, for nothing is more dangerous that political illusions.

Further Reportage on Latvian Paper Shortage

PRAVDA Also Affected

PM2401212590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unsigned message under "Urgent Signal" rubric: "To Readers of PRAVDA"]

[Text] Yesterday in the article "Rationed Newspapers?" we described the difficulties arising with the publication of party publications in Latvia. Now this has also affected PRAVDA. The reason for this is the acute shortage of paper and the lack of a solution to questions that have arisen.

As of this year 8-page editions of PRAVDA have begun to be published on a daily basis. We are endeavoring to make the newspaper more diverse, interesting, and accessible to a very broad circle of readers. The first comments indicate that PRAVDA's journalists are on the right track, although the journalists' creative schemes and ideas are only just beginning to be realized. However, within the next few days, if the situation does not change, we will be forced to reduce the size of the newspaper. This means that many of our plans—things that we promised to implement at the beginning of the year—will be extremely difficult, if they are possible at all. It is primarily the reader who will suffer as a result of this.

In the first 20 days in January a number of paper combines, above all the Balakhninskiy pulp and paper combine, have failed to supply the CPSU Central Committee's "Pravda" Publishing House with 1,550 tonnes of newsprint. In turn the combines failed to receive the requisite quantities of pulp, starch, and timber. Moreover a considerable amount of paper is being sold to foreign firms and informal publications at contract prices. To all appearances, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry is not sufficiently in control of the state of affairs in the sector and is not adopting timely measures.

This appeal to the readers does not aim to unravel the whole host of reasons for and contradictions within the prevailing situation. But the situation is such that stocks of individual sizes of paper at the "Pravda" Publishing House print centers for the publication of central newspapers range between 2 and 5 days, notwithstanding a 29-day norm. A most alarming situation has taken shape in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Lvov, Kharkov, Kuybyshev, Volgograd, Kherson, Odessa, Irkutsk, and a number of other cities.

At the current crucial stage of perestroyka, when a quest is under way for the most correct means of ensuring the country's further economic and political development, social and interethnic problems have worsened, and when socialism—rejecting outmoded dogmas—is reverting to its true essence and acquiring a practical new quality, the weakening of party press positions will inevitably have an effect on information availability and the peoples' spiritual life and will weaken readers' opportunities to exert an active influence on the resolution of topical tasks relating to the development of the party and society via their publications.

We ask communists, workers, and engineers at Ministry of Timber Industry enterprises to show understanding and ensure the regular publication of newspapers, including the party's central organ—PRAVDA.

Printing To Resume 25 Jan

LD2401132690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Sajudis Information Agency reports that newspapers were not published in Latvia on 23 January, the relay of the Mayak radio station was discontinued, and materials which were to be published by LATVIJAS JAUNATNE were read on the radio.

On the same day a meeting of press workers took place in the House of the Press in Riga. It became clear during the meeting that there was sufficient paper for the Latvian press for at least 3 more months and that the news about a cable from Moscow was false.

The printing of Latvian newspapers will be resumed on 25 January.

Pulp Plant Closure

PM2401162690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent I. Litvinova article: "Why Newspapers Did Not Come Out in Latvia or Influence of Politics on Economy and Vice Versa"]

[Text] Riga—As we have already reported, all the republican newspapers failed to appear in Latvia on 23 January. "Is this not pressure from Moscow?"—journalists asked the director of the publishing house where they are printed. "It is not pressure. The economy must be mutually beneficial; that rule has been broken." The republic Council of Ministers has assembled for an emergency session. A solution has yet to be found. In the few days remaining before the final shutdown of pulp cooking at the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant, the government is to continue talks with the Yurmala deputies who brought the "Sloka story" to a head on 18 January. What is this story?

The story can be divided neatly into two stages. The first can be related in literally a few words. For 2 years in succession, the inhabitants of Latvia were told that Sloka is the enemy of Yurmala, and the pulp and paper plant there is the main poisoner of the Gulf of Riga and the River Liyelupe. Pickets, demonstrations, television programs, press articles—there is no end to it all. The ecological aspect also had an undisguised political flavor: The activity of the "poisoners" was presented as further evidence of the diktat of all-union departments. Objections—to the effect that documents exist from which it is clear that the "hand of Moscow" did not impose the expansion of production at Sloka, that it was a local initiative—were swept aside. The republic did not hear a serious debate, still less serious calculations. All the time the chant was hammered home—by the informals, television, the press—"Down with the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant!"

"But what will happen if we 'shut' Sloka?"—a television program only recently tried to find out from scientists and economic managers, including those responsible for Latvia's economic ties with other republics. One of the participants in the discussion pointed to an impressive pile of papers:

"We sent our consumers—there are dozens of them—telegrams: Do not expect our products from 1 January. We received replies—more or less identical. From Belorussia, for instance, they write: In that case we will not supply you with wallpaper, cars, television sets, and other goods...."

"Economic blackmail"—that was the television commentator's diagnosis. But could it be the difficult path to the market, which we have striven for and which, as everyone realizes, will not be easy? Why should Belorussia, which has also gone over to self-financing, manage its affairs at a loss? No central authorities can now make it replace economic relations—in a barter economy which is admittedly only primitive as yet—with deliveries by command. The pile of responses was, let me remind you, impressive.

In the first week of this year, they suddenly started trying to change the opinion that had been foisted on the public over the last 2 years. Why? The cries of "down with!" were being fulfilled. The republic Supreme Soviet was consistent. At its session on 29 July last year it adopted a resolution saying, in particular: "Pulp production at the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant is to stop by 1 January 1990." At the 28 December session it was necessary to come back to this decision. Oleg Grigoryevich Misurkin, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, asked for the floor:

"We reaffirm our position: Pulp production at the Sloka plant should in principle be stopped."

But... The "but" was long and eloquent. The Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee [Gosplan] failed to find any pulp for Sloka. They went to Kaliningrad, Bratsk, Ust-Ilimsk, Arkhangelsk, Karelia—in vain. They offered food and consumer goods in exchange—no result. No surplus pulp was to be found in the country. But there is no shortage of ecological problems—in Arkhangelsk Oblast, in Siberia, in Kaliningrad Oblast. They turned to the Scandinavians: We will give you spruce timber, you give us pulp. But Swedish businessman demanded, for equivalent exchange, 960,000 cubic meters of—I cannot avoid using a jargon term here—derooted pulpwood. That is to say, for 1 tonne of pulp, 18 cubic meters of pulpwood (although only 5 cubic meters of it would be used). These barter terms were beyond the republic's powers: The "Latviyas Mezhs" ("Latvian Timber") Association produces only one-fourth of that quantity of lumber of the required type in a year....

The deputy Council of Ministers chairman also told the deputies about the quest for options for reassigning the Sloka plant. To ensure that the expert report was authoritative, they called in specialists from the Finnish firm "Jaakko Peuryu" [as transliterated]. Realizing that the problems of purifying effluent at the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant are due to contradictions between two sectors of the economy—tourism and the timber industry—consultants from the well-known firm stated, in the course of carrying out their work, that they seek to maintain strict neutrality. They submitted a program and guaranteed that, given its fulfillment, "the plant will meet the strictest ecological requirements stipulated for similar plants in the Scandinavian countries, while the output offered would be regarded as 'clean' by the entire world 'Green' movement. There will be no discharges of foul-smelling gases into the atmosphere."

The Council of Ministers asked for 4 years to convert the plant. But it promised in return that from 1995 it will be possible to allocate 1.5-2 million foreign currency rubles to Yurmala. Nor did it conceal the considerable expenditure on converting the plant to an ecologically clean enterprise—15-16 million foreign currency rubles, which will have to be borrowed and then paid back in finished output.

This was probably the first time the republic had been given such full, serious information on Sloka. They not only promised "mountains of gold" in 4 years' time (how many of these have subsequently turned out to be false!), but also specified what Sloka will produce, and in what quantities, during that time and outlined the Finnish firm's recommendations on bringing the ecological situation up to standard.

It was all in vain. The deputies did not believe them.

I. Emsis, first deputy chairman of the republic's State Committee for Nature Conservation, pointed out that the decision on the conflict between the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant and resort status was recently supported by three republics, three all-union ecological expert reports and a scientific commission, and the Yurmala Soviet of People's Deputies. The conclusion—that the decision adopted at the July session on stopping pulp cooking at Sloka from 1 January should remain in force. P. Tsimdinsh, deputy director of the Institute of Biology, said that the Sloka plant has no prospect of development in Yurmala and sooner or later will have to be closed. But the scientist noted that the creation of an independent paper and pulp production unit in the repbulic is also inevitable. Here considerable economic difficulties lie ahead—after all, an ecologically clean production unit requires substantial resources. On the basis of international standards, this expenditure is estimated at $9 million a year.

A. Ulme joined in the debate on behalf of the "Greens." It must be said that the "Greens'" social council includes representatives of both fronts—the People's Front and the International Front [Interfront]. At the moment such cooperation is a rare exception in the republic. But, Ulme said, there are no disagreements on Sloka: Close it!

He described the question as not only ecological or economic, but political, too. He explained:

"It is a question of whether power is to be in the hands of the people or the departments. As yet, real power still belongs to the departments, in whose hands are the means of production, money, and so forth. War has been declared on them, in effect, for the first time, rather late in the day. If the Supreme Soviet, as the last instance to which the public can appeal for help, loses that war, it will be discredited. Then the public will have no other recourse than to form their own 'Green' Supreme Soviet, their own 'Green' tribunal, and their own 'Green' prisons...."

Daynis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front, speaking at the session, also linked the ecology with politics:

"The situation is really serious: Comrade Gusev and Comrade Ryzhkov threaten that they will not give us a kilogram of pulp. In that case the question arises: Are we a sovereign republic or not? Incidentally, we could also demand that for every square meter that Ministers Comrade Ryzhkov and Comrade Gusev use at Yurmala's resorts, they allocate us a certain quantity of pulp."

I obtained a newspaper with the transcript of the speech by V. Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the July session in Riga. It contains neither threats nor promises to resolve the Yurmala problem at someone else's expense. There are words—which are now very topical—about how the problems in Sloka should not be divided into central and republican problems. By way of confirmation, let me cite extracts from a document that arrived at the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet on 10 January from L. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers: "The Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant, apart from processing its own pulp, also receives 21,000 tonnes of this raw material from union stocks and produces 90,000 tonnes of paper. The enterprise is the country's only supplier of very scarce types of paper product, including punch card paper for computers, packaging for icecream cones, cover paper for journals and books, and cigarette packs, with a total volume of 57,000 tonnes a year.

"In the event of the closure of this production unit this year the USSR Council of Ministers sees no possibility of resovling the problem of supplying the national economy with these types of paper, in view of a pulp shortage amounting to some 500,000 tonnes. This will entail the cessation of production at a number of enterprises in the country, with the loss of a total volume of production of more than R1 billion a year, as well as the need to restrict consumption of paper products in Latvia to 35-40 percent (actual consumption 115,000-120,000 tonnes a year)."

That was what drastically changed the tone of items in the local press about Sloka. Even the most radically minded journalists from the youth paper LATVIYAS YEDIATIYE [as transliterated] were no longer saying "Sloka is evil—period," but were only asking the industry minister, as a last hope:

"Could it perhaps be a perfidious trick after all, and we have swallowed it? Should we try not complying with the center's demands? Say, for instance, that we stop supplying 'big brother' with meat, and let us see what song he will sing then...."

But by then it had already been said publicly that the ban decision in Sloka, disrupting the new economic relations that are developing with difficulty, is giving rise to reciprocal refusals not on the part of the illusory center (which is no more than a bugaboo for children), but on the part of real, tangible partners, who are refusing to supply the republic with rolled metal, construction materials, chemical products. Neighboring Lithuania, by way of reciprocal action, has already refused to supply packaging cardboard; Moldavia—consumer goods, and the Ukraine—metallurgical output. Doctor of Technical Sciences U. Viyestur and Candidate of Technical Sciences A. Treymanis wrote:

"If the pulp and paper plant becomes a kind of 'kamikaze' of perestroyka in the ecological consciousness of the inhabitants of Latvia, at the same time damage that will be hard to rectify will be inflicted on a priority area of devleopment of the republic's economy."

After emotion—"they will not give us a single kilogram of pulp"—came calculations. On 11 January, as the session continued its work, deputies were issued with a printed memorandum from the republic Council of Ministers, and A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, could not help wondering aloud: Where were you before?

The memorandum is long, seven pages, so let me cite just a few excerpts:

"We import more than 21,000 tonnes of letterpress and offset paper, paper for intaglio printing, and newsprint, more than 5,400 tonnes of typewriter and chalk-overlay paper, and approximately 80 other types of nonprinting paper and packaging paper, and we export to other republics other types of letterpress paper (3,000 tonnes), punch card paper, paper for book and journal covers and wallpaper (backing), and other types of paper. For every inhabitant we consume approximately 43 kg of white paper products, which corresponds to the average level of consumption of this product in the world (including Africa) and is slightly higher than the consumption level for the Union."

"...The Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant is the only one in the country producing punch card paper, and in 1989 it supplied it to more than 100 consumers in all 15 republics, including the Yurmala 'Tekhnoinform' Factory, which in turn has 15,000 consumers."

"...The production of paper for the manufacture of disposable tableware (cups, plates, and so forth) is stopping, as is the production of nutrient yeast (1,500 tonnes) and its delivery for the needs of the republic's agro-industrial complex."

"...All consumers of the said output have in the last month asked and demanded that ties going back many years not be broken, since similar products are not produced anywhere else in the country."

"...Attaching special significance to the demand for this type of paper for computer centers and the food industry in our country, on the basis of the information available, the USSR Gosplan has prepared calculations and proposals and submitted them to the government, in order this year to stop entirely deliveries to the republic of all types of printing paper (newsprint, letterpress, offset), using it for exports so as to be able, out of the currency obtained, to import the types of paper whose production is ceasing at the Sloka Pulp and Paper Plant."

"...As a result a situation is arising whereby there will be no paper for packaging more than 60,000 tonnes of industrial output. In this connection the hygienic condition of food products in the trade sector will deteriorate sharply."

"...On the basis of information from the Latvian Republican Association of Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade and also the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House, cutting the range of this paper will paralyze the printing of newspapers, journals, and goods and it will be necessary to find different jobs for more than 6,000 printing workers (from 8 January, because of the lack of paper and technical and economic difficulties, the Latvian SSR Ministry of Communications has decided to close subscriptions to Latvian publications—both in the republic and elsewhere)."

It is time to sum up. The situation is so dramatic and so fully exposed that one can surely begin to make a choice: Did they act "correctly" or "incorrectly" in closing Sloka? The interconnection between republics, between the territory and the center, which some emotional politicians are still shrugging aside, has revealed itself so clearly and with such solid arguments that you feel as if you could reach out and touch it. In the conditions of economic autonomy, for the first time people have become aware of the very serious responsibility for a decision adopted. It was different before, when, for instance, seeking an end to the construction of the Daugavpils Hydroelectric Power Station (and I think they were right to want that), they quoted computations on electricity savings. The argument was that we could save electricity comparable to the capacity of Daugavpils. The power station was closed, the savings remained on paper, and as before, Latvia obtains exactly half its electricity from outside.

Another lesson of Sloka has also become obvious. The solid arguments and calculations appeared at the very end of the marathon. A choice has been made, but how conscious was it?

Baklanov Addresses Latvian Party Plenum

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[Speech by Oleg Dmitriyevich Baklanov, secretary of CPSU Central Committee, at Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum in Riga—live]

[Text] Esteemed dear comrades! I always have very profund feelings when I am in your republic. [words indistinct] we had connections with your enterprises, in particular [words indistinct]. I have to say that we always met with help and support, and we sensed the intellectual prowess that exists in your republic.

I remember the time, (?some 20 years) ago, when we arrived and lokked to see how we had to carry out the reconstruction of [word indistinct] production at [word indistinct]. We arrived here in a team of comrades and (?passed on) our experience of how to organize public catering at [word indistinct] VEF works. [word indistinct] when creating the (?power) systems [word indistinct] received very much help and support from (?your) enterprises, from (?your) design engineers, and by this I would like to stress the profound ties that have become established between many organizations and enterprises, between scientists and artists in our country.

In this connection I would not like to quote any figures, to present some book-keeping figures concerning who has paid what or who is indebted to whom, who has done more or who has done less. I would like to say that your republic possesses colossal intellectual ability, colossal experience of work, and this is very pleasant, that is beyond dispute.

I [words indistinct] note which I [word indistinct] and read: Why did you arrive so late in Latvia? Could you really not come for 3 of 4 days, visit the party organizations, hear what the economists think locally? Then you would have the right to express your opinion. Well, I really do feel quilty to a certain extent, in that I was unable to get here, and then have been given the floor. But I have to say that what I have heard here will be of great benefit to me, and of course I will try to use what I have heard for the benefit of our common cause.

As for the reasons why I could not get here, yesterday I was at the Politburo. The Politburo, as it happens, discussed the draft platform about which you have rightly said here that perhaps all the comrades were not involved in it, and evidently to some extent it has to be admitted that the criticism is justified. But all the same, there are also other principles that we have to adhere to. If there is a discussion, some options have to be given. What we have now is a situation where [words indistinct] these options, and yesterday the discussion lasted [words

indistinct] and it was recognized as necessary to request and instruct the party general secretary, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, to do some additional work on the proposals that were expressed by members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee, and other comrades who were present.

I think that this was useful work, and in connection with the fact that the material is very interesting, and that the leadership was distracted by other matters, including the grave events taking place at present in Armenia and Azerbaijan, a certain shortage of time has been created, and so the decision was adopted to postpone the beginning of the plenum by a week. And so, the [word indistinct] has now been determined, and this work will unfailingly be done together with you.

I apologize if, perhaps, I (?exceed my time by) 5 minutes. Will you permit that? I shall try to be brief. I shall speak in a fragmentary way. You will understand, as I understand it, that we have established, so to speak, a certain contact. At any rate, I have, and I [words indistinct]. What I have heard today convinces me of your wisdom, and despite the broad spectrum of opinions of 180 degrees, I will say that I put this down both to the abruptness that has been permitted, and, perhaps, more to the culture of discussion, and that is why I [words indistinct] differences in standpoints. But I think that in any case, everyone that spoke had a lot in common. I think that this is also the basis upon which we can build, live, and work.

I have to say that...[changes thought] have to appeal to you for restraint. Just recently, as I have told you, the plenum examined the platform. It will be examined at the plenum. It was the Politburo that discussed it, and it will be exaimined at the plenum; very little time is left. You know that at the conference of workers, collective farmers, and engineering-technical workers Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed the idea, and now we can sense that this could be heard here, that we have to speed up the course of events as far as the adoption of decisions on democratization in the party and democratization in society is concerned, and that is being done now. And so, evidently the plenum will also discuss the matter of bringing nearer the date for holding the congress.

You remember, I will not repeat myself, that we had this down for the beginning of 1991, then we adopted the decision on the fourth quarter of this year, and now the question is being put of bringing it even further forward. In this connection I consider that you too have the opportunity, taking advantage of our, shall I say, [word indistinct] today, to become more actively involved. I think the ideas that have been expressed here about the need to prepare proposals more actively, discuss them, and search for approaches on the basis of this have been quite correct. That is, everything can be brought nearer—both your congress, and the resolution of issues which (?are developing) here among you; this has been spoken of here, that certain, let us say, cadre reshuffles could be made.

The way I understand it, life goes on. It demands the resolution of issues that have been raised, but I would not consider it correct, as certain people have said here—true, perhaps this has not been said aloud, but it was [words indistinct]—that the composition of the bureau should be immediately changed, and that some committee should be organized. [words indistinct] extremely rash decisions, although [words indistinct] you can feel better than I can; I am not forcing anything on you, it is up to you to decide in the final analysis. But proceeding from these assumptions, I consider that there is an opportunity to think about these questions, to weigh things up, and, so to speak, to decide with better grounding. All the more since I have to say that the platform which will be (?reported on) at the plenum and which will be discussed will obviously clear up a lot of questions. This does not mean that we have some modern-day saint feeding the hungry with a single loaf, but at any rate many questions which have been mentioned here—you understand my position —cannot of course say more than the general secretary said while among your kind neighbors, and so I am simply saying to you—and you have to trust me, and I ask you to take me at my word—that many questions are resolved in themselves. This is also an argument to the effect that there is no need to act in the heat of the moment, if you will excuse the expression.

It would be presumptuous of me to try to force my own opinion on you. I can only ask you to reflect and make a calm choice. I can only ask you to make the work, joint work; the joint work we have done today, and the joint work that we will have to do in future. If you want to know my standpoint so as to avoid any diplomatic equivocations, I can speak my point of view—I stress it is my own point of view—and I will so to speak defend it by peaceful means of course, constitutional methods, and without weapons. The party: From my point of view, the party should be independent, from your standpoint, but within the framework of the CPSU. From the point of view of the CPSU: I consider that there should be a unified party in the Soviet Union, with a broad framework of independence for every republic in order to (?foliow) all the nuances of national coloring, and so on and so forth. That is my position.

There are people who agree and people who disagree, I can understand that. The question of statehood: Personally, I consider that the new federation, with new content, and the position that was expressed by the general secretary—I fully concur with that. The question of property: The question really is very complex and very important; several comrades have raised it here. I think that here we need to work jointly, as on the preceding questions, and look for the form of things. But I would like all the same to state some limited provisions. Until the time when states were formed—or perhaps one could take an example from the times of our state, and recall

Peter I—even then there were state enterprises. This concerned in particular industries which cannot be constructed in any other way; you know such industries—in heavy industry and in other contexts, the defense industry, and so on.

But there is a broad spectrum, right up to individual working property, or from another direction, what some people call private property. Here (?one aspect is reflected): With individual working property it is to be borne in mind that there should be no exploitation. Then there is page two, let us say, of private property; that is, any property in my view should exist without the alienation of the working people who work with this property. Again the same formula, again excluding exploitation. After all, it is exploitation that we fought against and that we have always objected to, that is a position of principle.

On the question of adherence to party principles: The latter already exists as a fact. What are we supposed to do now—fight against it with weapons in hand? No. You and we have made the decision that we must wage a good cause—the cause of perestroyka, the cause of new thinking, with clean hands, and so [words indistinct]. What we are talking about is that we must recognize this fact. [words indistinct] new conditions, as a member of the CPSU, one must naturally fight and defend the principles which our party stands for. I am in favor of a unified CPSU in this connection. [words indistinct] in our state. Opponents are emerging in our country. In this connection, in these conditions, I consider that we must take constitutional steps in order for our central authority to be more robust, both in the republics and the central authority in the center. I have in mind the Supreme Soviet route and the route through its Presidium. Criticism has been heard addressed to the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, and to the Politburo. I shall unfailingly pass on this criticism, and I think that it will be (?brought into) the activities of these bodies. I think that the criticism voiced here is largely justified, although one does feel a certain lack of information, a certain, so to speak, going over the top on certain issues. I can give answers to them.

The final question that I would like to dwell on: I consider that having the riches which your republic has, and having our common riches such as our friendship that has developed and strengthened in our joint work—one simply must not waste them; that is criminal. What is needed to this end is the unity of your republic. Its unity must (?be manifest) both in the party and in the republic. Unity in our country, the USSR, is needed to this end. Also needed is [words indistinct] ideological thinking, and perestroyka. A united CPSU must give perestroyka new content, and a federation must give perestroyka new content.

That is where I would like to finish—the position that I can express to you. Thank you very much, comrades, for your attention. It has been very useful and interesting for me to be among you. I think that our dialogue and our joint work will continue. I would like to report briefly to you about the plan of our work. We are planning to visit a few of your factories tomorrow, to visit your [word indistinct], that is always very interesting and useful. The day after tomorrow, (? Jan and I) plan to leave by air to make a start on the work that we spoke of, on [word indistinct] the platform and preparations for the plenum. [words indistinct]

There is one more question: There is another question concerning military construction engineers in Kuldigskiy rayon who are building new military installations without an ecological survey. I knew nothing [words indistinct] about these installations, but I have been [word indistinct] that such construction is indeed in progress, and that indeed no ecological survey was done. I promise I will [word indistinct] the question; I will [word indistinct] with this question, and will unfailingly give you an answer. I think that this will be a central provision.
Thank you very much.

Latvian Political Situation Detailed

90UN0613A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by V. Proskura, Riga: "Kind of Prey the 'Hawks' Are Hunting"]

[Text] There was this moment at the second congress of the People's Front in Latvia, which was held in Riga last autumn. In the House of Political Education, where the congress was being held, an envoy of the militant emigre organization "Daugava—Falcons" (the translator for some reason said "hawks") went to the rostrum and began to defend the rights of his colleagues. Incidentally, quite a few former volunteers from the Latvian legion of the SS found shelter in an overseas "falcon nest."

You see, there is a person on the staff of our delegation, said the speaker, who owned a shoe factory in Riga, and the Soviets nationalized it while he was there. He was confident, they say, that in the near future the former manufacturer will get his enterprise back. And, as soon as possible, "the justice that was violated by the communists must be restored."

Quite a few "falcons-hawks," according to their current registration, have flown in to this congress from over the sea and across the ocean, and all of them hurried, preached, and did not especially choose their words—it is time, they say, the time has come, fellow countrymen.

In fact, the duma of the People's Front in Latvia and its governing body did not delay. The new program of the front is permeated with the idea of "the development of Latvia outside the state of the USSR." The talk is still about the future, but here somehow they are hurrying unceremoniously. Briefly, it gradually became obvious: The national coloring of the movement is beginning to enter the second level. In fact, the reason why the front

was actually created was to be rolled out onto the stage—a striving for political power.

In the republic the second, special congress of the People's Front in Latvia was, perhaps, more awaited than the first. Especially agitated were the "industrial workers," to put it bluntly, non-Latvians, who basically speak the Russian language. Starting with the first congress, the People's Front in Latvia tagged them with the insulting label—"migrants." They began to proclaim from the rooftops about the migrant—the "social aggressor." For those who do not live in the republic and make judgments about everything on the basis of diverse and, as a rule, incomplete information from the central mass media, it is difficult at times to comprehend interethnic relations. Continuously criticizing the central press for disinformation, the leaders and publicists of the People's Front in Latvia get angry most often because they are accused of "nationalistic manifestations." And in my opinion, correctly, because the division of people according to nationality or language affiliation and not according to, say, practical considerations can hardly be justified. But, incidentally, not only metropolitan journalists erred.... We often at first perceived the activity of the People's Front as a peculiar reaction, although still insulting for the "migrants, to the gaps in the economy, ecology, and social life.

It seems that very many "populists," who joined the movement principally in an emotional wave of protest, which was skillfully charged by specialists from beyond the cordon, presented the situation rather simplistically. Because, they say, they all will begin to speak in one local language and they will start to sing their ancient hymn "God save Latvia" under the three-striped flag and everything will be resolved. Whoever does not like it can leave.

I am confident that quite a few of those who stood at the origins of the informal movement, who were even among its initiators, gave speeches that agitated the souls of fellow tribesmen, wrote scathing, cocky articles about their Baltic birches, which, of course, are different from those growing in the neighboring Pskov Oblast, and made judgments in about the same way. Sincerely made judgments....

The Second Congress of the People's Front in Latvia put a lot of things in place. Today they are talking and writing in the republic, as if to justify the fact that "the radicals took over" at the congress, at least in an ideological sense, particularly the activists of the "Movement for the National Independence of Latvia," who are entitled in the People's Front to the rights of "individual membership." Who came out ahead is a secondary matter, if not tertiary. The main thing is what they arrived at.

The leaders of the front felt their first missteps when they called on the population to boycott the celebration of Great October, especially in the capital of the republic. The misfire was obvious. On the embankment of the Daugava the many-thousand columns of communists and non-communists—literally all work collectives of Riga's factories and plants—marched shoulder to shoulder. Including, the rank and file members of the People's Front in Latvia and delegates of the "extraordinary" congress. This was a massive challenge to the high-handed leaders who became regular travelers abroad to meet with those who, in their words, are "examining the process of perestroyka in Latvia." The day before, one of these "examiners," V. Zalkaln, the vice-chairman of the foreign committee of the "Latvian social-democrats," in answer to a question about how to achieve Latvian independence, said straight out to the envoys of the "national-radicals" who came from Riga: "...We will do this ourselves, and, moreover, it will not occur without the spilling of blood." "Radio Free Europe" aired his words on a program addressed to the Soviet Baltics apparently as a warning.

Perhaps for a future "local examination?" Because not long after, E. Yansons, one of the "national-radicals," at a heavily-attended rally in the center of Riga transformed this statement of the emigre oracle thusly: "The rope of the gallows is still crying for members of the communist party."

...The next attempt to find an approach to the working class was the formation of the "non-party, international" Union of Workers of Latvia, on which the People's Front in Latvia did not and does not spare material or financial resources, according to a statement by its ideologist, chairman of the board I. Godmanis. However, this organization, which was also eyed by the recreated "Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party," in the final analysis had a little more than 1,000 members throughout the industrial republic. After a noisily advertised constituent Union of Workers in Latvia congress, in fact, nothing remained. And also in the so-called Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party there are barely more than 1,000 members, although it too made an announcement about its congress.

In the end, the most serious attempt to penetrate the worker environment politically, which was undertaken on the eve of the New Year, was the formation of the "initiative party groups" who were for the organization of "a communist party of a new type, independent of the CPSU." And this attempt, in fact, failed immediately. Moreover, in Riga and Daugavpils, the second industrial center of the republic in importance, it collapsed, as the saying goes, with a crash. At the meeting of the party activist group in Riga, in which representatives of public organizations participated, including the People's Front, 95 percent of all participants voted for a Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union and for a Communist Party of Latvia within the ranks of the CPSU. Almost 100 percent voted in Daugavpils against separatism and opportunistic "reforming" of the Communist Party. The political representatives of the worker collectives everywhere were unanimous, assessing the intrigues of the "initiative party groups," known for ties to the leadership of the People's Front in Latvia, as a

theoretical compact of political adventurers, or, as they are also called, "national-careerists." If you consider that the workers of many local mass media means, radio and television in particular, actually are mouthpieces of the leaders of the front, you can vouch for the truth of their desire.

Does this mean that the "shadow ministers" of the People's Front in Latvia finally gave themselves away? That their paths no longer coincide with those of the factories and plants? It seems that these questions are not even for political scientists and not for instantaneous sociological surveys. As long as our socio-economic existence limps along on two legs, the variegated phrase will also find a consumer, including on the "black market" as well.

From the moment the People's Front of Latvia was born its functionaries engaged in a peculiar plagiarism—they "copied" self-criticism from resolutions of the Communist Party of the republic and transformed it into criticism in their own resolutions, generously adding to it their own pathetic exposition, which can easily be found in the brochures of overseas sovietologists from the time of the "cold war."

The elections to local soviets that occurred at the close of last year only confirmed the socio-political line being formed in the republic, the distribution of social forces and their true essence. If today in Latvia, for example, they are talking at all levels about the "inevitability of dual authority," then this also is not from the sphere of historico-theoretical disputes and predictions. The "national coalition" and the People's Front, first of all, have acquired quite a few deputy seats, which will make it possible for the informals in a whole number of rayons to acquire real power. And no one has any doubts about the recent decisions of the duma of the People's Front in Latvia: The struggle at the helm of government will continue with increasing intensity, particularly in future elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The present "Program of Current Actions of the Communist Party of Latvia," which was adopted at the autumn plenum of the republic Central Committee, also talks about the possibility of a multi-party parliamentary system. The strategic mistakes, tactical omissions, and, mainly, the inflexibility and inertia displayed during the election campaign by some party committees, including the Central Committee itself, await their own analysis as early as at the upcoming plenum. The young organizational-party staff of the People's Front of Latvia proved to be more mobile and assertive, and worked, as they say here, according to world standards of pre-election battles. A whole series of scientific-practical conferences and seminars was held, with the participation of foreign political scientists.

And, distracted by internal discussions, and, I will add, group passions that were more than abundant and quite dragged out with self-criticism and mutually formed "interregional" heated arguments, the Communist Party of Latvia literally found itself captive to its own concerns. Other comrades still nourished the hereditary illusion: They say, it does not matter, because the simple people will understand us, and they will vote for candidates of the "indivisible bloc." Alas, "heredity" did not help.

Nonetheless, industrial Daugavpils, the workers of Zadvinye, the Leningradskiy Rayon of Riga, and other "proletarian districts" gave a majority to those who supported the communists. The attempt of the leadership of the People's Front of Latvia, directed at the working class of the republic, to arrange a political strike on the eve of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and thereby to demonstrate its influence on the international working people of Latvia, collapsed.

Latvian Constitutional Changes Discussed

90UN0637A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 3

[Report by V.O. Miller, chairman of Drafting Commission, at 14th Session, 11th Convocation of Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet held 27-28 December in Riga: "On Changes to Articles 6, 7, and 49 of Constitution (Basic Law) of Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] Comrade Deputies! Today, one of the urgent questions that is being discussed in various auditoriums—the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, meetings of work collectives, at party meetings, etc.—is whether it is necessary to retain in the USSR Constitution and in the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics the article on the leading and directing role of the CPSU, which declares the party to be the nucleus of all public and state organizations.

This question is also being discussed in our republic. Many letters and statements have come from various organizations of the republic to the Supreme Soviet of the LaSSR [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic] and its presidium. Comrade Gorbunov, our respected chairman of the Supreme Soviet, has already talked about this, and I will not repeat what he said.

Can the LaSSR Supreme Soviet not pay attention to all of these proposals, ignore them, and not review them?

I think that we cannot do this, and we must at least examine and discuss Articles 6, 7, and 49. This proposal was supported by a majority of the votes of the party group of the Supreme Soviet today as well.

Are there grounds for rejecting the constitutional consolidation of the leading role of the party? I think there are. First, there are not enough theoretical reasons to justify the need to consolidate the leading role of the party. This principle cannot be recognized as one of the principles of socialism. Yes, after the October Revolution, V.I. Lenin put forth and substantiated the concept concerning the

leading role of the Communist Party. Was there something illegal and incorrect in this? I think not, inasmuch as the Communist Party after the October Revolution became the ruling party, and, as the leader of the ruling party, V.I. Lenin developed the question of how the party should implement its own role, and what kind of a mechanism it should use. In one way or another, this is done by all party leaders who are the rulers in their countries. But during the life of V.I. Lenin, neither in the 1918 constitution of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], nor in the 1924 USSR Constitution, nor in any other legislative acts was there a consolidation of the leading role of the party. It is very likely that V.I. Lenin understood that the leading role of the party should not be consolidated legislatively. It was supposed to show its right to the leadership of society in practice and in deeds.

When did the constitutional norm about the party appear for the first time?

It appeared in 1936 in the USSR Constitution. This was Article 126 which stated that the CPSU constitutes the leading nucleus of all organizations of workers, both public and state. And although, as has now become known, among the authors of the 1936 USSR Constitution were Bukharin and Radek; nevertheless, there is no doubt at all that the position of the party as a leading nucleus was inserted through the direct participation of Stalin. This position strengthened his personal authority as the "leader" of the party. This enabled Stalin to reinforce his monopoly position in the party in the state, remove it from the zone of any critics, and it gave him the opportunity to consider any disagreement with the directives of the party, which were issued by the leader of the party, as anticonstitutional, as illegal, and to resort to the severest repression. Therefore, we may with full justification consider that the author of the constitution's stipulation of the leading role of the party was Stalin himself, who maliciously used this position to strengthen his personal, dictatorial authority for the gross deformation of the principles of socialism and to strengthen the administrative command system of control.

This situation received further development in the years of stagnation, especially in 1977, when the USSR Constitution was being reworked and adopted. Among the authors of the wording of Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution was not only Brezhnev, but also Chernenko, his closest companion, on whose recommendation the wording about the consolidation of the leading role of the party was reinforced and moved from the end of the Constitution to its beginning. Exactly like this was the Stalinist tradition used to reinforce the methods of administrative command leadership and the monopoly position of the party. Therefore, I think, if we want to put an end to the Stalin legacy and those of its theoretical positions that are not in agreement with the principles of socialism, we must review the wording of Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the LaSSR Constitution.

Second, the formation of a law-governed state is taking place in our country in which the party, public organizations, officials, and citizens must be rigorously subject to the law. The existing wording of Articles 6 and 7 place the party above all other organizations, which is incompatible with the very idea of a law-governed state. In a law-governed state, there should be no party that stands above all and instructs all. And from this standpoint Articles 6, 7, and 49 require new editing.

Third, it should be emphasized that there are no precedents in world practice where a constitution stipulates a leading role for any one party. As everyone knows well, the provisions on the leading role of the party were recently excluded from the constitutions of East European countries. Fourth, the overall situation in the country should be taken into account. There is no longer any doubt now that the wording of Articles 6 and 7, unquestionably, will not be repeated in the new constitution of the USSR. Therefore, the question of excluding the leading role of the party from the Constitution is a question of the times.

It should be realized that a different political situation has developed in various republics in various regions of the country. At the present time, this question is being raised especially persistently in the Baltic republics. The wording of Articles 6 and 7 has already been changed in Lithuania and Estonia. The Supreme Soviets of these republics excluded the provision on the leading role of the party from their constitutions.

Fifth, the Communist Party of Latvia in the Program of Actions adopted at the plenum of the Central Committee in August of this year stated its principal position on this question by stating that the constitutional wording on the leading role of the party should be rejected.

I quote: "The Communist Party of Latvia believes that the leading role of the party in society cannot be defined by the Constitution or by law, and that it must establish itself through practical work."

I suppose that these are far from all of the reasons that provide a justification for a review of the wording of Articles 6, 7, and 49.

And we must take this proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia into account.

The editorial commission which you, comrades, created, has completed its work. The commission has drawn up a new version of Articles 6, 7, and 49. You have received these recommendations. Meetings of the editorial commission are also examining this question—at the current session, to adopt the wording of Articles 6, 7, and 49 only in the first reading, and to adopt the final wording of these articles at the next session. This kind of a recommendation was also made by a group of deputies. You, comrade deputies, have to reach a decision on this question.

I want to inform you, comrade deputies, that the editorial commission discussed one other question—concerning the adoption of a special declaration in connection with changes in the Constitution. You have also received this declaration. And I ask that you express your position. After the meeting of the editorial commission we received a deputy proposal to change the wording of Article 49 and to draw it up as follows:

"Citizens of the Latvian SSR have the right to unite in a party and other public organizations that do not have as their objective the violent overthrow of the existing order."

And so forth in the text.

Thank you for your attention.

Top Official Views Latvian State Management

90UN0638A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 2

[Report by V.G. Bresis, chairman of Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers at 14th Session, 11th Convocation of Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet held 27-28 December in Riga: "On Changes in Latvian SSR System of State Management"]

[Text] Dear comrades! The 12th Session of the Supreme Soviet of our republic found it necessary to develop a new structure of management for our republic when it made a decision on the economic independence of the Latvian SSR. Republic working groups set up by the Council of Ministers of the republic and specialists from ministries and departments developed a proposal which is submitted to you for a discussion. These suggestions were previously considered and approved in the permanent commissions of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. Taking into account our tight work schedule, allow me to familiarize you briefly with the proposals of the Council of Ministers.

As is known, the general structure of management of the national economy which is currently in effect was adopted in June 1988. Pursuant to it, the number of ministries in the republic was reduced. Our transition to the new structure of the national economy made it possible to reduce the staff of the management apparatus. On the average, it was reduced by 28 percent at the time. However, this is merely a statistical analysis. We should note that the activities of the newly created ministries and departments did not improve qualitatively. Many of them, for example, the Committee for Industry, the Construction Committee, and others, have by inertia retained the management functions of the previous ministries and departments. Given the presence of the still dominant administrative methods of management in the republic and in our country, we will not be able to secure an improvement in the sphere of material production. To this day, industrial enterprises are managed through multi-stage management structures which strive to perform both state and economic functions. Therefore, the tendency to restrict the economic independence of enterprises continues. In other words, only a superficial change in the methods of administrative management occurred but the forms of their influence on the enterprises of the material production sphere did not change in principle.

The reorganization of ministries and departments now under development is aimed at creating a structure of state management which will be appropriate for an economic model intended to shape market relations and implement them in the economic life of the republic. As you know, goods-and-money relations, demand and supply, are the main points in market relations. Creating an arrangement able to respond flexibly to market trends calls for radical changes and shifts both in the organization of management and planning. It is necessary to get rid of the so-called "directive planning" and "managerial instructions."

The Law on the Economic Independence of the Latvian SSR adopted by the July session says that the organs of state power of the Latvian SSR direct the operation of the national economic complex mainly by using economic levers and proceeding from the Latvian SSR laws. It has been clearly set forth that the organs of state power provide equal opportunities to create various economic entities by using legislative acts. This will ensure the efficiency of the economic development of our republic and will place an obstacle in the path of monopolism. The state may interfere in the activities of enterprises only in cases envisaged by the laws of the Latvian SSR. The implementation of these legal requirements necessitates absolutely new approaches to solving economic problems. The focus of operations of ministries, state committees, and other management organs is shifting from administrative practices to the economic methods of management. The nature of activities of the management offices is also changing. Under the Law on the Economic Independence of the republic, their operations should be aimed mainly at providing legal support and economic norms. That is to say, a body of law is necessary and a mechanism for its implementation.

In the course of our further work, we should address the creation of a system of taxation, the establishment of individual tax rates, and the development of a state program to regulate various spheres of the economy. We should create a new price mechanism, a credit system, organize the sale of state orders to enterprises through competitive bidding, as well as resolve many other unknown issues which the organs of state management have not handled previously. In the process, we should keep in mind that directive planning will continue to exist for a period of time along with the economic methods because, as you know, new planning procedures for the 13th Five-Year Plan were not set forth at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. This is why structural units capable of using these directive methods of economic management should be retained at

least partially in the management structure. This is how managing the economy in the period of transition actually looks.

The reorganization of management is to be carried out in several stages. The first stage is outlined in the proposals submitted to you. At some point in the future, we will have to return to this issue and take the next step in reorganizing the organs of state management.

Taking the above into account, the government believes that the first stage of restructuring in management should be tied to three main issues.

A set of organizational issues is the first one. First of all, we need to resolve the issue of further procedures for the performance of official duties by deputy chairmen of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers. I believe that performing the duties of a deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers should not be combined with managing the economic sectors. Thus, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers should be relieved, except for one. I believe that the minister of the economy should be the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic.

Furthermore, it has been proposed that one additional deputy chairman for economic reform issues be appointed to the Council of Ministers. As you know, our neighbors have already taken this step, and this has brought about certain positive results in developing economic reforms and rallying progressive economists.

The second set of issues involves reorganizing economic management, so-called economic services and departments. The government of the republic proposes to eliminate the Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the State Committee for Prices, and the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and create on the basis of them a completely new management organ, the Latvian SSR Ministry of the Economy. The main task of this ministry is to ensure that the transition of management of the national economy in the republic to the conditions of a market economy is regulated, to ensure equal rights for all forms of property in social production, distribution, and redistribution of the gross social product taking into account mutual economic contacts and market trends in existence at a specific time. The task of the ministry is to work out levers for regulating the economy of the state which may ensure increments in the gross social product, stabilization of the development of the national economy, and a boost to the efficiency of production. The mechanism of economic regulation should facilitate the creation of ecologically pure production facilities. As has already been mentioned, the new price and tax policy should become the main instrument of this transformation.

The third set of issues covers separating the functions of state management and economic operations. This applies mainly to other ministries and state committees which are affected by the current reorganization. In the course of distributing these functions between the committees and the economic entities, and taking into account the points of view of managers of various branches, the government proposes:

1. To reorganize the State Construction Committee into the State Committee of the Latvian SSR for Construction and Architecture, the State Committee for Industry into the Ministry of Industry of the Latvian SSR whose jurisdiction should include all the industry of the republic rather than the light, local and woodworking industries as was the case previously.

We should note that, along with the formation of new organs of state management, substantial changes in all other ministries and departments are also envisaged because of expanding their functions or their sphere of operations. Thus, the Ministry of Transportation and Highway Management should assume new functions in shaping and developing transportation arrangements throughout the entire territory of the republic. A revision of the functions of the Ministry of Communal Economy, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies, and the State Fuel and Energy Committee is envisaged.

Comrades, I would like to dwell on one issue in particular—on arrangements for the development of agriculture. At the 7 December meeting with the commissions, we agreed to set up the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry of the Latvian SSR instead of the Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee]. However, USSR People's Deputy Chairman of the Union of Agrarians of Latvia Alberts Kauls approached me during the Second Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow. He said that during the work of the congress agricultural employees gathered once more and examined this arrangement yet again. Still, they did not come to a consensus. At the same time, as I have already stated in the commissions of deputies, we do nothing that runs counter to the wishes of the producers themselves. Considering that A. Kauls is not taking part in the in the work of the session, and that Chairman of the Gosagroprom and my Deputy V. Rymashevskiy, who is in Moscow on a business trip, is also absent I think that it would be more correct to reschedule the issue of the future of the Agroindustrial Committee for the second part of our session which is to consider those issues which we do not manage to discuss during these two days. This is where I could end my short report. However, I have received a letter from the leader of the Association of Industrialists of Latvia in which he asks me to read the letter and state my opinion. I will not read the entire text, but I will quote the main points.

"To the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Dear comrades! On 18 March 1990, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic will be held. We count on the creation of an authoritative supreme organ of power, as a result of the truly democratic elections, which will be

able to ensure the dismantling of the administrative-command system, to form a government which enjoys the confidence of the entire population of the republic, and to ensure an efficient revitalization of the national economy under economic sovereignty. In this regard, we believe that it is unfeasible and even unethical for the old composition of the deputy corps to carry out the reorganization of the government, appoint new people and make decisions on the foundations of the economic reform which will predetermine the actions of the new composition of the Supreme Soviet." Comrade Martinson goes on to make three suggestions:

The first suggestion is to instruct the government of the republic to organize additional work on the legislative acts with the participation of representatives of the labor collectives, the public, and so on, that is, to develop alternatives instead of adopting the legislative acts. The second suggestion is to refrain from making decisions which predetermine the actions of the new composition of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, including the decision on reorganizing the government. The third suggestion is to familiarize the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet with this communication.

Comrades, I must comment on this letter briefly, and state the idea that, as we all fully understand, the Association of Industrialists is giving a vote of no confidence not only to the government of the republic, but also to the Supreme Soviet. Pardon me for, perhaps, exaggerating it, but this is to a degree how it looks. I would like to note that I cannot subscribe to the point of view of the Association of Industrialists because, as I have said previously in the commissions of deputies, I believe that the current composition of the Supreme Soviet is fully empowered to adopt the most significant laws and resolutions of our republic, and there are absolutely no grounds to doubt this at present. Moreover, if we were to accept the proposals of the Association of Industrialists, it would mean that we would block and, even worse, mothball economic restructuring in our republic and would thus continue working in the old economic environment under beautiful slogans about new economic systems. This means that the "old" Supreme Soviet of the republic, that is to say, you and me, and the "old" government, that is to say, me and my deputies and ministers, would become passive and would not do everything in order to carry out the economic reform in our republic in a timely manner.

The second point which I would like to address, which I have already referred to in my report, and which everyone needs to grasp, is that the current reorganization of the government is not a one-time action but a process which should be carried out in keeping with the economic reform. I would like to stress once again that many of the changes in the structure of the government and the organs of state management proposed by me are long overdue, and that actually this reorganization in the committees for industry and culture and other organizations has already occurred. Therefore, life demands that we not stop, and we have no right at all to do so.

Here is the final argument which I would like to dwell on. Undoubtedly, nobody is depriving the new Supreme Soviet of the republic of the right to make proposals for renewing the government of the republic. We fully understand that the future Supreme Soviet has a right to make revisions in the structure of the government if this is necessary.

I ask that the session of the Supreme Soviet take these arguments into account and support the proposals of the government.

'Underground Group' in Latvia Stockpiles Arms

PM2301161590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jan 90 Second Edition p 8

[Own correspondent O. Meshkov report: "Arsenal at Home"]

[Text] Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic—Not so long ago Latvia's citizens were disturbed by a report that Leo Khirshsons, a photographer and cooperative member had been arrested by KGB organs for illegally storing a whole arsenal of firearms and other weapons.

This happened right on the eve of the organizational congress of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party [LSDWP]. The following fact has also become known: Khirshsons was one of its activists, joining it while on a foreign trip to Sweden. The leadership of the new party rushed to dissociate itself from the arrested man, and wasted no time in expelling him from the LSDWP.

In response Leo Khirshsons, being held in a preliminary detention center, asked for a meeting with journalists and protested to them the LSDWP Central Committee decision. He described the party's action against him with the quotation: "The Moor has done his job, let him go."

But, of course, it is not L. Khirshsons' relationship with his former comrades-in-arms and kindred spirits that is worrying the republic's citizens most. The point is that the investigation has thrown up highly alarming facts linked with the stockpiling of a large quantity of combat hardware in the cooperative photographer's home. And it is good that the investigative work itself is being conducted quite openly. S. Zukul, chairman of the republic's KGB, talked about new facts which refute L. Khirshsons' claims that he had stockpiled weapons out of fear of reprisals by racketeers. No confirmation of this claim by the accused has yet been found, but a different interpretation is much clearer. For instance, R. Klimovich has testified to the state security organs that he and Khirshsons took part in a meeting where it was "unanimously decided in the event of a crisis situation emerging in the republic to set up an underground armed organization aimed at waging a guerrilla [partizanskiy] war in Latvia with a view to toppling the existing system by force of arms."

R. Klimovich also talked about his acquaintanceship with a Western journalist. He approved our activities. In November 1988 the journalist suggested that I become his informant, and I agreed.

Other facts about the underground group's activities were also cited. The following weapons were confiscated: four assault rifles, eight pistols, grenades, antitank and antipersonnel mines, and more than 1,000 cartridges. Information on party and soviet workers was also collected in their "data base."

The investigation, which the republic's citizens are following, continues. The case is being conducted by the republic Prosecutor's Office.

Lithuanian Communist Party Bureau Meets 24 Jan

LD2501002490 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] A meeting of the bureau of the now independent Lithuanian Communist Party was held today in Vilnius. It was described at the meeting that party organizations of the Vilnius and Salcininkai regions, that approved of the Lithuanian Communist Party program and statute, are granted the rights of a territorial organization. More attention should be paid to the educational and cultural needs of these southeast regions of Lithuania with a predominantly Polish population. The mass media should also provide more information about the needs of these regions.

The main party dailies were discussed at the meeting. As subscription to these newspapers has increased here in Lithuania, the lack of paper is great, however, and it has become practically impossible to buy a daily at a newspaper stand. The publishing house of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party has been obligated to provide additional paper resources. So, from now on, the price of the republican newspapers will triple if they are brought at a newspaper stand. The subscription price has remained the same, though.

The Party bureau has set up a working group headed by novelist Romas Gudaitis on working out the moral and legal criteria for being a Party member.

The safety of the archieves was also debated at the meeting. It was unanimously decided that no archives could be destroyed or taken out from Lithuania. The bureau suggested to consider the issue of the Lithuanian archives at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania.

2,000 at Vilnius Rally Protest Army Actions

LD2501004990 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Today a rally was held near the headquarters of the Lithuanian Parliament in Vilnius. Arranged by several women organizations, the nearly 2,000 rally condemned the Soviet Army's action in Azerbaijan and, of course, the participation of the Lithuanian young people in them. Today's rally voiced rather categoric demands. The speakers, mostly parents of the soldiers, pointed out that the Soviet Constitution stipulating conscription to the occupationist Army contradicted the international agreements. Therefore, the young people who refuse to do military service, or defect from it, should be brought to justice. [as heard] The repeal of the respective article in the criminal code was demanded. Antanas (Meltinonas), member of the Lithuanian Union of Retired Officers, asked why the blood of Lithuanians was shed in Transcaucasia, (?the state so) remote from Lithuania. Our young people are subjected to pressure and made to protect political interests of the Kremlin, said Antanas (Meltinonas). He described this action as the old imperial policy of Russia which was to hold the reins of enslavement of some nations with the help of men of other nations. It was stressed that Lithuania had no claim to the Caucasian people. Therefore, it was immoral and criminal to force the Lithuanian young men to [word indistinct] or kill for the sake of Russia's ambitions. The resolution read out at the rally urged the Lithuanian Government to send a telegram to Mikhail Gorbachev demanding immediate withdrawal of the Lithuanian soldiers from Azerbiajan. (Litika) Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium, declared that such demands amounted to the supreme order of the republican government and promised that the issues of military service would be discussed at the nearest Parliamentary session.

Debate on Militia 'De-ideologization' Sought

LD2501002890 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] The Communists of the Lithuanian Ministry of Interior Affairs have spoken out for the de-ideologization of all militia bodies here in Lithuania. The Ministry's Communists meeting decided by a majority of votes to appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania for debating this issue at the next session of the Parliament.

Book on Gorbachev Visit to Lithuania Published

LD2401220290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] "It's for Us Together To Solve Our Common Problems" is the title of a collection of materials on Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania on 11-13 January. The collection has been published by Politizdat. It includes comrade Gorbachev's speeches at the meetings with the working people of Vilnius and Siauliai, a detailed account of the meeting of the republican party aktiv, comrade Gorbachev's speech there, and other reports.

Lithuanian Sajudis Criticizes Dual Membership

LD2401111590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Excerpts] The Sajudis Information Agency reports that the Vilnius Council of Sajudis Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, has issued a statement which reads:

Until now Sajudis has been an opposition to the ruling bodies of Lithuania. Many active members of Sajudis have been elected to the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] and to the Bureau. Therefore, some members of Sajudis are now occupying two positions.

Certan steps taken recently by the leaders of Sajudis cause our concern: Having become a Central Committee member, an active member of Sajudis began to urge Lithuanian young people to join the LCP (Lithuanian Communist Party); another Sajudis member who also is a USSR People's Deputy is now urging the electors to vote for him in the upcoming elections to the Lithuanian Parliament and is attempting to defeat another candidate of Sajudis. [passage omitted] In such a situation the people lose their orientation and fail to distinguish between the two political forces.

The present maneuvering by Algirdas Brazauskas, the leader of the LCP, and his consent to take up the post of chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet when only a couple of months are left until the elections, also cause our concern. A very formal repentence was announced by the autocratic LCP the past of which is burdened by an incaluclable number of crimes; the LCP has relieved itself of its own guilt although it cannot be dismissed by prescription. [passage omitted] Only people who aspire for real and not formal political independence should be elected to the Lithuanian Parliament.

Removal, Destruction of Archives Protested

LD2501004590 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Yesterday in Vilnius, a member of the Sajudis Seimas Council, Romualdas Ozolas, was the first to start a vigil near the headquarters of the State Security Committee in protest against the removal and destruction of the archival documents. As is known, Romualdas Ozolas is a member of the Parliamentarian Ad Hoc Commission to deal with the (?pacts) of destroying archives. Besides, later last year he made a motion to pass a parliamentary resolution on preserving archives. A resolution had been adopted so now Romualdas Ozolas is accusing the bosses of the State Security Committee for not complying with it. Late last night, a group of the USSR People's Deputies for Lithuania signed an appeal. The Seimas Council members and the USSR People's Deputies for Lithuania are making futile efforts to ascertain if archives are really being destroyed in secrecy. There is a threat that with public being kept ignored [as heard], the archives, unique and essential for Lithuania, or a considerable part of them, will be completely destroyed or brought outside Lithuania. Here we mean Lithuanian [word indistinct], dated 1940 to 1988. The deputies appeal says that the heads of the State Security Committee should be compelled to abide by the Supreme Soviet resolution, otherwise the committee leadership should be replaced without delay. All through last night, the USSR People's Deputies for Lithuania and the Sajudis people took turns on the vigil. According to them, during that time not a single truck left the headquarters of the State Security Committee. Romualdas Ozolas;

[Ozolas recording in Lithuanian fading into English summary] The chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium was handed a memorandum of the USSR People's Deputies for Lithuania. For its part, the buro of the Lithuanian Communist Party unanimously approved of the demand to put the issue of archives storage before Parliament and to hear the accounts made by the Committee's chairman, General Eismuntas. Algirdas Brazauskas agreed to hold a Presidium sitting tomorrow to hear Eismuntas' report and to take further action. At eight or so, say those on the vigil, the General Eismutas came up and asked what the racket was all about as nothing was being taken away or destroyed, so why the vigil? Since the USSR People's Deputies for Lithuania have no access to the security archives, any negotiations with the Committee chairman seem to be fruitless. Eismuntas is an executor of Moscow's will, said Romualdas Ozolas. We should adopt a special resolution of make amendments to the constitutional article that would regulate the status of the Security Committee. Another important priority (?of) the Security Committee met our demands. So tomorrow should provide a well-defined answer to this question. If no constructive decision is made, the vigil should be continued up to the 5th or the 6th of February, the day our parliament resumes its work. The unprecedented protest action is continuing, Romualdas Ozolas told the Lithuanian people last night in television news broadcasts and reiterated that tonight in the Sajudis program (Atgimimo Banga). We expect to tell you more about a decision of the Supreme Soviet Presidium tomorrow. [end recording]

Lithuanian Draft Law on Mass Media

90US0385 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 28 Dec 89 pp 1-2

[Lithuanian SSR draft law: "On Press and Other Mass Media"]

[Text]

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Freedom of the press.

Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] citizens have the right to free and unimpeded expression of their views and opinions and communication through the press and other mass media and to the acquisition through them of objective information regarding any issue of state or social life.

The mass media are not subject to censorship. Interference in their activity related to preparing and disseminating information is not allowed.

Article 2. The mass media.

In keeping with the present law, the mass media are understood to mean newspapers, magazines, books, bulletins, and other periodical or one-time publications published in more than 100 copies and intended for public dissemination and also television and radio transmissions, newsreels, communications from information agencies, audiovisual tapes and programs prepared and disseminated by state, political, and social organizations and social movements of the republic and also citizens of the Lithuanian SSR.

The mass media are represented by publishers and editorial offices of the press, television, and radio, and also information agencies and other institutions that produce and disseminate mass information.

The mass media are a legal body.

This law does not regulate social relations that arise during the publication of legislative acts, acts of organs of state authority and management, or departmental normative acts.

Article 3. Basic principles of the activity of the mass media.

The mass media freely prepare and disseminate information. They are guided in their activity by the principles of humanism, equality, tolerance, respect for human beings, and other general human values and they contribute to the development of democracy and glasnost and also social progress.

Article 4. The right to obtain information.

State, political, and social organizations and their leaders give information to the mass media with the exception of information that is not subject to publication in keeping with Article 6 of this law.

Article 5. The language of the mass media.

The mass media on the territory of the republic prepare and disseminate information in the Lithuanian language, and if necessary in other languages as well. Under the policy established by law national minorities are guaranteed the right to prepare and disseminate information in their own language.

Article 6. Information not subject to publication.

The mass media are not allowed to make public state secrets, a list of which is established by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers. The state may also establish other restrictions necessary for protecting the interests of the republic and the rights of citizens.

Information containing promotion of war, violence, and national or religious hostility may not be published.

Publication of information about the private life of a person without his consent is not allowed with the exception of cases dictated by the need to protect the rights and legitimate interests of the state, the society, and other citizens.

II. Establishing the Mass Media, Halting and Curtailing Their Activity

Chapter 7. The right to establish the mass media.

The right to establish the mass media is enjoyed by state, political, and social organizations and social movements, labor collectives, creative unions and scientific societies, religious, cooperative, and other organizations, and also adult citizens of the Lithuanian SSR living on the territory of the republic.

Article 8. Registration of the mass media.

Mass media are registered within a month from the day of the receipt of the application to the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers or the organization indicated by it or the rayon or city soviets of people's deputies.

The application for registration of mass media indicates:

1) The publisher (organization, movement, citizen);

2) The name and location of the mass media and also the language in which the information will be disseminated;

3) The purposes of the mass media;

4) The territory on which it is proposed to disseminate most of the products of the mass media;

5) Frequency and volume of output.

The application to establish mass media is taxed by the state in an amount established by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

After registration of the mass media the publisher is given a certificate of the establishment of the mass media.

The right of those who establish mass media to begin their activity is protected for a year after the receipt of the certificate. The publication is announced within three days by the organization that registered the means of mass media.

Mandatory copies of the publications are sent to libraries and other institutions in keeping with the policy established by the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 9. Publishing activity not subject to registration.

Mass media are not subject to registration if the publishing activity is carried out by organs of state authority and management that publish legal acts and also other materials necessary for their work.

Activity for manufacturing products not intended for public dissemination are not subject to registration.

Article 10. Refusal of registration.

It is possible to refuse to register mass media if:

1) The application was submitted without observing the requirements stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 of this law;

2) Incorrect information is given in the application;

3) The individual was previously subjected to punishment in the form of incarceration for a serious premeditated crime;

4) The individual is incompetent;

5) Mass media with the same name are registered and operating on the same territory;

6) The state tax has not been paid for the application.

The refusal to register mass media is sent to the applicant in written form with an indication of the reason for refusal.

Article 11. Halting activity.

After dissemination of information not subject to publication, in keeping with Article 6 of this law, the activity of the mass media may be halted, that is, the publication of one or several issues of the publication, and also instructions may be given to stop a television or radio broadcast.

The organization that registered it has the right to halt the activity of the mass media for a period of up to one month. The activity must be halted no more than three days after the information has been disseminated.

It is possible to interrupt the activity of the mass media for a period of no more than one year.

Article 12. Curtailing activity.

The activity of the mass media may be curtailed by the organization that registered them in the event of:

1) Regular violation of the present law and warning the publisher about this three times within one year. The organization that registered the mass media has the right to warn them about violations of the present law. Halting their activity is considered to be a warning;

2) Gross violation of the present law which has caused or could cause serious consequences;

3) Failure by the mass media to carry out their activity during the course of a year.

It is possible to halt the activity of the mass media no later than three months after the appearance of the justification envisioned by this law.

The activity of mass media is considered to be curtailed if the publisher does not appeal the decision to curtail its activity to a court within 10 days. Otherwise the activity is considered to be curtailed the day the court decision goes into effect.

It is possible to resume the curtailed activity of the mass media only in keeping with the procedure established by Articles 7 and 8 of this law.

Article 13. Appeals.

A refusal to register mass media and also a decision to halt or curtail their activity can be appealed in court by the publisher within 10 days.

Declaring these decisions illegal entails reimbursement by the organization that made the decision for the losses sustained by the mass media.

III. Organization of the Activity of the Mass Media

Article 14. Production and financial activity.

The production and financial activity of the mass media is regulated by laws of the Lithuanian SSR.

Article 15. Leadership of the mass media.

Leadership of the mass media is provided by the publisher or individual designated by him.

Every periodical publication must have an editor. He must be a citizen of the Lithuanian SSR. The editor is appointed by the publisher.

The editor is hired and fired in keeping with Lithuanian SSR labor legislation.

Article 16. The editor and the mass media.

The mass media carry out the publisher's program on an independent basis. Relations between the publisher and the editor (editorial staff) of the mass media are regulated by a contract between them.

Article 17. The editor and the editorial staff (editorial board).

The procedure for the formation and the authority of the editorial staff (editorial board) is determined by the provisions on editorial staffs.

The editorial staff is guided by the editor, who bears responsibility for making sure that the present law is not violated.

Disputes between the editor and members of the editorial staff are resolved by the publisher.

Article 18. Use of correspondence and letters.

The mass media study and publish letters and other correspondence at their own discretion. Journalistic materials and artistic literary and scientific works are used in observance of the laws on authorial rights.

Article 19. Publishing information (particulars) of the publication.

Each printed publication must contain the following information:

1) Name of the publication;

2) Publisher (organization, given name and surname of the citizen);

3) Language of publication;

4) Order number and date of publication;

5) Price;

6) Address of editorial staff;

7) Name of printing house and address;

8) Number of certificate of establishment of mass media;

9) Editor.

Other data pertaining to the state standard must also be indicated in the publication.

Television and radio stations give their name and also the given name and surname of the person doing the broadcast.

Article 20. Dissemination of mass information.

Products of the mass media are disseminated according to the procedure established by the publisher.

The manufacture and dissemination of products of unregistered mass media are prohibited.

Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR have the right to reproduce and disseminate published printed and other information if this does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of the author and also the publisher. Reproduced information must indicate the source from which it was reproduced, and the reproducer and time and place (address) of its reproduction.

Article 21. Official announcements.

Official announcements of organs of state power and management are published by state mass media free of charge and within the time period established by them.

The mass media are also obliged to publish free of charge court decisions and decrees of state arbitration that are subject to publication.

Article 22. Halting dissemination.

When the publisher has information that is not subject to publication in keeping with Article 6 of this law, the dissemination of this publication is halted by the organization that registered the mass media.

The mass media have the right to appeal this decision in court, which considers the case within no more than 15 days.

In the event that the court decides that the halting of dissemination is unjustified, the organization that made the decision must make reimbursement to the mass media for material losses caused by halting dissemination.

Article 23. Storage of published information.

Radio and television editorial offices must store tapes of information for no less than six months from the time the information is made public.

The publisher must store copies of publications for no less than one year from the day its dissemination began.

Article 24. Refutation.

State, political, and social organizations and social movements as well as individuals have the right to refute information made public through the mass media that does not square with reality and defames their honor and dignity.

The refutation must indicate precisely which information does not square with reality and when and where it was published.

The mass media must publish in the press or by other means disseminate the refutation if it does not have proof that the information that has been given does correspond to reality.

Article 25. Time periods and procedure for refutation.

The refutation must be published within the following time periods:

1) In newspapers—within seven days of the time the refuted text was published;

2) In other periodicals—in the next publications prepared in the press;

3) By radio and television—in the next broadcast or, lacking that opportunity, in a similar broadcast.

In the event that the mass media refuse to retract information that has been disseminated, the individual or organization has the right to demand through the court a retraction of this information if the mass media do not have proof that the information is true.

The mass media may refuse to retract information if:

1) It is suggested that they retract facts that have been put into legal force by a decision or sentence of the court;

2) They have refuted information for whose dissemination on the basis of Article 35 of this law the mass media do not bear responsibility;

3) The information has already been retracted in keeping with the procedure established by this law.

Article 26. Secrecy of the source of information.

The mass media need not indicate their source of information and do not have the right to disclose the surname

and given name of an individual who has given information without that individual's permission.

The source of information may be indicated only at the demand of investigation organs or the court if this is necessary to investigate and examine a case.

IV. Rights and Responsibilities of the Journalist

Article 27. The journalist.

In this law by journalist we mean an individual engaged in the collection, creation, editing, or other preparation of materials for the mass media who has concluded a work agreement with them or does this work on instructions from the mass media or is a member of the journalists' union.

Article 28. The rights of a journalist.

The journalist has the right:

1) To gather and publish information;

2) To refuse to prepare and publish material that goes against his beliefs;

3) To remove his signature from material he has submitted if its content has been distorted during the process of editorial preparation;

4) To make tapes, including with audiovisual equipment, and movies and photographs, and also to record information by other means.

Impeding journalists from performing their professional duties is not allowed.

Article 29. Refusal to grant information.

The refusal to grant information by state, political, and social organizations and social movements and their leaders is possible only if it contains knowledge that comprises a state secret or a secret protected by law. The refusal is given to the representative of the mass media in written form within no more than three days with an indication of the reason for the refusal.

Article 30. Appealing a refusal to grant information.

A refusal to grant information may be appealed to the higher official or the court.

Article 31. The duties of the journalist.

A journalist working in the mass media must:

1) Give reliable information;

2) Have a statement made public for the first time approved by the person who gave the information;

3) Obtain the approval from the individual or his legal representatives for dissemination through the mass media of information about his private life. Approval is not required if it is necessary to protect the rights and legitimate interests of the state, society, and also other individuals;

4) Let the editor know about the limits beyond which the disseminated information could be divulging a state secret or one protected by law;

5) Refuse to follow instructions from an editor if the instructions involve violation of the law;

6) Respect the rights and legitimate interests of individuals and state and social organizations.

Article 32. Accreditation.

The mass media may, with the agreement of state, political, and social organizations and social movements, give journalists their credentials.

The journalist has the right to participate in meetings, conferences, and other measures of the organization that has accredited him, and to receive shorthand reports, minutes, and other documents.

V. Responsibility for Violation of the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media

Article 33. Bases of responsibility.

Responsibility for the manufacture and dissemination of products of unregistered mass media, the divulging of a secret source of information, the dissemination of false information that defames the honor and dignity of a person is born by the person guilty of this in keeping with Lithuanian SSR legislation.

Article 34. Restitution for moral harm.

Moral harm caused to an individual as a result of dissemination by the mass media of information about the private life of an individual without his agreement or false information that defames his honor and dignity is reimbursed by the mass media by a court decision. The amount of reimbursement for moral (nonproperty) harm is determined by the court but the sum in each individual case may not exceed R10,000.

Article 35. Release from responsibility.

Publishers, editors, journalists, and users of the mass media do not bear responsibility for the dissemination of false information if this information:

1) Is contained in official documents and announcements from organs of state authority and administration, political and social organizations, and social movements;

2) Is a verbatim reproduction of public statements;

3) Was obtained from other information agencies.

VI. International Cooperation in the Area of Mass Information

Article 36. International contracts and agreements.

International cooperation of the mass media is regulated by contracts and agreements concluded by the Lithuanian SSR, the mass media, professional organizations of journalists, and other creative unions.

Circumstances of Masherov's Death Described

PM2401134990 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 2 14 Jan 90 p 15

[Interview with Vladimir Kalinichenko, senior investigator of major cases under USSR General Prosecutor, conducted by MOSCOW NEWS correspondent Natalya Gevorkyan: "Details of Petr Masherov's Death"; date, place unspecified]

[Text] First Secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, Alternate Politburo Member Petr Masherov died in 1980 in a road accident. This is virtually all we know about the event. All the rest is rumour and conjecture. His strained relations with Brezhnev and genuine presige in Belorussia gave grounds for hypotheses of sabotage or assassination. A short time ago Vladimir Solovyev and Yelena Klepikova in their book "The Kremlin Struggle: From Andropov to Gorbachev" published in the West, unambiguously accused Brezhnev of killing Masherov: "Following the death of Kulakov, Masherov was intended as Brezhnev's successor. His armoured limousine ran into two empty militia cars in his way at a crossroads. No one in Minsk doubted it was political."

Is there a mystery behind the Belorussian leader's death? Could rumours be due to lack of information? MN correspondent Natalya Gevorkyan talks about the road accident at km 659 on the Moscow-Brest motorway with Vladimir Kalinichenko, Senior Investigator of major cases under the USSR Procurator-General, who handled the case.

On the evening of October 4, 1980, Deputy Procurator-General Vikor Naydenov suddenly rang up the investigation section, asked who was still there, and told me to come to his office. Obviously agitated, he said: "Several hours earlier Masherov died in a road accident in Belorussia. A lorry ran into his limousine—that is all I know from initial reports. The truck driver is alive in hospital. Go there and report daily on the progress of the investigation."

The officials of the Belorussian Procurator's Office, militia, KGB, and relevant experts had come to the Belorussian Procurator's Office in Minsk. The bodies of Masherov, his driver, and bodyguard were in the morgue. We began by examining them. The victims sustained terrible injuries. One immediately noticed that the driver was an elderly and sickly man. We were told he had been Masherov's driver for years and begged to be allowed to drive him even after retirement age.

The scene of the accident was depressing, too. We saw a heap of scrap metal that was the remains of the non-armoured Chaika limousine. The damaged and burned lorry GAZ-53B (license plate 02-01 MMB) was some distance away. Examination of the limousine revealed nothing interesting except a pair of spectacles on the driver's seat.

In the afternoon of October 4, 1980, Masherov had left Minsk on business. He did not like travelling in state, so contrary to the tradition at the time, his limousine was escorted by just two militia Volga cars. The one in front had neither distinctive colouring nor a flash beacon on top. The distance between the Volga and Masherov's Chaika was between 60 and 70 m, the three cars moving at 100 kph down the center line. At 3:05 p.m. the front car climbed a hill, its yellow lights flashing, and descended into a valley. It was seconds before the accident.

New traffic rules introduced on July 1, 1980, had not yet been mastered by all drivers. Under the new rules, upon sighting an official vehicle, on-coming vehicles were to "stop by the curb or at the side of the road". Violations of the rule were subject to severe punishment.

The lorry driver, Nikolay Pustovit, father of three young children, a driver at the Zhodino Farming Research Institute, was on a routine cross-country run along the motorway. For some time he had been following the heavy MAZ-503 truck (license 89-19 MND) 50 to 70 m ahead. Taraykovich, the driver of the truck who worked at Service Centre No. 4 in Minsk, was the first to spot the official motorcade. Following the rules, he pulled over to the roadside and shifted into low gear to brake. His truck slowed quickly.

Said Nikolay Putsovit during the first interrogation: "The road I was travelling on the day of the accident was well known to me... Driving conditions were good and I felt no tension. When I raised my eyes from the dashboard I suddenly saw the back of the heavy truck in front. My impression was that it came to a sudden standstill in front of me... I swerved sharply to the left. I remember the moment of collision... as a terrible crash, and flames."

Pustovit said his attention had strayed from the road for a moment when he looked at the dashboard readings. I cannot exclude the possibility of a momentary black-out due to monotonous driving, which may have occurred just before the truck ahead braked.

The Volga at the front of the motorcade was the first to see the lorry veer towards the centre line from behind the MAZ truck. The driver's reaction was instantaneous and absolutely correct under the circumstances: he sped up and forged ahead. The Chaika driver, whose specs we found in the limousine, tried to do the same, as was evident from the short braking track which broke off about 100 m before the crash. Then came a terrible head-on collision at full speed, and an explosion.

Turning sharply left, Pustovit was thrown out the right-hand door to the ground. His clothes were ablaze and he survived only because passers-by came out to his rescue. All the passengers in the Chaika limousine died instantly. The second Volga car miraculously braked a few metres short of the heavy MAZ.

From the written report of forensic motor experts to the USSR Ministry of Justice:

"Had the driver of the GAZ-53B lorry taken appropriate measures to brake his vehicle, he could have prevented the road accident. Given the circumstances, it was technically impossible for the driver of the Chaika limousine to prevent the collision with the lorry by braking.

"The driver of the Volga and the officer in charge of the motorcade were unable, within the framework of Traffic Rules and special instructions, to prevent the GAZ-52B lorry from veering into the on-coming traffic lane."

On October 7, 1980, Belorussia paid its last respects to Petr Masherov, the general favourite. Tens of thousands queued to march past his coffin. Even more people flanked the road to the cemetery, despite pouring rain. They did not conceal their grief.

The CPSU Central Committee sent its secretary, M. Zimyanin, to attend the funeral of the Alternate Politburo Member. Brezhnev sent a wreath. Incidentally, a short time later, when Kunayev was celebrating another anniversary in Kazakhstan, Brezhnev and several other Politburo members chose to come in person.

The investigation into Masherov's death was conducted and completed by Vladimir Ignatovich, at that time an investigator of major cases under Belorussia's Prosecutor-General, now a USSR people's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nikolay Pustovit was sentenced to 15 years in jail. He was not involved in any plot by the KGB, CIA, or other secret service.

Situation in South Ossetia Improves

90US0373A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 10 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Eka Akhalkatsi and Aleksey Sinelnikov: "South Ossetia: Situation Is Improving"]

[Text] An improvised news conference by Roman Gventsadze, deputy minister of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was held in the office of the chief of the South Ossetia UVD [Directorate of Internal Affairs].

"The situation is improving. You know that passenger trains are operating and that the foodstuffs train has already made its first run. There were cases when local residents, fearing attacks, left the oblast. Approximately 1,000 persons moved out, mainly women and children, but the mass nature of this has now stopped. We are conducting negotiations both with informal and with official organizations, and with representatives of the public. Now there is every reason to hope that life in the oblast will enter a normal channel. The pickets have been removed, and classes are being held in the schools.

"We call on everyone to turn in official weapons that were taken from militia employees. It is necessary to do this first to normalize the situation.

"Twenty-three cases have been initiated for injuries, illegal arrest of citizens, and removal of cold steel and firearms. Similar cases are encountered on both sides. But for now I consider it necessary to continue patrols in villages to avoid unforeseen incidents. And only after the situation normalizes completely will it be possible to assign the maintenance of law and order to the UVD of South Ossetia."

There is a sad report on the ethnic crisis in South Ossetia: According to data of the Georgian SSR MVD, there are 17 persons today undergoing in-patient treatment in Tskhinvali. A total of 42 injured persons have been registered, and of these, 18 with shotgun wounds. Thirty-four out of the 36 city enterprises have started production again (two are not operating for lack of raw materials).

Several days ago it seemed that the confrontation reached an impasse. It is unlikely that anyone could have predicted that, owing to the efforts of the mission in Moscow of Georgian and Ossetian people from the same area, it would be possible to begin multilateral negotiations with all forces involved in the conflict, and to achieve a significant easing of tensions in the region.

Before relating the activity of the intermediary mission and the settlement plan which was promulgated at the meeting of the Tskhinvali public the day before yesterday, we will dwell on several of the most critical facts that are interpreted in a contradictory way by both sides. First, the question about the "reunification of both Ossetia's" has been practically removed for today. In the "[Adamon nykhas]" leadership, only one person continues to adhere to this unrealistic program. The position of the leadership of this organization is unclear on the question of the status of the oblast, but note should be made of the readiness for cooperation with the commission of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, which is headed by Eldar Shengelaya. Second, to this day, both sides interpret events since 23 November differently and, accordingly, they decide the question differently about who should maintain order in the zone of tension—the Ossetia militia or MVD forces of the republic from other regions. Third, there are several cases of illegal arrests of citizens by picketers from both sides.

To build bridges between the conflicting parties in the republic, David Beritashvili, deputy chairman of the Georgian community in Moscow, and Major General Kim Tsagolov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and chairman of the "Farn" society of Ossetian culture in Moscow, arrived in the republic.

In an interview with us, David Beritashvili said the following: "In Moscow, in the association of people from the same area, the telephones were red hot. They rang continuously, and they talked about the fact that Georgia is seething.

"When reports came in that the situation in South Ossetia was extremely tense, we immediately got together and departed for Georgia. There was a dialogue. I intentionally do not want to go into details and to speak beforehand of the results achieved. It seems to me that if ethnic crises occur in our motherland again, their settlement will be possible only with the participation of all of the interested parties. It is necessary to be frank and to go halfway. The plan for the resolution of this conflict is not yet coordinated with everyone, and there is still much in the area of ideas. But there is every reason to hope that it will be realized completely."

Kim Tsagolov held a meeting with the public in the obkom [oblast party committee] building, which was attended by about 1,500 people.

"Over the last two days," he said, "we held several meetings with authoritative representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia. Eldar Shengelaya gave active support to the building of bridges. In a conversation with the leadership of the republic, he proposed holding a joint news conference with the participation of Ossets and Georgians in order to knock down the wave of disinformation. The popular servant of the church, Father Rostom, took part in the work of the group. In the very near future, we must have an open exchange of opinions and information between all interested parties. A lot has piled up which we must analyze together.

"About the situation today. Yes, there are people who did not have enough of the experience of these days, and they would like to start everything all over. But blood should not be spilled. Provocations are always possible in this kind of a situation, but for the present we have been able to avoid succumbimg to them, and, I hope, it will be this way henceforth. A weapon that turns up in the hands of people who do not understand what they are doing is dangerous. It is not possible to search for a solution to complex problems through armed confrontation. It happens that people call up the militia at night, at the headquarters of the internal forces, and they say: Well, they are attacking us. This is not needed. Everyone must begin to work. I believe that the Georgian intelligentsia is favorably inclined, and that there is a readiness there to resolve questions and to assist in ending the conflict."

Further, Kim Tsagolov acquainted those present with the settlement plan. It includes a rejection of the formulation of questions associated with "reunification" and the reorganization of "[Adamon nykhas]" in the association, which can be joined by representatives of all nationalities living in South Ossetia, and the rejection of mutual picketing.

Father Rostom, an archpriest of the Holy Trinity Church, and a member of the People's Front of Georgia, said:

"The fact that a conflict broke out between our nations, who have from time immemorial lived side by side in peace and harmony, is a tragedy for all of us. A great mistake occurred, and now is not the time to analyze who made it at the very beginning and what started the confrontation. Now we have to use all means in order to resolve it with peaceful means, with Christian wisdom. In the next few days we, a group made up of several persons, plan to go to South Ossetia in order to begin the implementation of our planned measures, and we will certainly announce their results to the public.

"But for the time being, I would like to say this: The main thing now is that each resident of Georgia, regardless of his national origin, realize that this is his motherland. Only in this event will it become possible for everyone to take the correct positions. Only then will the two nations, historically associated by the power of the cross, unite in unity and fraternity.

"I pray to God so that common sense will triumph over emotions. This is necessary for the future of Georgia, and this means that it should not be otherwise."

Turkmen Supreme Soviet Session Resumes

LD2401175390 Ashkabad Domestic Service in Turkmen 1646 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Summary] The first session of the Turkmenistan Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation has resumed. The earlier meeting was chaired by Niyazov where a proposal about changing the name of Azadlyk Street in Ashkhabad to Makhtum Kuli Street was unanimously supported. The session will continue on 25 January.

Begins To Form Government

LD2501071990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] The session of the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenia will continue in Ashkhabad today. Yesterday, the deputies examined a matter not previously included in the agenda. A decision to hold days of the poetry of Makhtum Kuli, the classical author of Turkmen and world literature, in May was adopted unanimously. A proposal to change the name of the main street of Ashkhabad, Liberty Avenue, to Makhtum Kuli Avenue was adopted. Then the deputies began forming the composition of the new government.

Anti-Drug Efforts Up Opium Prices in Turkmenia

PM2301140990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 90 p 4

[Our correspondent A. Bushev dispatch: "'Soldering.' Opium Prices Are Rising But They Are Not Curbing Increase in Drug Addiction"]

[Text] An ordinary electric soldering iron standing on the window sill or on the floor in the corner of the room. How many times, when visiting country people's houses in Turkmenia, have I seen this innocuous tool of radio hams. No, the householders were not keeping the soldering irons to repair their televisions; these soldering irons on openwork bases had a basic flaw which made them unusable for their proper purpose: They had no brass tip, but instead an ordinary steel wire had been inserted. Once this was red hot, it was taken out and used to heat a piece of opium ("teryak") so the intoxicating smoke could be deeply inhaled. What always struck me was something else—this tool whose specific purpose I'm sure was clear to any schoolchild in the village was kept absolutely openly like an everyday essential, like a spoon, a cup, a pipe, or a cigarette holder...

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Court recently sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment a group of people who had engaged in acquiring, in Uzbekistan among other places, transporting, and selling large quantities of drugs.

"It would be naive to think," V.M. Boyko, chief of the Turkmen SSR KGB Investigation Department, told me, "that the group that was sentenced was the only one in the republic selling drugs. The exposure of drug dealers continues. It would also be naive to think that this evil can be stopped solely by the efforts of law enforcement organs. This idea is often repeated, but... We, for example, receive no assistance either from the Leninist Communist Youth League or from any other social organization."

Indeed, opium smoking is an ancient and almost traditional pastime among a certain section of the republic's population, and all the measures that are being taken are leading, as yet, not so much to a reduction in the number of drug addicts as a sharp rise in drug prices. A gram of opium is now estimated at R150. More expensive than gold.

Kuzbass Workers Union's Popularity Noted

904F0062B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 3 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent A. Parshintsev, Kemerovo Oblast: "Together Rather Than Side by Side. Confrontation or Search for Common Platform?"]

[Text] In mid-November, the first conference of representatives of labor collectives of the oblast organized by the trade unions was held in Kemerovo; it worked out a package of documents. Subsequently, the Fourth Oblast Conference of Workers' Committees was held in Novokuznetsk at which the Union of Workers was transformed into the Union of Toilers of the Kuzbass, a socio-political organization. A program and charter of the union were adopted, and an organizational committee was elected to set up its own press organ.

Having heard of the alleged creation of an alternative party in Siberia, many foreign journalists and representatives of various political currents came to Novokuznetsk. The conference was broadcast by the oblast radio.

I will note right away that the attitude toward the new socio-political movement is equivocal, ranging from collective petitions for admission to the union to open hostility toward it and calls for delineation—are you with the CPSU or with the Union of Toilers of the Kuzbass?

This position was stated in a particularly sharp manner at a plenum of the party obkom [oblast committee] held during the same month of November. I will quote several statements by participants in the plenum.

A. Melnikov, first secretary of the party obkom: "If the organizers of the union strive to form other political structures with objectives other than that in the program declaration we will have to distance ourselves."

A. Lenskiy, first secretary of the Novokuznetsk party gorkom [city committee]: "Life has never before set a political task in a manner so naked and sharp: Each communist should determine his position with regard to the Union of Toilers and, thus, to his own party."

A. Zaytsev, first secretary of the Belovo party gorkom: "A split in the party oblast organization cannot be ruled out. It is necessary to conduct a serious conversation in the primary party organization: Who is on whose side? Let us not simplify the situation. If a communist supports the Union of Toilers of the Kuzbass, can he and should he be a party member?"

This is it, and there is no other way!

These and and other speeches have reminded me of the period of the first wave of strikes when the obkom bureau adopted a resolution on the impossibility of participation in strikes by communists on pain of being expelled from the party. However, communists went to the city squares together with the people. It turned out that they not only failed to undermine the authority of the party but attempted to reinforce it, as did, incidentally, the entire workers' movement. Later, submitting to the logic of life after all, the obkom revised its resolution and even praised the courage of the communists who had violated the stern order.

This time, the lesson has been learned. At any rate, the resolution of the plenum does not reject outright the participation by communists in the workers' movement and, therefore, in the work of the union. Still, the hostile attitude on the part of some leaders of party committees toward this grassroots organization can be seen, as they say, with the naked eye. I will once again refer to the speech by the Belovo secretary:

"Recently, all of us have witnessed the publication of three documents which are, to my mind, of vital importance: the action program of the oblast party organization, materials of the First Conference of the Representatives of Labor Collectives, and, finally, the documents of the Union of Toilers of the Kuzbass. We should acknowledge that the documents of the union, its program and statute are more popular. I draw this conclusion from the opinion of the citizens of Belovo. Deplorable as it is for us, members of the obkom, it is a fact. We should ask ourselves in a highly exacting manner: Why is it so rather than otherwise?"

Why? They should have undertaken a study of this issue in depth. However, Anatoliy Maksimovich Zaytsev saw one of the most significant reasons for the popularity of the union's economic and political platforms in the mass media's vociferous support for them and the vigorous work by the so-called "people's alternative propagandists."

I understand that they would very much like to pass off consequence for cause. However, the program of the new union is indeed more powerful, primarily due to the fact that it is firmly rooted in local conditions, concerns, and the needs of residents of the oblast. For its part, the program of the oblast party organization still suffers due to its declaratory nature and generalities, despite being considerably longer than the program of the union.

The reasons for this are known. We have happened to hear frequently about them from party functionaries. They speak with alarm about the party, having declared perestroyka, nonetheless not being given to change itself very much. It looks like some of the apparatchiks have forgotten about the need to fundamentally revise the style and methods of their work in the environment of pluralism and democratization. Frequently, they operate in keeping with customary patterns and entrenched stereotypes. However, when someone loses the initiative others take it—those who are free of regimentation and conventions, capable of acting freely and aggressively under given circumstances and advancing perestroyka.

The workers' committees which have been created from strike committees and have now organized into a union have been such a force in the Kuzbass. However, why is the party leaders' attitude toward the union so guarded?

This is what head of the chair at the Kemerovo University V. Shabashev says about the union: "At the Third Conference of the Workers' Committees, a 'child' with dictatorial leanings was brought into the world. I think that at the Fourth Conference in November, a different 'child' of perestroyka was born—healthy and democratic..."

Indeed, the wave of uncontrolled spontaneity seems to have receded. Stubborn reality faced the workers' movement with a choice: to hold further meetings wringing short-term preferences for the region from the government or to better their lives themselves while renouncing the fiat of ministries and departments and to put their house in order.

The consciousness of the local populace has changed noticeably within the short half year in which the worker's movement has developed. At the very least, they have understood that a force capable of accomplishing something has appeared in the form of workers' committees. The latter demanded a fundamental revision of social policy in the region and clear-cut planning of the production of consumer goods, and raised the following issue: Why is this very rich area forced to beg ministries and departments for sops in order to build schools, hospitals, and day-care centers.

One of the soviet functionaries exclaimed upon reading the union program: "No problem! Both the soviets and the party vote in favor of this..."

The organizers of the union do not deny this: "Indeed, the programs are alike, except for certain items and specifics concerning actions. Why are our initiatives not supported by either the soviet or party leaders in this case? We explain it this way: They would like to see us only as rivals in a power struggle."

I have happened to hear all kinds of things about the workers' movement. Repeating some of the vicious retorts does not come easy. Say, an opinion about the leaders of the movement: "They are angling for positions... They are establishing a new dictatorship... We have already learned it the hard way..."

Let us hear from the leaders of the workers' movement from the regional committee themselves.

M. Kislyuk, deputy director for economics of the opencast coal mine "Chernigovskiy": "The concept of setting up an alternative party is offered to idle thinkers by, among others, party leaders themselves. Personally, I support this idea though we did set forth in the program that we do not claim to be a party. What do I aspire to personally? To breathe energy into the party to which I belong. Party leaders must know: There is a parallel opinion. Life-giving thought would surface then, and perestroyka will proceed more vigorously."

V. Golikov, miner from the city of Berezovskiy: "Indeed, I am in favor of a dictatorship, but the dictatorships of minds and ideas rather than of classes. As far as power is concerned, the program of the union says that we are in favor of the unified and inseparable power of soviets and of extensive representation of the most active toilers in them."

A. Aslanidi, senior mechanic at the imeni 60 Years of the USSR Mine: "We are alarmed by the never ending attempts to discredit the leaders of the workers' movement in any way possible. I have personally heard the party aktiv maintain in prestigious forums that we are supposedly paid 35 rubles per day, that almost all of us

have been convicted previously, that our 'fellow travelers from an obviously non- proletarian background are leading the workers' movement toward a skirmish [as published] with the reactionary forces.' I am a party member, and I state with complete responsibility that we are not distancing ourselves from the party, unlike some party leaders who are trying to distance themselves from us. The statute of the union does not forbid belonging to both the CPSU and the union. After all, the goals are the same. We stand together with all those who are in favor of fundamental social restructuring, but through deeds rather than words."

I will add my own statement to the above. If the logic of idle talkers is to be believed, Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet Taymuraz Avaliani who heads the regional council of workers' committees should be exposed for his aspiration to grab the post... of the CPSU secretary general on the mere basis of his writing a letter to L. Brezhnev demanding that he resign at the height of the years of stagnation.

During a break in the conference in Novokuznetsk, I interviewed briefly Ye. Ostrovskiy, the representative of the political current "New Socialists."

"Do you believe that you are witnessing the birth of an alternative party?"

"I don't. All of this is not that simple. The workers' movement is just budding. It has still to overcome many contradictions before it grasps its role."

Both hidden and open struggle among political clubs of various orientations for the workers' movement is under way. Under the circumstances, the position of the party committees and their inner failure to accept the new movement as a real force in the struggle for perestroyka is all the more incomprehensible. However, the path of confrontation offers no prospects. This is why a search for mutually acceptable solutions and actions rather than confrontation. The authority of the party only stands to gain from this.

Nuclear Waste Contaminates Leningrad Site

AU2501095290 Paris AFP in English 0903 GMT 25 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 25 (AFP)—A sudden rise in underground water levels at a Leningrad nuclear plant caused nuclear waste stocked at the site to contaminate the ground on the reactor's territory, a Soviet official said Thursday.

But a spokesman at the environmental agency Goskompriroda told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that the incident entailed no danger to the population as the contamination was not in the air and confined to the nuclear plant territory.

He said experts were deciding how to deal with the problem, and suggested that the Leningrad plant, built in the 1970s, may have construction faults. Construction norms provide for nuclear waste to be stocked no less than four metres (12 feet) from underground water sources.

Finnish authorities Wednesday said they had opened an inquiry into the January 16 incident.

Leningrad Communist Leader Withdraws Candidacy

LD2401134190 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Leningrad January 24 TASS—Leningrad Communist leader Boris Gidaspov has removed his candidature for the Leningrad city soviet of people's deputies. The local newspaper LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA today carries his letter, explaining his decision.

Gidaspov expressed gratitude to the Vereteno, Meridian and Progress work collectives and the residents of the microdistrict in Constuency Number 300 for the confidence in him.

"The events of the past months—I was elected first secretary of the Leningrad city party committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Federation—impelled me to concentrate above all on these activities and withdraw from being registered as candidate for the Leningrad city soviet of people's deputies," the letter says.

"I want to assure all Leningraders that, as a people's deputy of the USSR, I will continue to take an active part in the work of the Leningrad city and regional soviets of people's deputies and persistently uphold the interests of the residents of the city and the region."

Gidaspov thanked those who supported the Leningrad party organisation.

Tyumen Ideologist, First Secretary Clash

90UN0653A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by B. Bogodelov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent, Tyumen: "Obkom Member Recommends First Secretary Resign"]

[Text] Simultaneously, two newspapers—TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA and TYUMENSKIY KOMSOMOLETS—published a letter on their front pages from M. Metakov, head of the ideological department of the Tyumen obkom [oblast party committee] of the CPSU, "To Members of the Oblast Party Committee." The letter is worthwhile. Here it is with some abridgments:

"Availing myself of a statute right, I want to address myself to each member of the CPSU obkom and to seek advice on something that is of particular anguish to the oblast party organization. The question concerns the crisis of the political leadership of the oblast, which is headed by G.P. Bogomyakov.

"I believe that there are communists in the oblast party organization among the obkom members who can and want to conduct another policy—a policy free of intrigues , dictates, rudeness and boorishness, personal servility, and fear. An honest and frank policy for people, and a policy together with people.

"This is quite adequate for a description of Bogomyakov's personality and work style. Even the powerful intellect of this individual does not cover the damage caused by his dislike of people and his faith in his own infallibility.

"I think that Bogomyakov has to be relieved of the position he holds, not waiting for June, when he becomes 60 years old. I will explain why.

"The people have turned away from him. As long as he remains in authority, people do not expect anything good, and they often associate everything that is bad in the life of the oblast with his name. But this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the shadow of his odious figure falls on all personnel, including on those who do not want to be on 'Bogomyakov's team' or to conduct his policy. He has :tied up' everyone this way. People, placed by Bogomyakov in the hierarchy of authority, are forced 'to pay him' debts, and to support him even when his style of leadership has become extremely unpopular.

"Bogomyakov's removal will be the beginning of the alteration of this 'system,' and it will open up an influx to authority and control by fresh forces. Today Bogomyakov, who remains 'the first,' will not encourage the initiatives and searches of communists because of his own set ideas, and, in the 'interests of perestroyka,' he will hamper and do everything to defend his own views and assign personnel suitable to him to key posts. With such 'dead weight' he can form new soviets and it will be very difficult to get prepared for the party congress.

"I turn to the obkom members, because I see the helplessness of the entire staff of the bureau to resolve this undoubtedly difficult question. Bogomyakov has to be relieved immediately. I think at the plenum which is planned for the middle of January. This is what the situation requires objectively.

"Perhaps I am not right. I allow this. If the plenum again shows confidence in Bogomyakov, I ask that I be relieved of the duties of an obkom member and department head. As I already explained, I have no desire to belong to 'Bogomyakov's team.' I consider it immoral." This is the reason this kind of a notice has appeared.

The replacement of first party leaders of krays and oblasts is not such a rare phenomenon these days. It is another matter that we usually hear about this "ex post facto"—from official TASS reports about organizational plenums that are being held. Only in a few cases (Sakhalin, Bashkiriya...) were the underlying reasons for such removals given publicity. So it is not difficult to judge how unprecedented it is for the head of an obkom department to challenge the first secretary.

However, in any case the current situation in the Tyumen Oblast party organization deserves attention. How will events unfold? Because now, after the promulgation of M. Metakov's letter in the press, not only obkom members but also rank and file communists must reach a decision.

In the year just ended the authority of G. Bogomyakov, which seemed unshakable (for many years he held the post "of first one" in a huge oblast), was thoroughly shaken. In March, he suffered a defeat in the elections to USSR people's deputy, despite the fact that he was the only candidate in his district. Soon after this, the new Supreme Soviet of the country rejected his candidacy for the post of minister of the oil and gas industry... Naturally, the Tyumen communists expected the first secretary to provide self-critical findings because of these two serious failures, but Bogomyakov remained confident in his style, and he by no means hastened to speak frankly in work collectives and in newspaper columns.

But in the meantime calls to hear the first leader of the oblast party organization began to arise more persistently now at meetings of the plenums and active groups, the gorkoms [city party committee] and raykoms [rayon party committee] of the CPSU. Nonetheless, at the last, October, plenum of the obkom, on the demand of a large number of participants, the question of confidence in G. Bogomyakov was introduced in an additional paragraph in the agenda.

In the opinion of M. Metakov, the author of the letter and obkom member, this was a farce. The necessary "approval" was reached with the usual open voting. M. Metakov was not at the plenum himself—he was at a session in the Academy of Social Sciences, which is attached to the CPSU Central Committee.

"Still, hope remained," he said in a conversation with our correspondent, "that in the preelection campaign that was starting, G. Bogomyakov would finally explain his position frankly. Because at practically every meeting with responsible party workers, the voters make statements about the obvious lack of glasnost surrounding the activity of the first secretary. However, their questions remain hanging in the air.

The ideological department on its own initiative asked the first secretary for a meeting. The answer was a refusal. No straightforward and frank conversation was obtained at G. Bogomyakov's 29 December meeting with workers of the staff of the CPSU obkom.

On 2 January, M. Metakov transmitted his letter to the obkom bureau. It is now being considered in the gorkoms and raykoms of the party, with broad participation by activist members, after which it will be examined at the regular plenum of the oblast committee.

In conclusion, several words about the person who broke the ostentatious staff unanimity which for many years reigned inside the walls of the Tyumen Oblast of the CPSU. Mikhail Mitrofanovich Metakov is 41 years old. He has been in the party since 1973. He graduated from the Higher Trade Union School. He was a student of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. He worked as a lathe operator. He was a soldier. He worked again as a lathe operator, a carpenter, and a rigger... Since 1978, he has been in party and soviet work. He was the chairman of the rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] and the first secretary of the Nefteyugansk CPSU GK [city committee]. He has been in his present position since December 1986.

FROM THE EDITOR. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA will inform readers about future events in the Tyumen Oblast party organization, and it will also print a detailed report from the plenum of the CPSU obkom.

Tyumen Obkom Chief Under Pressure To Resign

PM180114539O Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Special correspondent I. Ognev article under "Following Up" rubric: "Finale of Strong Personality"]

[Text] The editorial office has not received a reply to the article "Strong Personality?" (IZVESTIYA No. 168, 1989) to this day. Let me remind readers that it covered the work style and methods used by G.P. Bogomyakov, first secretary of Tyumen Oblast party committee [obkom], who at that time was slated for the office of USSR minister of the petroleum and gas industry. To a certain extent this style could be considered typical of the administrative edict system.

But the lack of a reply to IZVESTIYA's article does not in any way mean that life in Tyumen has come to a standstill. On the contrary, events are developing quite tumultuously and, in the very first days of January, the oblast youth newspaper published what could be mildly described as a strange statement by A.G. Alpatov, member of Tyumen City CPSU Committee [gorkom] and deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee West Siberian Interdepartmental Commission. Specifically, the author expressed bewilderment "in connection with the transfer of G.M. Goloshchapov, second secretary of the party obkom, to other work."

To cite the letter further, a statement by G.P. Bogomyakov at a conference of an inner circle at the party obkom made it known that Goloshchapov cannot remain as obkom second secretary. Grigoriy Mikhaylovich is now looking for "a job outside the oblast, without ruling out the possibility of a job outside the country."

I approached G.M. Goloshchapov himself for an explanation.

"Indeed, I am moving to another job. In my specialized field," Grigoriy Mikhaylovich replied.

"But the newspaper says that the decision was made behind closed doors and that it also involved pressure on you?"

"Well, this question should be asked of others..."

The reason behind Grigoriy Mikhaylovich's evidently laconic statement became clear after I had asked two Tyumen Obkom secretaries the same question—"How do you appraise the political situation within the oblast party organization?"

Yu.R. Klat:

"Everything deteriorated in particular after the elections of USSR people's deputies. As you may recall, people refused a vote of confidence to our obkom first secretary and, according to my belief, this refusal was justified. He should have resigned. After all, the obkom apparatus and its bureau have simply failed to abandon the old edict style all through the years of perestroyka.

"I have no desire to blame just one person, the top leader, for everything. We bureau members were equally involved and are not trying to evade blame. I also realize my own blunders and mistakes. But our attempts—and mine in particular—to change anything invariably came up against a solid brick wall of incomprehension. And how much can you achieve when your hands are tied? It is no surprise that the years of perestroyka have brought little change to the life of people in Tyumen, not to say that things have become worse. And never mind the specific results, we have always been past masters at submitting wonderful figures to our advantage. The unfortunate point is that the gap separating the obkom first secretary and the population groups which are directly involved in shaping public opinion is as wide as ever, and when we try to shape public opinion 'number one' often tells us: You are seeking cheap popularity.

"A party obkom plenum is scheduled for mid-January. I am convinced that this is the end of the road. This plenum must evaluate, critically and with utmost objectivity, the activity of the obkom bureau and of its first secretary personally. But let me emphasize this: It is not a question of just one man. The administrative edict system can simply drown even a superrevolutionary leader in the bureaucratic swamp. And the Tyumen party organization is not unique in this regard. I can see similar process under way in other oblasts. This is why the party's democratization needs efforts from both above and below."

V.P. Pervushin:

"Having held the office of obkom secretary for ideology for a short while (although my interlocutor has successfully worked in various positions in the oblast party organization for many years—I.O.), I constantly hear Communists asking the same old question: Does the obkom first secretary intend to resign? I think that there

can be no more graphic illustration of the mood within the oblast party organization. This question was already discussed at an obkom plenum last October. And almost all the participants (with one voting against and one abstaining) cast a vote of confidence in G.P. Bogomyakov. This plenum decision was not accepted by the oblast Communists. This is indicated also by the numerous letters arriving the the obkom. Look no further than this excerpt from a message from a large group of Communists from Tyumen to all Communists in the oblast: 'The practice of changes in leadership cadres... does not meet contemporary demands... The shuffling of cadres orchestrated by one and the same group of people... cannot confuse anyone. Serious concern is caused by the stance taken by G.P. Bogomyakov, present obkom first secretary..., who has finally lost the respect of the majority of oblast Communists and working people... A sizeable proportion of obkom members who cast a vote of confidence in G.P. Bogomyakov at the plenum... are themselves not trusted.'

"Recent pre-election sampling of public opinion in Tyumen and Khanty-Mansiyskiy Okrug," V. Pervushin went on, "where the most socially active part of the population lives, demonstrated the effect the situation within the oblast party organization has had on people. For example, this is how they replied to the question: Which category of candidate deputy would you prefer for election to the soviets? Only 5-10 percent of those polled intend to vote for representatives of the state or party apparatus. Where do we go from here, as the saying goes?"

Political life in the oblast has been especially tense in the last few days. It was further heated by an open letter from M.M. Metakov, member of the party obkom and chief of its Ideological Department, published by the local newspapers. Having described G.P. Bogomyakov's policy as one of intrigue and of gross and boorish diktat, Metakov demanded the obkom first secretary's immediate resignation.

A joint enlarged plenum of Tyumen Gorkom and rayon party committees was held (attended by primary organization secretaries). The agenda was: "On the Sociopolitical Situation and the Stance of Tyumen Communists as Regards the Situation Prevailing in the CPSU Obkom."

The plenum participants supported M.M. Metakov's letter. There were proposals that G.P. Bogomyakov should not be simply allowed to quietly retire on pension but that he should be held fully accountable and be dismissed as having lost people's trust. And that the obkom bureau should resign.

The city Communists demanded that an extraordinary oblast party conference be convened not later than May.

An obkom plenum is due to be held in Tyumen in a few days' time, but for the time being the obkom bureau has accepted its first secretary's resignation.

Yeltsin To Run for Election in Sverdlovsk

LD2401164590 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] USSR People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin has decided to run for a seat in the supreme legislature of the Russian Federation in Sverdlovsk, where he headed the regional party organization before receiving an appointment in Moscow. Under the national constitution a person may be deputy of two councils at once. Mr Yeltsin has told an election meeting that he will not back out of the rivalry for the post of president of the Russian Federation. This prospect is being favored by many of Yeltsin's supporters. He expressed the hope that the Russian Federation's parliament will be more democratic than the national parliament.

Stavropol Reservists Return Home

LD2401154690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] The last group of reserve soldiers who several days ago were temporarily called up in the Kuban and Don region have returned home to the Stavropol area. Among the returnees are (Nikishin), secretary of the CPSU kray committee, and about 60 other senior employees. Having donned military uniform they shared all difficulties with their fellow countrymen, from start to finish.

Officials Discuss Komsomol 'Crisis'

90UN0706A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, 20-26 Jan 90 pp 5-6

[V Lepekhin, instructor of All-Union Leninist Colmmunist Youth League (VKLSM) Central Committee, A. Matsaytis, first secretary of Lithuanian VLKSM, and S. Smirnov, secretary of VLKSM Central Committee, comment on Komsomol situation: "Komsomol: Crisis or Impasse?"; dates, places not given]

[Text]

V. Lepekhin, instructor of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee

It is no secret that the majority of Komsomol [Communist Youth League] members are a part of the VLKSM formally and that only the collectors of the dues remain in many primary organizations. From 1983 through 1988 the number of young workers joining the Komsomol declined sixfold (!), and of rural inhabitants, almost fivefold. The numbers of the Moscow City organization in 1986 declined by 44,000, in 1987 by 70,000, and in 1988 by 130,000. The situation is the same in a number of other Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the union republics.

In my view, the main reason for the present crisis in the Komsomol is the crisis of the "upper strata". In other words, this is a crisis of a system where power, authority,

rights, and opportunities are concentrated at the so-called "center," but essentially, in the hands of a dozen VLKSM Central Committee secretaries above both the elective authority and the apparatus. This power is fenced off from the millions of Komsomol members by a multitude of barriers, but it is on account of this that the "upper strata" are manifestly experiencing a shortage of the influx of fresh forces, new ideas, and striking, extraordinary personalities. A real leader cannot, as a rule, "grow" to the office of Central Committee secretary: The system of party- schedule selection of loyal and dependable cadres breaks or "mothballs" a striking personality while at the "approaches" to the executive chair.

The crisis of the "upper strata" is a consequence of the stagnation model of organization of the Komsomol, in accordance with which the executive bosses are formed according to the party schedule, from a limited list of persons and without consideration of the opinion of the Komsomol rank and file. From what circle, for example, is the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee elected? From the 35 million Komsomol members? From the 130,000 full-time Komsomol officials? No. From the few dozen members of the VLKSM Central Committee, and more likely still, from the several members usually forming the presidium of a Central Committee plenum. But who decides who will be leader of the league? Not, of course, the Komsomol rank and file.

The crisis of the "upper strata" engendered a crisis in the primary organizations. Words about lack of confidence in the VLKSM Central Committee, not to mention mass withdrawal from the Komsomol, have been appearing more often in the resolutions of Komsomol meetings.

But in order to decide how the VLKSM will escape from the crisis we evidently need to answer the question: What kind of Komsomol does the youth need? The concept of a new Komsomol does exist. It has been devised by a group of Komsomol officials from Moscow State University and a number of other organizations representing the "Surgut Alternative" movement. The essence of the proposed new Komsomol model is the priority of the primary organization and its independence on all matters without exception; a decision of the elective authorities takes effect only in the event of the primary organizations being in agreement with it. "It is not the 'center' and not the VLKSM Central Committee that should decide how much in the way of rights and liberty the 'primaries' should have but the primary organizations should determine the kind of Central Committee they need or whether they need one at all," a document of the group records. The primary organizations adopt, if they so desire, their own programs and rules, nominate their own leaders for the executive bodies and form, if necessary, or abolish rayon committees, city committees, and so forth.

According to the new model, the Komsomol is to change from having been an organization with a rigid structure into a movement of primary organizations; the authority of the apparatus should be reduced to a minimum; power is separated into legislative, executive, and supervisory; direct elections (by way of the nomination of delegates from the "primaries" by electoral okrug) at the time of formation of the executive, more precisely, coordinating bodies of the VLKSM are introduced; the party-schedule selection of cadres is abolished; and so forth.

Discussion With A. Matsaytis, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Youth League Central Committee

[Correspondent] Last June, at its 22d congress, the Lithuanian Komsomol declared that it was withdrawing from the VLKSM. What led to this decision?

[Matsaytis] First of all, the Lithuanian Republic cannot be independent until all its political structures are independent. The party and the Komsomol of Lithuania were previously just executors of the wishes of the highest executive authorities. For this reason our Komsomol reflected least the opinions of the young people, and most, the desires of the party authorities.

Currently, the VLKSM is very slow to restructure itself. And we decided that we could no longer wait for and refer to Moscow and that we ourselves had to take concrete steps, otherwise we would lose the Komsomol conclusively.

Second, there should remain in an organization only those who believe in it. It will now be possible to quit the Komsomol freely, and the ages of the members of our organization ranges from 14 to 35. The minority has the right to defend and uphold its opinion and form factions.

All rights belong to the primary organization, and it decides how many apparatchiks there will be in the rayon committee and what their work will be. The rayon committees and city organizations, in turn, determine the numbers of the Komsomol Central Committee machinery and its functions and rights. All of us, incidentally, were elected at a Komsomol congress and were not confirmed by the party's central authorities. And if the Komsomol members say that they do not need us, this will be the law for us.

Incidentally, the apparatus of the Komsomol Central Committee in Lithuania is, of all the union republics, the smallest—only 40 people—and it will be further reduced to 25. We have no privileges, not even our own store, and we have to wait in line after work.

[Correspondent] How now, following the separation, are your relations taking shape with the VLKSM, with Moscow?

[Matsaytis] Whereas at the VLKSM Central Committee plenum the rank and file of various republics supported us, the position of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau and the CPSU Central Committee is entirely unequivocal. Although it is incomprehensible to me why another communist league is unwilling to recognize us, the Communist Youth League.

The VLKSM Central Committee believes that there should be two communist youth leagues in Lithuania—the Lithuanian Komsomol and the VLKSM. That is, it turns out that our Lithuanian organization is not an heir to the ideas of the VLKSM. We simply did not expect such a turn of events, after all, our differences were only in form.

At the present time we have three basic contradictions with the VLKSM.

First, we believe that the VLKSM Central Committee was the instigator of the split on the nationality issue in our organization.

Currently 71 nationalities are represented in the Lithuanian Komsomol. All—Russians, Poles, Belorussians—voted for separation at our Komsomol congress. Yet the VLKSM proposes the creation in our republic of a further Komsomol organization, but this would inevitably lead to a split and, possibly, to an interfront being formed on the basis of the Komsomol. But the biggest merit of our Komsomol is that it is, perhaps, the sole international organization in Lithuania, and we wish to keep it such. After all, there is nothing worse than national conflict.

Second, the VLKSM prefers to preserve its former structure: all rights belong to the Central Committee, and the lower organizations are subordinate to it. We, however, have, in accordance with the rules, handed back all rights to the "primary," and the "primary" now dictates the Central Committee.

Third, we do not wish to see the Komsomol's relations with the party organized per the former model, where the Komsomol would be the simple executor of the party's will.

I can state responsibly that the party authorities of Lithuania no longer dictate to us today. Because the party today understands that whether there will be a party at all depends on how we view it.

We are, for all that, the younger generation which will replenish this party. We have to capture it from within if we wish to change it and change the very political system altogether. This, incidentally, is why I believe that a communist youth league is needed in Lithuania and in the union generally and that those who are proposing that it be abolished are wrong—we are the sole youth organization in the USSR that can really influence the political situation.

If within a large machine just one screw turns in the other direction, the old political system will disintegrate more rapidly, and perestroyka will proceed more quickly. This is the larger meaning of the restructuring of the Komsomol.

Opinion of VLKSM Central Committee Secretary S. Smirnov

I have known both authors—A. Matsaytis and V. Lepekhin—for several years and I respect their opinions, but am not prepared to agree with them on all matters.

Yes, among the reasons for the serious situation in which the Komsomol finds itself we may cite that which V. Lepekhin, my VLKSM Central Committee apparatus colleague, designated "crisis of the upper strata". But is this the main reason? Such a claim is at least contentious. After all, it knowingly or unwittingly engenders the illusion that it is sufficient to discover a truly democratic procedure of the election of Komsomol leaders, and the Komsomol will rid itself of its defects. Is this the case?

Things are far more complicated. The basis of the crisis in the Komsomol is the manifest discrepancy between the settled ideas concerning the essence, goals, and internal arrangement of the league and the rapidly developing process of the renewal of Soviet society and the rapidly changing reference points in the life and priorities of the youth.

How to overcome this discrepancy? I agree that this is impossible within the framework of the old model of the Komsomol with which we are familiar. V. Lepekhin believes that the desired version of the new model has been found by a group of Komsomol officials of Moscow State University, while A. Matsaytis sees it in the decisions of the 22d Lithuanian Komsomol Congress. I would note, however, that there are also many other proposals, such as, for example, reorganizing the Komsomol in a youth trade union and converting it into the youth "wing" of the party and into a league of organizations uniting the youth on a social basis. Nor, what is more, do the authors of each project have any less telling arguments. A debate is under way in connection therewith in the Komsomol organizations currently whose outcome will be summarized by the 21st VLKSM Congress in April.

I will not dispute the attractive aspects of the concept offered by the boys from Moscow State University: democratic spirit, a broadening of the liberties guaranteed the primary Komsomol organizations, and respect for the opinion not only of the majority but ultimately of each Komsomol member. But we have also to heed the opinion of those who believe that the realization of these principles in full could in the present situation lead to loss of the organizational fulcrum, the absolute helplessness of the elective authorities, the erosion of the political character of the VLKSM and its conversion into some amorphous conglomerate of primary organizations.

Incidentally, these misgivings are shared not only by Komsomol officials but also the VLSKM rank and file. For instance, when, at the recent all-union student forum, there arose the question: What is the Komsomol

today—a social and political organization or a democratic movement. The absolute majority of delegates answered: An organization.

Whereas this concept of the restructuring of the youth league is as yet theory, the 22d Lithuanian Komsomol Congress is a fait accompli. Its decisions evoked ambivalent opinions and were carefully analyzed by the VLKSM Central Committee ninth plenum. The plenum, specifically, recognized that a new youth organization had been created in Lithuania. It was simultaneously decided that Komsomol members wishing to maintain their statutory ties to the VLKSM should have such an opportunity, regardless of who they are by nationality: Lithuanian, Russian, or Belorussian.

There is no ill intention of the "center" in this decision. What is apparent, on the other hand, is something else—the position of the minority which disagreed with the decisions of the 22d Lithuanian Komsomol Congress and which, according to A. Matsaytis, should have the right to defend and uphold its opinion, organizationally included, is reflected.

And is it only in form that the Lithuanian Communist Youth League and the VLKSM differ? After all, in the Lithuanian Communist Youth League rules the primary mission is the achievement of full state sovereignty, whereas the socialist ideas and values which form the basis of the unity of the VLKSM are relegated to a secondary and tertiary position.

The rebukes leveled at the VLKSM Central Committee for it wanting to conserve the administrative-command model of the Komsomol are not interested in the priority of the primary organizations, and urging preservation of the old style of mutual relations with the party authorities are far-fetched, to say the least. And this can easily be seen by familiarizing oneself with the VLKSM Central Committee program statement for the 21st congress. However, I am firmly convinced that the renewal of the Komsomol cannot be achieved at the expense of the breakup of its unity.

Journalist, People's Deputy View Press Law

90US0382A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 1, 6 Jan 90 p 3

[Debate between G.V. Pryakhin, deputy chief of CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department, and A.Ye. Sebentsov, USSR people's deputy, moderated by Ye. Solomonov: "How Is Glasnost To Be Codified"; place, date not given]

[Text]

Dialogue of Party Functionary...

GEORGIY VLADIMIROVICH PRYAKHIN was born in 1947. He began his work as a journalist at the age of 17. He worked in the rayon and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as a correspondent, department editor in chief, political commentator, and as a deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting. He is a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department.

Georgiy Pryakhin is a member of the USSR Union of Writers, the author of the narratives "The Boarding School", "An Oriole Weeps Somewhere...", the novel "The Farewell of a Slavic Woman", essays, and stories. He is married and has four daughters.

...and a People's Deputy

ANDREY YEVGENYEVICH SEBENTSOV was born in 1945. He graduated from the Moscow Mining Institute; since 1968, he has been working at the Moscow Searchlight Plant as a designer and a department chief. He has vigorously participated in volunteer work and has published in the periodical press. He was nominated a candidate deputy by his mother enterprise. As a result, Andrey Sebentsov became the deputy in his district out of a field of six. At present, he is a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Issues of Legislation, Rule of Law, and Legal Order.

He is married and has four sons.

Solomonov: I understand that it is difficult for both of you to discuss the draft because you have been directly involved in working on it. Nonetheless, please try to be as objective and self-critical as possible. Moreover, try to replicate some of your working discussion in the past. However, for starters please evaluate the published draft Law on the Press as a whole.

Pryakhin: I am in favor of it. Why?

What is our society most afraid of at present? Despite all the cataclysms, sharp contradictions, and difficulties of our reality, we still fear a return to the past more than anything else. Indeed, the mood of our society is mixed, and there is a nostalgic mood among others; however, I will venture that the reluctance to reverse past [illegible] is prevalent. This is a concern of the workers, the peasants, and in particular the intelligentsia which in general is highly sensitive to such matters. It is not called the sensor of the nation for nothing.

It is interesting that, as a rule, the talk of a "foreground surface" in mass circulation of the time when M.S. Gorbachev turns out to be not in the public's field of vision. I think that someone's designs are not to blame for this. It is just that historical freedom is a factor that intelligentsia is sensitive to, even the people have good memories, and it is headed by our memory. [illegible] chosen ... the habit and tradition of [illegible] future, and that of the current might only [illegible] individuals. In our country, personality [illegible] more and to this day exerts a huge influence on [illegible] by way of revenge for its having [illegible] ... role in history. For so long [illegible] ... fought with [illegible]. It is not easy to [illegible] ... balancing [illegible] ... [illegible] ... to the past. [illegible]

of this mechanism, I would say, its driving force. I hope that, in its turn, the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media will become a safeguard of glasnost. To be sure, television and radio are classified as "other mass media". However, in keeping with the logic of life, at present they are more up-to-date and powerful. After all, it is not the name but the essence of the law that is important.

There are people who believe that as soon as the law is adopted everything will be resolved. No, this will not happen. We cannot make the role of any law absolute, and in particular the role of this law because in this instance we are dealing with a quite delicate and even emotional matter. I repeat that the law is one of the mechanisms of a living balance preventing a recurrence of stagnation.

To my mind, this variant of the draft has been set forth in a lively and easy-to-understand manner, in a good, nonbureaucratic language. The law itself contains the elements of an essay. This is unexpected in the case of such documents, and the draft sort of advertises itself through this peculiarity. To be sure, by the same token it scares some people...

Sebentsov: I will note that this law is necessary in order to safeguard glasnost but is by far insufficient. Laws on the freedom of information, on archives, on procedures for classification and declassification are also necessary. The foundations of glasnost should be consistently built into all laws regulating the operation of the organs of power. It is also important to free the laws from an ideological burden. I believe that the ideological effect of the draft is due to the very fact that it is restricted to legal norms.

Pryakhin: We should give credit not only to your group but also to the authors of the well-known alternative draft the influence of which on this draft is obvious. Initially, the ideas of different groups negated each other. However, convergence set in later, and diffusion began. As a result the variant emerged which we now have.

I repeat that I am in favor of it. However, this is where I will stop the flow of compliments. Remarks and suggestions will follow. In all of this, I want to be properly understood. In this case, these are not the ambitions of an official with whom they did not agree (we did a lot of arguing until our throats were sore!). I proceed at present not only from my post but also from my own experience as a journalist and a writer, including the experience of mutual relations with editors, editorial offices, and publishing houses. Any writer will have a great deal to tell you about in this matter. Read, say, "The Seeing Staff" by V. Astafyev.

I think that the draft law is not consistently democratic.

Sebentsov: This is how I would put it: On the one hand, the draft is sufficiently democratic, and it has been praised for this. On the other hand, it is very rigid. I could also criticize it for being undemocratic.

The draft is sufficiently firm with regard to the journalist, the founder, the publisher, and the distributor—all the participants in the process. It establishes a quite rigid framework within which all of them have a right to operate.

Solomonov: Apparently, you like it that way. After all, you worked on it. This is why it is not quite clear whether you are praising your labor or criticizing it.

Sebentsov: In the absence of the law, a new form of suppressing freedom may emerge under the guise of freedom. I would like to see this document "in operation" so that practice would show its advantages and drawbacks. Something could be changed subsequently. After all, in the current situation we have both journalists restricted by illegal fetters and arbitrariness, as well as the freedom of the press restricted by nothing, i.e., there are newspapers at present which do not depend on anyone at all, at least not as far as can be seen. I mean the newspapers which they sell in, say, Pushkin Square. In the press which comes to us from the Baltic republics, a complete freedom of opinions which are unconventional for us is found. This law also introduces a framework and provides conditions for responsibility with regard to this "unbridled" freedom. I believe that at present many publications do not even give a thought to getting registered. However, if they retain their unregistered status after the law takes effect the authorities will be obligated to use sanctions. The law forbids "telephone rule" but prompts journalists to be mindful of an opportunity to be taken to court.

Solomonov: Is it not strange that we began our conversation with restrictions?

Sebentsov: There is no law without restrictions. A law always draws certain boundaries which cannot be overstepped. The issue is the kind of values which these boundaries protect—democratic or totalitarian.

Solomonov: Unfortunately, we have no mechanism which would clearly define the boundaries of what is allowed. Supposedly, the Constitution says it all. However, have we charged many people with propagating ethnic hostility? For example, much has been written in our country about Pamyat, about other nationalist phenomena. So what? At present, most zealous nationalists say or write that they only are patriots of their nation and their people. Indeed, how do you draw the line here? So, during World War II a newspaper appeared in America which everyone suspected of pro-Fascist views. However, a mere suspicion is not enough. Subsequently, scientists carried out a content analysis on the basis of which the newspaper was taken to court and closed down. Therefore, there should be some refined mechanism rather than just a law. Say, it is entered in the draft: Divulging a state secret is not permissible. However, who is going to determine whether a state secret has been divulged or not?

Sebentsov: Of course, the skill of applying the law is not worked out immediately. It is also important to reinforce

the court system, enhance its prestige and independence. There is a reason why the USSR Supreme Soviet, and especially our Committee for the Issues of Legislation, Rule of Law, and Legal Order, pay much attention to this. As far as a state secret is concerned, an editor in chief cannot divulge it himself, just like that, because he does not know it. This issue does not arise in our everyday life because people hired for work associated with state secrets sign a secrecy pledge and accordingly have a duty to protect such secrets. If a state secret is divulged a trial will determine the source. Since an editor should be an educated man he will be held responsible under the law just the same for divulging the secret to the extent he is personally guilty.

Pryakhin: However, I repeat, I would like you to return to the insufficiently democratic nature of the draft....

Here is a specific example: There is an article in the draft concerning the convictions of a journalist which gives him the right to refuse to write an item which contradicts his views. Undoubtedly, this is a provision in the spirit of our time. However, let us imagine that I, a journalist, came to work for an editorial office. I considered my convictions to be in line with the policy of the newspaper. However, having worked for a month, I found that my views differ from those of the management and the policy of the newspaper. Nonetheless, I went on working because there were no offers from other publications. Meanwhile, the editor gave me an assignment, and I refused, and once more, and yet again... I refused assignments with delight. My self-esteem grew—was I not a principled person?

As they say, the editor swallowed hard: The law was on my side. Something of a stalemate developed. How are such conflicts to be resolved?

I consider a contract system to be the most efficient device. A labor contract for half a year, a year is signed with a journalist. Once the term expires, the parties extend the contract if they are satisfied with each other. The contract is dissolved in keeping with all legal nuances if their positions have not drawn closer together, or if the editorial office finds the professional performance of the journalist unsatisfactory.

You may rebuke me: Supposedly, this is an element of editorial arbitrariness, supposedly, the contract is like the sword of Damocles. I believe the opposite, I believe that this is an instrument for the social protection of a journalist. This is more democratic and up-to-date.

Sebentsov: However, Georgiy Vladimirovich, the law encourages such a system. In the draft, the notion "journalist' is defined in a way that allows for any kind of relationship between a mass medium and a person employed by it. He may be a staff employee, and may just write for the publication. There are people who are offended by the failure of the draft to refer even in passing to worker and rural correspondents. However, in the draft they are referred to as journalists, just journalists endowed with full rights.

Pryakhin: Somehow, Andrey Yevgenyevich, I fail to see that the draft encourages this mutually democratic system in the spirit of competitiveness. As far as full rights are concerned, I have a complaint to make. As I see it, the draft is insufficiently democratic in this regard. There is a touch of journalistic snobbery in it. I will quote an example from memory: "The editorial statute is adopted by a meeting of the collective of **journalists.**" Meanwhile, Yuriy Borisovich who is moderating our dialogue certainly remembers the courier Nadezhda Dmitriyevna from the time of working for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, as I do. She was a saint! She began working for the editorial office in wartime. She is not a member of the Union of Journalists, not a creative-art employee. She just takes the offprints of newspaper pages to various offices. She plods to the printing plant, upstairs-downstairs, her feet ailing. She also became famous at one point for the then Editor in Chief Yuriy Petrovich Voronov apologizing to her personally. He decided that he was not right and apologized.

This is a conflict which merits the attention of a legislator in an epoch of democratization: The editor is not right, but a simple worker who is a member of the same collective is. Under our draft, Nadezhda Dmitriyevna has no vote at all. How about it?

Hence my amendment to the draft law. The notion of an editorial office collective rather than a collective of journalists should be introduced in it.

I am certain that in an editorial office, whether it produces a newspaper or operates at the radio and television, **the infrastructure is responsible for half the success!** We, the creative people, are vitally dependent on the technicians, on the technology of producing a printed publication, on the light and sound in preparing programs. Our "glitches" are frequently entailed by the technical aspect of the matter.

Is it worthwhile to leave the workers out so blatantly when, for example, in the West the notion of a company as "a single family" is vigorously promoted? What I propose is not the slogan "closer to the people" but mutual social responsibility and justice. In its turn, separation brings about the decline of motivation for creative work among workers. On the average, a printing plant worker in our country makes R202, which is not much. If we take into account the imperfection of prices for printing work, the schedule of operations, and social conditions, it becomes clear that a printing plant, as well as a television technical center, is now a zone of heightened social tension. Should we exacerbate it?

A while ago, my other colleagues at the time and I happened to be the originators of the program "Good Evening, Moscow!", "Look," and "The 12th Floor," so you will have difficulty branding me a hard-boiled conservative: In this case, I have formidable credentials as "a revolutionary..." So, when we made the program "Good Evening, Moscow!" equipment was in short supply, and the workers did not want to work overtime.

Then we decided to set up a comprehensive brigade of which not only the creative arts employees but also all the technicians became members: Light operators, drivers, assistants. This is the way it used to be: At the end of the work day, all technicians made themselves scarce. Meanwhile, in a comprehensive brigade the final result became everyone's common goal.

Sebentsov: I believe that we try to attribute too many things to the interests of the working class. This is not nec ssarily legitimate.

Recently, guys from the plant called me and told me about the following. Recently, the plant supposedly acted as the initiator of a volunteer Saturday work drive. When the most curious individuals tried to establish the originator, he was not to be found at the enterprise. The initiative came from on high.

Let us still try to separate the publisher and the editorial office of a newspaper. A contract should exist between them which would distribute, among other things, their profits. It is just not serious to be afraid of wronging someone in the process because these are normal contractual relations.

The functions should be separate in principle: The founder is the ideological parent of a newspaper, the editorial office is a creative collective of employees which compiles information for the mass medium. Next comes the publisher who takes little interest in what is written but who is interested in selling this and making a profit.

Pryakhin: As you, Andrey Yevgenyevich, have been able to see, I am an extremely obliging debater, and in this case I agree that we cannot have an absolute dictate of either the publisher or even the founder. One of the people's deputies when he was just a poet said: "A poet in Russia is more than just a poet... (do we get more deputies by losing poets, writers, and independent thinkers?). Just the same, a newspaper or a magazine in Russia more than anywhere else belongs to the people rather than to the editorial office, the publisher, and even the founder. This is how we have so few of them. This is why there is this special emotional and ethical atmosphere surrounding them.

So much for the "I agree" part. Now about something else, about notorious profits and a market mentality in the sphere of information. Is everything in this matter that uncontroversial? If we are going to emphasize profits alone, the fact that everything earned will be retained by the publication, does this not pose the threat of commercializing our publications too much?

Who wants to break away from the embrace of publishing houses? Mass publications first of all. At present, a publishing house, as a rule, serves several publications: There is a common accounting office, common infrastructure, and so on. Separation means increasing the number of administrative employees severalfold: In this case, everybody has to have "everything of his own." Is this the modern thing to do in an era of concerns?

It is more efficient to have a multitude of most varied press organs within the framework of a single publishing house, from elitist publications without a mass appeal (they are also needed!) to commercial publications. The same thing, the same principle, applies to televison: More channels, good and different channels! The Springer Publishing House is a conglomerate, a complex. Given this comprehensive approach, one and the same publishing house may bring out highly artistic literature, various popular publications, and elitist writings not generating profits.... Somehow, I have not heard of someone embarking on the publication of new volumes in the epic of Marcel Proust...

Combining profitable and unprofitable publications in a unified complex is a more modern and democratic alternative.

Sebentsov: This is possible, but I also interpret this as striving for a monopoly and unity of control....

Pryakhin: However, we have quite a few patently unprofitable publications! Look at a number of magazines published by the Academy of Sciences. What are we to do—close them down? The progress of scientific thought is impossible without such publications. What about educational literature? Is it unnecessary, just as scientific literature is? What about books for children?

Going back to the draft law, this is, perhaps, the wording we should have: A mass medium amounts to an editorial office in combination with a publishing house or, in the case of television, an editorial office in combination with a television station. We should provide a more specific definition of what a mass medium is.

Solomonov: It also seems to me that the draft does not set forth the relationship between the publisher and the consumer.

Sebentsov Only market relations are built in, and nothing else. By now, it has become impossible to make someone subscribe to some publication or listen to a particular program through administrative or party means. If an individual so desires he subscribes to it, and buys it. If he does not want to, he is free not to. He has the main right, the right of a participant in a market operation. He votes with his wallet, and as a result affects the quality of the publication. If there are going to be many editorial offices a fair ratio of incomes which makes it possible to live well for both the journalists and those who produce the newspaper will always be established.

Pryakhin: That is so. However, recently I have been asking the following question more and more frequently: How come we have more and more of those wishing to publish a newspaper, and fewer and fewer of those wishing to breed chickens? Is total literacy to blame? Literacy is a factor here—the point is that something akin to hidden subsidies exists in the sphere of producing

information given the current imperfection of wholesale prices. Cooperative members and simply resourceful people caught on to this fast. After all, we have been breeding chickens all along in a pluralistic manner, whereas in the course of publishing a newspaper or a book we transfer money from one state coffer to another—so much for prices. There is an opportunity for "windfall" profits here, especially given the current environment, and this is why the business circles fell over themselves rushing into this sphere. The altruism of our "private sector" is common knowledge; however, I believe that in this instance we are dealing with a desire to bring benefits to more than just our society.

The average salary of a printing plant worker is R202, and that of a letter carrier delivering newspapers is R163. I am certain that the earnings of the enthusiasts of the cooperative or "private" press are altogether not on par with these numbers. There is much for all of us to think about in this matter, think rather than act rashly. One of my teachers said: "He writes well who thinks well." Apparently, he also meant writing laws.

Sebentsov: However, this should not be a pretext for restricting the right to start a publication. This right is an element of freedom, and it should be regulated by the demand of readers rather than administratively.

Pryakhin: I agree with you. However, we must put in order our wholesale prices for newsprint, printing services, and postal services, as well as prices for chicken feed. This **order** will make enterprising people think—could it be better and more useful to produce something tangible? Then selfless individuals will emerge from among the enthusiasts, genuine Sytins....

Solomonov: The following point of view also exists in our society: The people are not yet mature enough for the Law on the Press, for the law to work full tilt; neither our social consciousness nor the economic base are ready.

Pryakhin: There are historic situations which every people embarking on the path of democratic transformations should go through. We have to go through the first congresses of real people's deputies, and the first attempt to enact the Law on the Press, and many other things. A society cannot become democratically mature on command, just like that. This is a long and tormenting process, though it is also captivating, and it is a humanizing influence on us.

Sebentsov: Certainly, this law, as well as any other, is a part of a system of developing social relations. However, there were attempts to do it so that the draft law would take into account everything conceivable. Voices were heard to the effect: "What is to be done if we fail to take this into account? And if we fail to take that into account...."

If we squeeze everything into one law the latter will not take off, just as an overloaded plane. This is why the law contains a certain declarative element. I believe that the law will be able to become fully operational at the next stage of implementing perestroyka, when a radical economic reform begins. In part, the law is designed for the future. Under our current circumstances, it makes it possible for the journalists to feel more secure in their collectives of journalists. Of course, their responsibilities also increase.

Solomonov: Let us talk about responsibility in the event a person has suffered moral or financial losses. Who, which collective organ, is going to determine whether to print or not to print a refutation? The wronged party most frequently appeals to the party organs. Some of the readers always work with carbon paper—a letter to the editorial office and a copy to the CPSU Central Committee. How are we to combat this denunciation mentality?

Pryakhin: I would steer clear of expressions such as "denunciation mentality:" A person has a right to protect himself in every legal way.

As far as the refutation is concerned, in the event personal rights and dignity have been infringed on a person is within his rights to even demand that it be printed in a manner which satisfies the wronged party rather than the one more convenient for the editorial office which has allowed the flaw to occur. After all, sometimes it does happen like in the joke about a smuggler ant who led an elephant with a loaf of bread tied to him across the border and told the border guards that this was a sandwich rather than an elephant.

Sebentsov: The draft indeed does not say where a refutation is to be printed, and what its size should be. I believe that all of this can be worked out only under actual conditions, when we have some experience. At present, it is impossible to adopt specific norms. The practice of consideration of complaints and petitions by the courts will indicate many things.

Pryakhin: Did we not emphasize the courts too much in the draft law? Many issues are referred to them whereas I do not think that this is where the issues of glasnost should be resolved....

Sebentsov: The courts are the only device for a legal settlement of conflicts. Unfortunately, the condition of the courts and the standard of their work are extremely poor. The political channel for complaints is vigorously used in our country. Our Soviet man makes carbon copies of more than just responses to articles. His faucet leaks, so he sends his complaint... to the rayon committee of the party. After all, this is an absolutely barbaric, abnormal situation. A tenant should have a contract with the organization providing the apartment in which all conditions are set forth. If a DEZ [Building Operations Directorate] or a ZhEK [Office of Building Maintenance] do not meet the conditions the court will help the tenant, pardon me for the rude word, "to take the DEZ to the cleaners." The DEZ will be able to do the same if a tenant violates rules for operating equipment.

Solomonov: However, this calls for a different quality of the courts. I know from the experience of court cases of our newspaper that judges should be highly skilled.

Sebentsov: This is exactly the point. However, we have no right to wait for such courts to appear. This resembles the situation in our economy. They say that we will not be able to switch to the principles of a market economy until the market is saturated with goods. However, the goods cannot appear without these principles being implemented. So, a vicious circle emerges.

Only actual practice may answer many questions.

Solomonov: Will actual practice change mutual relations between the founder and the editorial office? Say, you, Georgiy Petrovich, frequently call editorial offices and, putting it mildly, correct journalists and leaders of party publications.

Pryakhin: After all, the point here is not whether or not I call. Firstly, the point is for the message in your phone call to be in keeping with your conscience—say what you might, but in this matter perestroyka has made its ennobling corrections. We cannot accomplish much resorting to complete noninterference and just complementing each other. Reverse calls also happen—"for advice." Of course, it is easier to avoid giving advice; however, at present being definitive and the ability to assume responsibility for something, including advice, command a premium rather than passing the buck. Recently, we have received many calls associated with the material-technical issues of glasnost (though this would appear not to be the domain of the Ideological Department): Printing facilities are bursting at the seams, there is a shortage of newsprint. Specialists say that in 1990 newsprint worth more than 200 million foreign-currency rubles must be purchased abroad. This would be enough for several paper-making machines. I am saying this so that they know: Indeed, a material price should be paid for the subscriptions boom and glasnost; the government does not have it easy, and neither do we.

Generally, I call both the editorial offices and publishing houses. Worse yet, I visit editorial offices much more seldom than I should. As a rule, instructors are forever gone on business trips. These business trips are not of a punitive, but rather a protective nature as far as the journalists are concerned.

Incidentally, on recent business trips our instructors had to defend not only journalists but also people's deputies.

Sebentsov: Incidentally, our work on this draft has created an absolutely new situation for the Ideological Department and the party organs in general. Somewhere, this sentence was even spoken: What kind of an outrageous thing is it, the Supreme Soviet is beginning to develop laws—this has never happened and can never be. The deputies sort of seized the initiative, but the party organs also met them halfway. This is a sign of the times.

Solomonov: Elections of leaders are also a sign of the times. The draft law also says: The editor may be elected....

Pryakhin: I am not sure that a majority will necessarily elect the best man. Alas, we should generally be more careful about the old axiom: The majority is always right, the collective is always right. You know that a collective may elect the most convenient enterprise director or editor in chief rather than the best. A director cannot be good just because he has been elected rather than appointed. I would not make the principle of elections absolute even in the sphere of material production, to say nothing of the sphere of journalism. Our penchant for simple, slogan-like solutions, for panaceas has done us a disservice on many occasions....

Sebentsov: I would not make any one article of the draft absolute. We should consider this draft law broadly and freely, without thinking that it contains some issues which, as they say, merit a fight to the death.

Solomonov: All the more so because a lot can change in the course of the public discussion....

Sebentsov: Pardon me, but in general I do not think very much about the procedure of public discussion. The people who are satisfied are not going to write "by all means do not change a thing." The people will write who do not like something, those who will want to expand individual provisions. There is also the danger of the remarks received being used as a foundation for destroying the democratic basis of the draft. To be sure, there is another very interesting aspect. In the course of a public discussion, people begin to understand what is at issue. This is the main and, to my mind, most significant result. That is to say, discussions are instructive. Ideas and provisions are comprehended.

Pryakhin: Indeed, the current process of democratization turns out to be no less important for society than the result, perhaps, even more than the result....

Sebentsov: Most of the ideas and proposals that will emerge in the course of discussions have been tried many times by those who have worked on the draft. I assure you that there will be nothing new. After all, we have enlisted very many specialists and sought advice.

Here is an example for you: A representative of the communications sector, a USSR people's deputy, made a very correct and passionate speech in the Supreme Soviet. She referred to difficulties with deliveries, the wages of letter carriers, and many other things. However, in the law everything that she referred to is expressed in a single sentence: Relations between the publisher and the distributor are based on a contract. You see—everything is in the contract, and in the law there is but a line.

Pryakhin: Let us not forget that there is a very strong subjective, moral aspect of our work.

I recall myself at age 17, when I started working for a rayon newspaper. My department chief was a man who had changed many posts and trades in his lifetime. Our joint creative work consisted of him dictating editorials and me mastering a typewriter. He used to come in and say: "Today we are going to write about construction." I inserted a sheet of paper into the typewriter and, while he was walking around the office collecting his thoughts, managed to bang: "All of our country is one huge construction sight of the seven-year plan." I already knew that he was going to say these very words, and I reeled them off without thinking that, perhaps, the fact that the entire country is a construction site is at the root of all our troubles. What about other cliches? In its time, journalism did a lot for the enlightenment of our society but it also did a lot to promote stagnation.

It turns out that at present I and many of us, those who write, should repent, and then the intonation of our calls for comprehensive repentance would not be that imperative.

A writing person, a filming person, or a person with a microphone has never been a utilitarian, mirror copier of reality.

There were a great many indignant letters when OGONEK printed a portrait of a front-line veteran with a caption under the picture "Stalin is with them!" After all, everything was supposedly extremely objective: The man was holding a book by Stalin in his hands. To be sure, in addition to the ribbons on his chest, he had four chevrons for his wounds.

The truth is three-dimensional, it cannot be squeezed into slogans, including picture slogans of the type "Stalin is with them!" Alas, this would be too simple. Incidentally, I think that very recently OGONEK has displayed broader views and greater tolerance. This is not just more useful and fruitful. It is more interesting. After all, it is boring indeed when you turn the cover and know in advance who and what awaits you inside.

Individual people and entire peoples frequently see each other only through the eyes of journalists. I do not take issue with appeals for "the truth and nothing but the truth!", but I do add that talent and good will are needed along with the truth.

Party Must Adapt To Cope With Informals

PM1201113190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with V.L. Timonin, deputy secretary of a Yaroslavl plant party committee, by own correspondent M. Ovcharov: "Without Barricades. Party Official on Informal Movements"; date not specified; second paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Yaroslavl—[Ovcharov] Valeriy Leonidovich, Yaroslavl is well known in the country as one of the most lively centers for informal movements, which are represented not only by the People's Front but also by the "Green Branch" ecological club, the "Memorial" society, the workers' club, the "Movement for People's Power," and so on. Big, noisy rallies, stormy debates at the stadium and the Political Enlightenment Center, wall posters, bills, appeals, and mass actions have all become a customary sight in the city. Unfortunately, confrontation between informals and the "apparatus" has also become customary. Is this confrontation warranted? [Correspondent ends]

Our conversation with Valeriy Leonidovich Timonin, deputy secretary of a party committee at a plant where informals are particularly broadly represented, on a subject that worries everyone today began with this question.

[Timonin] Some 18 months ago some people in Yaroslavl official circles, indulging in wishful thinking, would have liked to present all informals without exception to people as damaging. Saying that half of them bore Soviet power a terrible grudge, while the others had just escaped from psychiatric hospitals. How far-removed this all is from the truth! By and large they are people who see no chance of realizing their potential within public organizations' pro forma official structures. Communists are no exception. A CPSU member, unable to prove his worth within a primary party organization, attends rallies, debates, and informal associations. Why? Because he is perfectly well aware that if he speaks at a primary organization meeting, his words will at best be recorded in the minutes and then lie in a "storage" file—that's all, the whole result. That is the best-case scenario.

[Ovcharov] And the worst?

[Timonin] The worse involves some trouble. Who likes criticism...? But within an informal organization people probably hear him out and no one will persecute him for voicing very bold and radical proposals. What is more, he knows that informals will invariably take his ideas into consideration if, of course, they are practical.

The problem of informals is also the problem of the party's vanguard guiding and leading function. To put it more broadly, it is also the question of our state's future political structures. Let us not close our eyes to the fact that the party is also experiencing a crisis in conjunction with the crisis in society. Last year at our plant alone 238 people left or were expelled from the party. Moreover, this trend is increasing. The activity of alternative forces, politicized informal groups, and associations is further evidence of this crisis.

I would single out three categories of informals. There are those who are within the mainstream of perestroyka's avowed values, ruthlessly and uncompromisingly revealing social evils in our society and asserting the principles of freedom, democracy, and glasnost. At any rate, that is what they proclaim in their documents although, as we have seen for ourselves, declarations frequently do not coincide with real actions. I would

include, for instance, the Yaroslavl People's Front as informals of this kind. There are organizations that have emerged amid the increase in national awareness: The ecological struggle, the struggle to combat alcoholism, the struggle to revive national traditions.... But then they fell back or are falling back on subjectivist and even extremist positions. The third category is represented by those informal associations which, from the very outset, proclaimed themselves to be alternative associations embarking on a path of confrontation with the CPSU. They include above all the Democratic Union.

[Ovcharov] What is your prediction for the future? Where are the informals going?

[Timonin] I believe that, having recovered from the childish ailments of leftish inclinations, some will embark nonetheless on the path of actively fighting for perestroyka and will, with their characteristic radicalism, exert massive pressure with a view to speeding up the perestroyka processes. Others will go to pieces organizationally. There are a host of examples of this kind. For instance, the Yaroslavl People's Front split into the People's Front and the "Movement for People's Power" owing to internal clashes.

[Ovcharov] Is that a positive phenomenon?

[Timonin] It is probably not the best way, nonetheless. As a result of the split some are continuing to grow radical, while others swell the ranks of the disillusioned and indifferent who generally wash their hands of everything. Alas, against the backdrop of economic crisis, in conditions of the continuing domination of the administrative-edict system, particularly at local level, and in the atmosphere of social discontent over the pace of perestroyka, the developing radicalization will, I believe, further incite informals to take up extreme positions. Look at the dynamics. In summer 1988 when the People's Front had just emerged in Yaroslavl all the speeches at the large rallies began and ended with the resounding beating of breasts and assurances that the People's Front advocated and would implement perestroyka, that it was with the CPSU. Now many people who spoke then in the name of the 19th party conference are already talking openly about the "original sin of Marxism" and the mistakes made by Lenin and the October Revolution, clearly rejecting our history and denying CPSU ideology and policy.

[Ovcharov] As a party official, such trends cannot, of course, fail to alarm you?

[Timonin] Of course. Confrontation is simply fatal for our society in its present state. Confrontation is the way to anarchy, and it is one step from anarchy to dictatorship. That is why I incline to close cooperation with the positive informal, albeit quite radical trend, but by means of perestroyka.

[Ovcharov] What is needed for such cooperation?

[Timonin] We must cooperate. We must not control or look on from the sidelines, instead of working. I have the impression that many party members simply do not understand what is happening. Suppose that a party committee instructor attends a People's Front rally and does not enter into the polemics, but then carefully records in his notebook everything the speakers say in order to report back to his leadership later. Is that political work?

Let me recall summer 1988 once again. The city was rocked by events concerning the election of F. Loshchenko, former first secretary of the oblast party committee, as a delegate to the 19th party conference. Radical forces consolidated and the rudiments of the People's Front appeared on the crest of this turbulent social wave. What was happening in official circles? Utter confusion.... In this complex situation we, at the motor plant party committee, decided unequivocally that we must not let the situation get out of hand.

The following announcement was made after a large rally at the "Shinnik" Stadium: "Comrade motor builders, participants in the movement to promote perestroyka, and the People's Front, we ask you to assemble in such-and-such a sector after the rally...." This announcement was made by our party committee. We raised the question as follows: Let us set up our own People's Front structure at the plant. Fancy, when we held an open honest discussion with people, no one brushed us aside, calling us bureaucrats and apparatchiks. We allocated the so-called "Round Hall" at the Palace of Culture and Technology for the People's Front debating club. We decided together that a rally was not the place for elaborating anything constructive. It needed a debate in which any motor builder, any person, could take part. An organizational committee was also set up, comprising members of the action group and both the plant's party committee deputy secretaries, along with several party organizers capable of profound thinking on progressive positions.

[Ovcharov] As a party official, do you always reach mutual understanding with the People's Front?

[Timonin] Of course not. There were people on the plant People's Front committee who from the outset embarked on setting up an independent structure, and later they joined forces with the Yaroslavl motor plant informal workers' club. I will be honest and admit that I did not force myself on its council, but I did not refuse when I was elected to it. Although I said that I reserved my right to uphold my own stance.

[Ovcharov] What compelled you to make this statement?

[Timonin) Judge for yourself.... Even Igor Borisovich Shamshev, one of the leaders of the Yaroslavl People's Front, who attended the first sitting of the workers' club as a guest, sharply protested about the club's original draft statute. He said roughly the following: You seem to be meeting now to adopt a statute which resembles the

statute of a party struggling deep underground. Incidentally, the workers' club, like any other informal organization, is heterogeneous: For instance, a group of its council members embarked on the social defense of their comrades against the administrative tyranny and trade union inertia which often occur. That is a good thing. But there are also people within the club council who firmly uphold extreme positions. Suppose there were unsuccessful attempts to incite the motor builders to strike, without our having serious grounds. Some people are inclined to seize everything from official structures—say, from the trade union—irrespective of whether it is progressive or not. So, we must persuade people and prove our case. There is no other way.

[Ovcharov] You get the impression that informals have forced the party committee to change its work style?

[Timonin] Yes, that is the case. We cannot keep aloof from the stormy process of the politicization of the masses. The party must generate ideas born among the people. It does not have the right to lag behind events and wait for other leaders to seize the initiative. If the party brings up topical and highly attractive ideas, people will follow it. The more ideas we have that reflect the population's interests, the more reliable CPSU prestige will be. But we lose the initiative too often. For instance, Yaroslavl's party and soviet organs proposed eliminating rayons within the city. This idea was discussed heatedly at a joint debate between the People's Front and the city CPSU committee and won support on the whole. It was a splendid opportunity to switch from confrontation to compromise. But.... The idea got "bogged down" in some offices. The party's political initiative was lost, and then the "Movement for People's Power," a breakaway group from the People's Front, latched onto the idea.

[Ovcharov] Why does this happen?

[Timonin] Because, the party has still not adapted to political work—that's the paradox! Some Communists degenerate within closed hierarchical structures. The apparatus is selected on the basis of the nomenklatura. Elections within the party are "rigged" and based on Stalinist instructions. But Communists are refusing to put up with this now. Incidentally, the plant has elaborated and published the party organization's platform for the 28th Congress following a long debate. The platform's basic principles are as follows: Direct, multiple-candidate elections of party leaders—ranging from the party group organizer to the general secretary. And direct, multiple-candidate elections of all congress delegates from party okrugs.

Official Cited on Foreign Periodicals

PM1801123590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with L.B. Alfimov, director of "Sovinperiodika" firm, by G. Charodeyev: "How To Subscribe to TIME Magazine"; date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] In an interview with IZVESTIYA (No. 341, 1989) USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy stated that we are on the threshold of radical changes. There is already the USSR Council of Ministers decision to bring our information practice up to the level of all-European standards. The Soviet Union is thus implementing the Vienna accords and confirming by deeds its intention to turn Europe into "a continent of glasnost and openness." L.B. Alfimov, director of the "International Book" all-union association's "Sovinperiodika" firm, describes how successfully this process is advancing in the field of the exchange of periodicals.

[Alfimov] We are trying to overcome our information isolation from the rest of the world—we are exporting Soviet periodicals abroad and importing newspapers and journals to the USSR. In the past few months alone there has been a considerable increase in the distribution of foreign publications in the Soviet Union. One example: As of this year 1,000 copies of TIME magazine are being distributed. Of course, that is not much. The demand for such popular publications in our country is considerably higher. Unfortunately, "Soyuzpechat," the main distributer, has not special institutions studying demand. In fact it engages in collecting advance orders. But even in this situation "Sovinperiodika" cannot always meet orders. That is connected with our limited hard currency potential.

[Charodeyev] In what Soviet cities can Western periodicals now be bought?

[Alfimov] Until September last year newspapers and journals from the United States, Britain, the FRG, and other countries were distributed for rubles only in Moscow, Leningrad, the capitals of the union republics, and Sochi and Yalta. Today "Soyuzpechat" has begun to receive orders from our country's oblast centers too. As of 1990 recent periodicals can also be bought for hard currency in Moscow's "Beriozka" stores and in hotels where foreign tourists are staying.

We were told by V.L. Romanova, chief of the Moscow City "Soyuzpechat" production association retail trade section, that Western periodicals are now reaching 50 newspaper kiosks in Moscow and also 50 various organizations and enterprises in the capital.

[Charodeyev] That means that it is possible to acquire THE NEW YORK TIMES or THE WASHINGTON POST freely in oblast cities?

[Alfimov] No, unfortunately. These newspapers are very voluminous and weigh a lot. Their delivery by air is an expensive pleasure. For the same reason even in Europe they are not that widely distributed. They are replaced there by the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, published in Paris. Our firm now receives over 700 copies of the newspaper and in the very near future we believe this figure will increase to 1,000.

[Charodeyev] In concluding contracts with foreign publishes do you stipulate deadlines for the delivery of newspapers and journals to the Soviet Union?

[Alfimov] We set our partners the compulsory task of ensuring that dispatch is by air carrier at their expense. We dispatch Soviet publications abroad by the same route. That is the custom throughout the world. But unfortunately Aeroflot's treats the publications it dispatches in the same way as ordinary freight. We ask Aeroflot to distribute our freight straight from the aircraft and not through a depot. Often it is precisely for this reason that newspapers and journals are late in reaching readers. And we lose currency.

[Charodeyev] Leonid Borisovich, individual subscription will probably soon become possible?

[Alfimov] There are many problems here. For instance, the examination of the publications we buy is within the competence of the Main Administration for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press [Glavlit]. It gives the go-ahead to each publication, unless they contradict constitutional norms and legislation in operation in the country, that is unless they call for the violent overthrow of the existing system or preach war, racism, or pornography... It does happen that Glavlit forbids the sale of a particular publication. The result is that "Sovinperiodika" cannot guarantee readers that they will receive the publications to which they have subscribed in full over the year. Yet it is through us that they will demand compensation.

And finally about individual subscription. It will be very expensive. For instance, the reader will have to pay about R400 for a complete year's set of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. That is on a level with world prices. But we know the USSR Ministry of Culture has been charged with ensuring that all those who want it can have free access to foreign periodicals distributed in the Soviet Union—in libraries, reading rooms, and culture and information centers. We will do everything to support that idea.

[Charodeyev] But if a Soviet person has convertible currency, can he subscribe to PARIS MATCH or TIME?

[Alfimov] Yes, but to be honest, that has not happened in our practice. We are already prepared to accept individual subscription for hard currency. Relations or friends abroad can also organize subscription for a Soviet citizen for any publication. In that case the publisher himself fulfills his obligations to the subscriber. He seals the journal or newspaper in an envelope and sends by ordinary mail to Moscow or any other Soviet city. Responsibility for delivery in this case rests with the USSR Ministry of Communications.

International Lenin Prize Renamed

90US0366A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "International Lenin Peace Prize"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has renamed the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Between Peoples". Henceforth it will be called the International Lenin Peace Prize.

This important step reflects the current stage of the movement of broad public forces for the survival of mankind, the building of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, and the affirmation in international affairs of new political thinking.

The Presidium meeting confirmed the statutes of the prize and new regulations governing the committee to study the nominations of future winners. Candidates for the prize may be either citizens of any country, regardless of political views and philosophical positions, or action committees, national and international public foundations, organizations, and movements, scientific and research centers, institutions, and establishments, and educational institutions.

The main criteria in examining the nominations are outstanding contributions in activity geared to the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, disarmament and a halt to the arms race, a strengthening of mutual understanding and cooperation between peoples, a real contribution to demilitarization and the democratization and humanization of international relations and the solution of present-day global problems, active peacemaking activity, and tireless struggle in defense of interests and values common to all mankind.

Nominations for the prize may be made by parliaments, interparliamentary and other international organizations, and government and other bodies of the UN states. Among the possible initiators of this process are public foundations, organizations, and movements, associations of figures of science, culture, and art, and also scientific and research centers, institutes, and establishments, and educational institutions. Winners of the International Lenin Peace Prize and members of the International Lenin Peace Prize Committee also have the right to nominate candidates.

The committee is formed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and consists of 11 members, five of whom are foreign citizens. The decision on conferment is made by secret ballot at a meeting of the committee in Moscow in March or April.

The candidates awarded the prize are presented with the "International Lenin Peace Prize" Diploma, a gold medal portraying V.I. Lenin, and the cash part of the prize amounting to R50,000 or the equivalent sum in foreign currency. In the event of conferment of the prize simultaneously on several candidates, each of them is presented with a diploma and gold medal, and the cash amount is divided evenly among them. The prize is conferred biannually. The committee's decision on conferment of the prize is published in the press on V.I. Lenin's birthday—22 April. The prize is presented in Moscow.

Nomination of candidates in 1990 closes by 1 February. The proposals should be addressed to the International Lenin Peace Prize Committee (the Kremlin, Moscow).

Winners of the new prize will inherit the best traditions of the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Between Peoples," which in the 40 years of its existence was conferred on 160 peace fighters from 60 countries.

Economic

Statistics Chief on Consumption, Demand, Income

LD2401103690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0932 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 24 January (TASS)—The question of accelerating economic growth is becoming particularly topical in the USSR, according to Vadim Kirichenko, chairman of the USSR State Statistics Committee, commenting in the PRAVITELSTVENYY VESTNIK on the statistical data on the country's economic development in 1989. He regards it as grounds for concern that the size of the per capita national income is close to the limit at which it remains invariable.

He considers that the question of the state of the consumer market and money circulation should be at the center of attention. Goods turnover in actual prices rose 10.2 percent or, in absolute terms, R37.3 billion. "These are indices of increase unprecedented in past years," Kirichenko points out. "However, the consumer does not feel these increases at the store counters; on the contrary, he is struck by the expansion of the deficit zone, by normal trading turning into ration-card distribution, and by the emergence of closed forms of trading at enterprises and in institutions."

The commentator sees the reason for this in the fact that "it has not been possible to halt the snowball growth of money incomes, and the accumulation of unsatisfied purchasing power." Back in 1988, the money incomes of the population grew 9.2 percent and increased in absolute terms to R41 billion. In 1989, the increases amounted to 12.9 percent and almost R64 billion respectively.

The head of the statistics service estimates that the population's accumulated unsatisfied purchasing power and demand for goods and servics has increased to R165 billion. "If we tried to eliminate this by way of free price formation according to market laws," Vadim Kirichenko says, "prices of consumer goods would have to rise a minimum of 40 percent immediately, with extremely undesirable and acute social consequences."

Kirichenko stresses that measures are needed at all management levels for improving the system of shaping the labor remuneration fund. In 1989, it grew 5.4 times faster than the growth in national income and nearly 1.5 times faster than the growth in sales of goods and provision of paid services to the population.

Among other important problems Vadim Kirichenko also cites the need to break down excessive concentration and monopolism in industry. Any disruption in the operation of an enterprise holding a monopoly takes a heavy toll on the work of related enterprises and of whole sectors of industry.

Another danger, in his view, lies in the fact that in recent years the entire increment in national income has been directed at increasing the current consumption and nonproduction construction fund. As a result the possibilities for expanding production have been substantially diminished.

Flotation of State Internal Loan Announced

904A0120A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian ll 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Statement issued by USSR Finance Ministry: "In USSR Ministry of Finance"; place, date not given]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Finance, with the authorization of the USSR Council of Ministers, is issuing the 1990 five-percent State Internal Loan for subscription on a voluntary basis by state, cooperative, and other public enterprises and organizations, and credit establishments. The acquired bonds of this loan are paid for with the funds retained by the enterprises and organizations. Their proceeds are included in the total amount of profits (revenue) of enterprises and organizations holding the bonds. The face value of the bonds is paid to the owners of the bonds the numbers of which come up in the drawing; it is placed in the account of the funds with which they were purchased.

Other terms for the issuance of the 1990 five-percent State Internal Loan are published below.

Terms for Issuance of 1990 Five-Percent State Internal Loan

1. The 1990 five-percent State Internal Loan is issued for 16 years, from 1 January 1990 to 1 January 2006, in bonds of 1 million-, 100,000-, 50,000-, 25,000-, and 10,000-ruble denominations.

The loan is issued in individual series of R5 billion each. Each series consists of 2,000 bonds with a value of R1 million, 7,500 bonds of R100,000, 15,000 bonds of R50,000, 30,000 bonds of R25,000, and 75,000 bonds of R10,000.

2. Dividends on the loan bonds are paid by the banking institutions through noncash settlement once a year by virtue of bond coupons, in the amount of five percent of the face value of the bond. Coupons separated from the bond do not give a right to collect dividends. The term for coupon payments is annually on 1 January beginning with 1 January 1991.

3. The loan bonds will be redeemed by the banking institutions beginning on 1 January 1996 over 10 years in equal annual installments.

4. The loan bonds subject to redemption by the banking institutions in 1996 through 2005 are determined by annual redemption drawings which are held annually in December beginning in 1995. The bonds [the serial numbers of] which will not have come up in the redemption drawings will be redeemed beginning 1 January 2006.

5. The face value of the bonds is paid to the holders when the bonds are redeemed by banking institutions.

6. The face value of the bonds and coupons, including the coupon for the year in which the bonds are subject to redemption, is paid for the loan bonds which come up in the redemption draw. Coupons for subsequent years will not be paid for.

7. The bonds and accompanying coupons the time of redemption for which has come may be produced for collection until 1 January 2007; the bonds and coupons not produced for collection are invalid and not subject to redemption thereafter.

8. The bonds are sold by the banking institutions. In the course of their sale, the bonds are registered.

9. In the process of selling loan bonds, a rate differential is collected the size of which depends on the time of acquisition of the bond in the course of the year and is determined by the USSR Ministry of Finance in coordination with the USSR State Bank.

10. Owners of the loan bonds may resell them through the banking institutions to other state, cooperative, and other public enterprises and organizations, as well as to credit establishments.

Official Calls for Market Relations

LD2201155790 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 22 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 22 TASS—Deputy Chairman of the State Commission on Economic Reform of the USSR Council of Ministers Andrei Orlov has pointed to the need to create an integrated all-union market in the USSR.

In his interview with PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (The Government Herald) periodical, he referred to measures to give a free hand to enterprises, introduce new economic methods in industry and agriculture, restructure central management and many other government steps towards a market economy. Orlov rejects any haste in this sphere.

Loose discipline when fulfilling agreement commitments and slow rates or even decrease in production in some industries often follow the granting of independence to enterprises. However, a search for ways to independence is not to blame.

Orlov rejected the simplified approach to some Soviet specialists towards the market regulation. "It will be difficult to learn market relations and it will cost us a lot. But we have to study this 'science,'" Orlov said.

Commenting on the planned rise in consumer goods production by 66 billion roubles this year, Orlov noted that these plan targets must be met at the expense of increased sales of TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, cars, video recorders, personal computers and other high tech products.

A number of specific measures have been taken to achieve this goal, Orlov said. He also stressed the importance of the social aspect of the economic program—the expansion of production of goods for children and senior citizens.

When elaborating a program for the improvement of the economy, proposals of not only ministries and departments but also of informal movements, mass media and individuals are analyzed, Orlov pointed out.

Bureaucracy, Graft Defeats Private Farm Venture

PM2401141890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 2, 14 Jan 90 p 7

[Letter from former farmer Natalya Popkova: "Admissions of a farmer Who Gave Up"; first paragraph is editorial introduction, final paragraph is editorial postscript]

[Text] MN has received a letter from Natalya Popkova, 28, a Muscovite who moved to the Moscow Region with her husband and kids to rear pigs and make life for themselves and other people easier (see MN No. 33, 1988). This letter came 18 months after her first, and looks like being her last.

My story is straightforward. When the Party called on the people to start perestroika and change their ways, I acted on this call. My husband and I bought a house in the country, borrowed money and built a modern pig farm. I could fatten up to 300 pigs a year. As part of an agreement with the local state farm, I delivered the first four tons of pork. But the farm did not keep its side of the bargain. Deliveries of fodder were erratic and the vet didn't seem to want to be involved. The state farm also insisted on buying my pork at a very low prices, so I was left with meagre profits.

I learned a lot on the open market: whose palms should be greased, the size of bribes. You can't simply hire a stall in the market, all of them seem to be booked, you have to pay the meat chopper 10-25 roubles a pig to get a place at the stall. And you also have to bribe the vet. If not, he will say your pork is infected. And you have to bribe the management.

Selling at the market pays: pork gets snapped up at 5-6 roubles a kilo. But selling on the market won't do for me. You spend the day selling pork and the night cutting it. This leaves no time for sleep. I can't sell a hundred pigs single-handed, and I can't find an honest middleman. Honesty is hard to come by nowadays. I saw people of

the Russian Union of Consumers' Societies selling meat purchased by the state in Australia and New Zealand. The Union people had bought the meat at 2 roubles a kilo and were selling it at the market for 5-6 roubles. The meat wasn't being sold in state- run shops, so you had to pay through the nose at the market. Many line their pockets using this strategem, including the limbs of the law, who turn a blind eye.

Having sold a ton of pork in the market I decided to turn for help to the consumers' cooperative society. I went scouting up and down the region only to find that no one was interested in taking in pork. The reaction throughout was: "We are ready to buy it at three roubles, but we can't issue a receipt stating that you've sold us pork. Your official place of residence is Moscow, so sell your pork there." Without a receipt you can't buy items in short supply. I was about to give up in despair when a "kind person" came along and gave me help and guidance. Apparently the consumers' cooperative society doesn't have to fuss about buying meat 'from rural dwellers. Meat is secondary to receipts about the availability of meat.

The affair with receipts involves, for example, a procurer agreeing to buy a pig from a farmer if the latter signs for having sold two pigs. Then the receipts are taken to the meat-packing factory where they are used to account for the surplus pork got through cheating collective and state farmers who sell their pigs to procurers: shortweighing, understating the pig's fatness, etc. A fortune can be made from forged receipts, which also entitle the bearer to buy goods in short supply. The country, however, does not get more meat, I learned all this while the "kind person" bought my pigs over two and a half months, denying his services to other clients.

After six months of toil I produced 14 tons of pork. An official from the Moscow regional consumers' society, Comrade Lentsi, lavished praises on me saying I had produced more than anyone in the region. But he made a helpless gesture as soon as it came to our right to buy a truck. My husband told him: "The desire to buy a truck is no whim. We need one to deliver fodder and pigs". The reply was that only 150 trucks out of 3,000 will be allocated to private farmers by the Moscow Regional Executive Committee. So this means that no matter how I toil, the truck will be sold to someone else who can pull more strings. well, I gave up and the farm is now empty.

It pains me to read reports about the opening of new shops—they have nothing to sell. We could have fed the country, but we cannot ram through the wall of bureaucrats, profiteers and grafters. They exploit the people and drag the country down, in order to then be in charge of handing out ration card.

What am I to strive for if my country does not need my talent? Should I regard myself as a failure and devote myself to running the house and raising my kids? But what can I teach them, what ideals can I pass on to them?

From the Editors. We invited Natalya to put questions to those in charge of agriculture in the Moscow Region and the country as a whole. This exchange will be published in our coming issues.

Agricultural

Ligachev Discusses Food Problem, Agrarian Policy

WA2401134890 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 21 Jan 90 p 3

[Report on discussion between Ye.K. Ligachev, politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with SELSKAYA ZHIZN collective in Moscow; date not given: "Most Important Business for Agrarian Journalists"]

[Text] How can agrarian journalists increase their contribution to solving the food problem? In what areas should they concentrate most of their creative forces today for successful implementation of the decisions of the March (1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee? A meeting with Politburo member and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ye.K. Ligachev, and workers of the newspaper held in the SELSKAYA ZHIZN editorial offices was devoted to this and other crucial questions having to do with implementing the party's modern agrarian policy.

Before the meeting began, the Central Committee secretary visited the divisions of the SELSKAYA ZHIZN editorial offices, where there were discussions of the course of restructuring in the work of party and soviet organs and the implementation of the economic reform in the system of the agro-industrial complex. Ye.K. Ligachev questioned the journalists in detail about their observations and impressions from trips to rural regions and the nature of the editorial mail, and he touched upon questions of the effectiveness of statements in newspapers. Then the discussion was continued in the conference hall of the editorial offices.

The announcement of the newspaper's editor in chief A.P. Kharlamov and the statements of other journalists pertained mainly to the role of the press in implementing the party agrarian policy, the formation of the social atmosphere in rural areas, and the position of agrarian journalists in the restructuring process. The consistency and substantiation of newspaper materials, their targeting of priority areas, the effectiveness of their delivery and their depth—these are the main things that determine the effectiveness of journalistic discourse.

Having touched upon various disputed statements about the position of the peasantry and the pathsfor the development of rural areas under modern conditions, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee expressed judgments about the need to evaluate the situation soberly and not go to extremes when evaluating the role both of the social forms of carrying out agricultural production that have developed and the possibilities of

individual peasant and farm production. Here, of course, a comprehensive approach is needed for solving various problems. With all the possible diversity of opinions about ways of solving the food problem, it would be a dangerous illusion to think that the goal here could be achieved by some one decisive step and in a short period of time. It will take time, and more than a year, and it will also take a large amount of money. In addition to increasing material and technical support for agricultural production, the need to make a decisive increase in investments in the processing industry and the social sphere in rural areas as well as in road construction has come sharply into focus. And here it is important to combine the restructuring of production relations in rural areas with scientific and technical progress and to combine the rejection of administrative-command methods of management with the introduction of new forms of management.

Typically, during the course of the conversation Ye.K. Ligachev seemed to be holding council of the journalists, trying not to impose ready-made answers on complex issues but inviting them to look more deeply into the situation and weigh all sides of the merits and shortcomings of various solutions to the problem, openly expressing their viewpoints based on an analysis of the situation, calculations, and predictions. Here special attention was drawn to that part of the conversation that pertained to restructuring production relations in rural areas, about which the most contradictory statements have been made in the press recently.

"I know," noted Ye.K. Ligachev, "that in the mass media there are many reproaches against me regarding this. And this is why I consider it my duty once again to candidly express my ideas about how I see the development of our rural areas. Without going into the precision of the decisions of the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in whose preparation I participated directly, I wish to explain my personal opinion regarding this. I am in favor of diversity and equality of all forms of agriculture on a socialist basis, including kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], agricultural firms and consortiums, private peasant farms, owner operated farms, and so forth. The only important thing is to adhere strictly to two fundamental points in the development of all these forms: In the first place everything must be voluntary, and in the second place there must be economic justification...."

In the dialogue that was started, they also touched upon many aspects of the forthcoming changes within the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the running of farms, leasing relations, and the possibilities of private subsidiary farms of kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers. The editor of the SELSKAYA ZHIZN economics department, N.G. Kopanev, and workers in this department Ye.G. Petrakov and V.A. Virkunen, expressed the idea that the newspaper should discuss more extensively and deeply the transformation taking place today on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. As they develop they should become unique cooperatives of lessees and should not be ossified in the forms in which they originated. At the same time it is important to provide for equal positions for various forms of management,which has not yet been achieved in practice everywhere.

During the years of restructuring a number of large formations of a new type have already appeared, including agricultural combines, firms, and associations. But, unfortunately, the press in general, and SELSKAYA ZHIZN in particular, are still not saying enough about them, and not enough attention is being devoted to an analysis of the activity of these large cooperative associations. Journalists will have to study them thoroughly, analyzing the experience and problems that arise during the course of the structural transformations in the management of the agro-industrial complex.

The editor of the department of social development, A.Ye. Kostyukov, and the editor of the letters department, M.K. Seslavin, expressed their ideas about the great difficulties in the realization of a number of fundamental points of the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, noting that so far the command system is being broken down extremely slowly in the APK [agro-industrial complex] and that no procedure has been developed for allotting land to those who want to farm independently. Responding to questions that were raised, the Central Committee secretary drew attention to the need to take a concrete approach when solving these and other problems and to take all factors into account—production-economic, social, and moral. When making one suggestion or another and defending it, one must adhere strictly to one rule: It is mandatory to predict the future and to account as fully as possible for the consequences of various changes.

A simple example. Certain scientists and specialists who previously placed the technical equipping of the agricultural worker at the center of attention have not changed their position sharply and assert that this is not the problem; the only important thing is to give the peasant land and give him the opportunity to farm independently.... But if we turn, say, to the history of the development of agricultural production in the United States and compare it with the situation in our country one sees a very curious picture. The technical equipping of the American farmer at the beginning of the fifties was at approximately the same level as we are today. And here is a very significant "coincidence": At that time the average productivity of grain crops and the average milk yields per cow in the United States were approximately the same as they are in our country today. And now the technical arsenal of American agriculture per worker is four times as great as it is here. Why?....

So to count solely on changing the nature of production relations in rural areas is to fall into the illusion of the possibility of rapidly solving the food problem in this way. No, we need changes not only in the forms and methods of farming but also in measures of an investment nature. Here one should take into account that our industry which produces agricultural equipment has

been oriented, up to this point, only toward the satisfaction of the needs of large enterprises—kolkhozes and sovkhozes. And practically nothing is produced for the needs of the small peasant farm.... Journalists should monitor this problem and with their interested words exert an influence on industry so that it will more rapidly develop mass production of minitractors and power units, the necessary set of mounted implements for them, and other technical equipment!

"But if we wait for a favorable solution to this entire problem," a voice rang out in response, "Will it not be too late for those who would like to begin farming independently today, outside the framework of a kolkhoz or sovkhoz?"

The answer is ambiguous and again calls for people to approach the problem taking concrete circumstances into account. If, say, a strong kolkhoz somewhere in the Ukraine or in Kursk Oblast not only gives the necessary products to the state but also provides a decent income and good working conditions for its people and creates everything necessary for their life, then why artificially force people from such a farm into a village? And what about, for example, the depopulated villages of the Russian Non-Chernozem Zone or the Baltic area? The situation is different there and the attitudes among the peasants and other factors might also be different. This must be taken into account and all snags, all unreasonable restrictions on farming methods must be removed. Intrafarm leasing also deserves support. Here is another broad field of activity for journalists.

Another rejoinder is heard: The deputy official secretary of SELSKAYA ZHIZN, V.I. Degtyarev, said 10 years ago we began to write much in the newspaper about the production of mini-equipment for the peasant farm and still nothing happened. It would be good if the government would take more effective measures!

The Central Committee secretary agreed that such measures are necessary. And they are being taken. The government has drawn up a program for expansion of the production of mini-equipment. But so far it is being implemented poorly. Therefore it is important for the press also to make its contribution to the formation of the proper public opinion: It is necessary to allot more resources for the development of the APK, otherwise the problem will not be solved. Of course, here one should discuss not only budget allocations. There is much that can be done by industrial enterprises themselves, various departments, and local power organs. Under the condition, of course, that they do not operate by command and not by the methods of coercion. It is very important for the press to support the beginnings of cooperation of industrial and agricultural enterprises which are being constructed out of mutual interest on a long-term basis and to relate the first steps and the experience of agro-industrial associations, consortiums, and so forth.

The discussion also turned to the immense possibilities of private subsidiary farms of rural residents. In the opinion of the Central Committee secretary, SELSKAYA ZHIZN devotes a good deal of attention to this. But it will be necessary to take a new approach to this method of increasing the country's food resources and open up additional possibilities. It was stated outright: If a person is willing and able while working on a kolkhoz or sovkhoz to work individually on 3 to 5 hectares then why stand in his way! But here one must not forget that he can run his farm most fruitfully if it is int grated with the public farm. The allotment of feed, pasture land, young animals, technical and transportation services, consultations with specialists, and many other things the kolkhoz or sovkhoz has to offer—all this is a guarantee of successful development of the individual farm.

From the kaleidoscope of problems that arose during the course of this discussion in the editorial offices, we should like to single out the following as an object of special attention: The attention journalists pay to the work of all those branches of industry, including defense, which could sharply increase their contribution to solving the food problem. It is important to place all this under public supervision in order to raise the processing industry to the modern level and at the same time create conditions for setting up sausage, cheese, vegetable drying, canning, and other productions directly on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This will make it possible to prevent losses of products and greatly increase food resources in all regions of the country.

Considering problems of an economic and production nature, participants in the discussion did not lose sight of the main thing—the working man, the conditions of his life and work, and the development and satisfaction of his spiritual interests. The editor of the department of culture and rural schools, B.M. Pilipenko, noted that recently among journalists there had been a certain underestimation of the essay materials about rural people and some people consider this genre to be almost obsolete. We cannot agree with this viewpoint. Of course it is necessary to raise the literary and artistic level of such articles, resolutely get rid of attempts to whitewash reality that were typical of the period of stagnation, and show man in all of his multifaceted and complex nature. Developing this point, a special correspondent from this department, A.L. Kharitonov, discussed the problems of material support for spiritual life in rural areas and the development of cultural and educational institutions there.

I fully agree that primary attention must be devoted to this in the press and in life, Ye.K. Ligachev backed up the speakers. Indeed, he noted, we must write more and more lucidly about the moral and social image of the working man and expound on this subject thoroughly and in an interesting way. And another thing: We must protect the rank-and-file worker from all kinds of manifestations of bureaucracy. And rural leaders as well, for some people are trying to present them in an unfavorable light, almost as advocates of serfdom or policemen. And yet the majority of these people are serving the common

cause faithfully and devotedly and are bearing an immense burden of concerns both about production and about the rural workers.

During the course of the discussion, naturally, the topic came around to problems related to restructuring the work of local party and soviet organs and a decisive revision of the style of their influence on all aspects of the production-economic, social, and spiritual life of rural areas. Speaking of this, the deputy editor in chief of SELSKAYA ZHIZN, V.A. Tsarev, discussed the first approaches on the part of the newspaper's journalists to this difficult subject. The editorial mail shows that traditional articles on subjects of party life do not work here and, therefore, they have taken a course toward discussion of these subjects at roundtables in heated discussions and dialogues.

Speaking out against the remnants of the administrative system in the activity of party committees, especially the apparatus of the party raykom [rayon party committee], the newspaper is striving at the same time to find and reveal the creative search of the party workers, the establishment of a new style, and the democratization of life and activity within the party.

Special correspondents of the department of party life, T.A. Boykova and A.N. Sidorov, outlining the problem that was raised, shared their observations about the new processes in organizational party work and the formation of the moral- political atmosphere in the rural areas. The influx of fresh forces into party organs has not yet been reinforced everywhere with the corresponding concern for the establishment of a new style and work methods. Sometimes the specialists, having grown up under the influence of the old "school" of party administration, when going to work in the apparatus of the raykom or obkom [oblast party committee], cannot find the energy or ability to work in the spirit of the restructuring processes. Among the masses of population one can see an inclination to passively wait for decisions and actions "from above" and there is a certain militant infantilism, a certain social dependency which it is important to counteract with real civic activity, various forms of which must be supported.

Approving these intentions, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee drew attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the changes that have been noted and the need to investigate deeply and thoroughly, enlisting the best efforts of scholars and practical workers for this. It would be good, for example, to create under the SELSKAYA ZHIZN editorial staff a kind of discussion club of agrarians which would discuss these and other difficult life problems and phenomena. It is no secret that recently, while devoting a good deal of attention to the general problems of democratization, the newspapers have somehow begun to bypass questions of democracy within the kolkhoz. A good deal that is stagnant has accumulated here and the kolkhoz system has largely been appropriated by the state. And yet in essence the kolkhoz is a democratic form and it is very important through renewal of this form to actually reveal and put to work the immense potential of the kolkhozes and overcome the ossification in their activity.

Ye.K. Ligachev agreed and noted that there is much stagnation in the work of the party raykoms as well. But remember that they are in a difficult situation. They are trying to get away from commanding the farms, but the new system of life activity of the agro-industrial complex is not yet developed and the local soviets are not prepared, as they say, to fully take over management of the economy. Local party and soviet organs are experiencing a good deal of pressure from the forces that are prepared to destroy the old but so far they have given little thought to the creation of the new. So it is very important for journalists to use all the power of their talent to support the innovative search of party committees and local party organizations in rural areas, to show modern leaders in a bright light, to allow them to speak, and to help form an atmosphere favorable to restructuring in rural areas.

Also participating in the discussion were editorial workers of the weekly ZEMLYA I LYUDI of Agropromizdat.

Ye.K. Ligachev answered many questions from the journalists. The director of the publishing house of the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda, V.P. Leontyev also answered questions.

Late December Weather, Crop Data Reported

WA2301212290 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by agrometeorologist A. Grishina: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] During the last 10 days of December the weather on the European part of the USSR remained warmer than usual. The average air temperatures everywhere exceeded the average of many years by five to 10 degrees. In the Ukraine, in Moldavia, and in most of the North-Caucasian region the daytime temperature rose as high as 8 to 12 degrees, in the Crimea and the Krasnodarsky kray it was as high as 15-17 degrees. The ground thawed for the most of the period. The vegetative stage of winter grain crops was renewed, but it grew colder at the end of December and their vegetation stopped.

There was no snow on the fields in the west of Latvia, in Lithuania, in Belorussia, in the Central Chernozem Zone, and in southwest of the Central region. The snow cover amounted from one to three centimeters on the fields with winter crops in Estonia, eastern Latvia, in some regions of the Pskovskaya, Novgorodskaya, Kalininskaya, Smolenskaya, Kaluzhskaya, Tulskaya, Ryazanskaya, and Volgogradskaya oblasts, and in Mordovskaya ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and also in certain parts of the Penzenskaya and Saratovskaya oblasts. But there were no frosts in that area and the lowest temperature of soil at the tillering node level did

not drop below two to four degrees below zero in most places. The soil in most regions was frozen to the depth of 10 to 25 cm.

By 31 December the snow cover was more than 15 cm deep on fields with winter grain crops in most parts of the Northern and Uralskiy regions, and in the northeast of the Volga-Vyatskiy and Central regions where plant hibernation was going quite well.

In some areas thawing caused an ice crust that was sticking to the ground by the end of December, but it was rather thin and covered with snow. The crust presents no danger for crops.

The weather remained warm in the Transcaucasian republics. The highest daytime temperature was from 10 to 17 degrees above zero. Winter grain crops were growing through most of the described period. Some snow cover was observed only in the east of Georgia.

On most of the arable lands of Western Siberia and in Kazakhstan the weather remained warmer than usual but on some days there were frosts from 25 to 40 degrees below zero. However, they were not dangerous for hibernating plants as the height of the snow cover by the end of the period was from 20 to 40 cm.

The weather also remained warmer than usual in the Far East. Snow that fell recently considerably increased the depth of the snow cover. The ground froze to the depth of 40 to 100 cm.

It was warm in the republics of Central Asia. Winter grain crops kept growing for the most part of the period. It grew colder by the end of the 10 days and snow cover formed in places. Vegetation of the crops stopped.

Military

Bodruk Interviewed on Officer Corps Morale

PM1701102190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Captain Second Rank O. Bodruk, candidate Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, by Colonel A. Polyakov, permanent correspondent in Kiev Military District; date, place not given: "Worried About Instability of Society"]

[Text] The candidates to be People's Deputies of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] have been nominated. There are 3,653 contenders for deputies' seats in the republic, including 72 servicemen.

Colonel A. Polyakov, our permanent correspondent in Kiev Military District, spoke with Captain Second Rank O. Bodruk, one of the Ukrainian candidate people's deputies, who is a candidate of philosophical sciences.

[Polyakov] Oleg Sergeyevich, you have served in the Armed Forces for around 20 years and you were nominated candidate people's deputy by the staff of the Kiev M.I. Kalinin Higher Military Engineering Signals School, where you lecture in Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Does that mean that you are expected to protect the military's interests, too?

[Bodruk] I would not put it like that. I am categorically opposed to protecting narrow departmental interests, as for example—if a veteran deputy pays attention solely to veterans' problems, or a deputy from the trade unions pays attention just to problems in the trade union movement....

[Polyakov] So what is behind your desire to be a deputy?

[Bodruk] Deep concern about instability in society and its reflection in the Army. The core of my election program is the social protection of all categories of the population on the basis of radical changes in the economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual spheres. This work must be organized by uncompromising, honest, and profoundly erudite deputies. The center's voluntarism has been perceived everywhere up to now.

A person offers his goods—his labor—in order to live, learn, and relax. This labor must be evaluated in such a way that the person can look after his health, provide for his family, and have a place to live. The question arises: According to what economic laws is our minimum wage fixed at R70-80, if it does not provide for a person's minimum needs? There are no such laws. When we originally rejected market regulation, we did not create flexible socialist economic criteria but relied on the center for everything. We are told that socialism's achievements lie in the fact that the profits made are used for the good of the people. But let us compare these figures: In 1985 the United States spent around $175 billion on education, while we spent around R40 billion; and they spent $178.4 billion on health services, while we spent R20 billion. Where is our money? It is difficult to say. After all, it goes into centralized funds. I believe that many funds must be decentralized, notably in enterprises, where sums of money should be credited to worker's accounts for pensions, health protection, and so on.

[Polyakov] Surely such a direct comparison of figures is not justifiable, although it is a subject for discussion.... How do you see the possible changes in the sociopolitical and spiritual sphere?

[Bodruk] In the moral improvement of the individual, the family, and society. A radical change in women's position in society, so that the woman can feel her importance in motherhood and in raising children. In the elimination of privileges and in resolute struggle against corruption, organized crime, and speculation. The adoption of the Law on Referendums: The people's opinion must be the basis of the government's main decisions....

[Polyakov] Oleg Sergeyevich, we are talking about "departmental" problems all the time, our problems, army problems....

[Bodruk] The army's problems are nationwide problems. The billions that we are given must be spent carefully. I believe that it is time for a radical reorganization of the USSR Armed Forces which follows on from our internal and foreign policy. The main thing is not to lose the officer's corps, not to make people who are ready to protect the Motherland at any moment lose faith in the fact that they are needed by the country and the people.

[Polyakov] Tell me, what is the response to the current period of restructuring in the student environment? What is your opinion about the process of educating young people?

[Bodruk] I think that we must educate them in the same way as we carry out the election campaign—honestly. Together, in the lecture halls, we seek answers to the acute questions of the times and we do not avoid controversies. We can see that interest in officers' service is falling; last year the school received 500 fewer applications than the year before. And those who became students and who were ready to be officers are now worried about their future. But I would not like to dramatize the situation.

[Polyakov] You want to become a Ukrainian SSR people's deputy. What connects you to the Ukrainian people? What is your attitude to the "Rukh" movement? Do you have any contact with it, or do you refute its platform?

[Bodruk] I am connected to the Ukrainian people by the fact that I am Ukrainian; my father, who had 5 years' education, worked at the "Arsenal" plant, and my mother worked there, too. I lived in the hostel at the plant for 16 years with my parents. Wherever I worked, I rented an apartment, and now I have a 26-square meter, 2-room apartment for 3 people. And so it is as hard for me as for any engineer, worker, or collective farm worker who represents the Russian or Ukrainian people.

And now about "Rukh." It started off as a movement of the Ukrainian intelligentsia leaders, who were alarmed at the situation in the country. I quite approve of many of its program's positions. But the original "Rukh" can be seen as a snowball rolling down a hill: Now so many groups with extreme views have "stuck to it" that the clean "snowball" can scarcely be seen. I am against nationalist, extremist, or else adventurist views. Among the 48 Ukrainian SSR candidate deputies who have been nominated with me in Pecherskiy Electoral Okrug No. 12 is Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M. Popovich—one of the ideologists of "Rukh." It is up to the voters to decide whose program they agree with more....